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PREFACE 
This thesis has been undertaken because I am of the opinion that 
John Dewey has been misunderstood and misinterpreted by a large segment 
of educators and laymen in America. While personally not a follower of 
Dewey, it has been my conviction that each man's thought should be view-
ed from the basis of the total philosophical orientation of the man. Dewey 
has not in many cases been accorded this right. 
I became interested in what appeared to me to be misinterpretations 
of Deweyan thought while writing a research paper for a graduate course 
in "Contemporary American Philosophy." It appeared to me that criticisms 
of Dewey were not relevant in the light of my readings in the original 
source. 
When the time arrived to decide on the choice of a problem worthy of 
a doctoral dissertation, Dr. John Susky agreed that the possibility of a 
false equation had been made between Deweyan thought and a system of 
radical progressive thought which I have termed Deweyite education phi-
losophy. My thesis committee were unanimous in their support of my pur-
suing the problem. 
I wish to express sincere appreciation to Dr. John E. Susky who has 
served as chairman of my committee. Dr. Susky has given constant guid-
ance and offered a number of indispensable suggestions, I owe him a great 
iii 
debt. r rnembers of my commHtee are: Dr. Thomas C, Mayb~rry I DL 
Robert W. Scofield and Dr. Judson D. Milburn. Dr. Mayberry has offered 
many valuable suggestions in the area of Oeweyan philosophy. Dr. Sco-
field not only suggested the definitive title for the thesis but indicated 
that Freudian influence was a possible source of Deweyite thought. Dr. 
Milburn rendered great service in correcting punctuation throughout the 
dissertation . 
. I am grateful to the librarians at Kansas State College of Pittsburg, 
Kansas who were tireless in their efforts to secure needed sources for the 
completion of my research. Also, to colleagues Dr. John Reardon and Dr. 
Max Mathis who read the original manuscript, and to Dr. James Wheeler 
who suggested the existing confusion between Romantic Progressivism 
and Dewey• s Instrumentalism. Professor Ima Van Natter, of the EngUsh 
Department at Kansas State College, read the original manuscript and 
made suggestions for improvement of writing style. I am indebted to Mrs. 
Eileen Osborne who typed the origina 1 draft from my handwritten copy. 
She, along with her daughter Jan, typed the final copy. 
iv 
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John Dewey has been called the greatest American educator and 
philosopher. His professional life was full and creative. Born in Bur-
lington, Vermont, in eighteen fifty-nine, he lived to challenge the philo-
sophical foundations of traditional education. Before his death, in nine-
teen fifty-two, he wrote a total of thirty-eight books and five hundred and 
seventeen articles. 
Dewey's ideas have exerted a tremendous influence on the educa-
tional thought of America. Today, in the Hterature of education and in 
discussion groups of educators, his theories and practices are a source 
of intelligent reference. It is therefore worthwhile to give careful con-
sideration to an analysis of the educational philosophy of this gifted 
teacher and thinker. Such a study will involve interpretations of his 
views by both friend and foe. It may be observed at the beginning that 
there is no perfect agreement in the educational discussions involving 
Dewey's ideas. Another evident fact that should be noted is that not 
,only among his several critics but between his friends and interpreters 
i; 
there are charges of misinterpretation which have led to some confusion 
relative to the actual meanings Dewey endeavored to express. 
John Childs and Robert Ulich, both friendly interpreters see Dewey's 
l 
development of thought in a different light. Childs contends that Dewey's 
thought remained fairly c9nstant. He says, "for Dewey, the long search 
of man for a dependable method to control the course of his own intellec-
tual activity has culminated in the logic of discovery and testing inherent 
in experimental inquiry." 1 Ulfbh, on the other hand, implies that Dewey 
wavered in his methodological emphasis after nineteen thirty and express-
ed faith in values and ideals lying behind experimentation. He said, 
"In the second period of his thought, Dewey's whole conception of values 
received a character of definiteness which lifts it out of mere experimenta-
tion into a sphere of persistent validity. 112 Controversy between friendly 
interpreters of Dewey provides a setting for the widely different interpre-
tations of Dewey's theories by both friends and foes. 
- That same situation is evident in any discussion of Dewey's influ-
ence on actual schoc;>lroom practices. It is generally accepted that Dewey 
has made a tremendous impact on American educational practices. However 
it is not so easy, as some naively believe, to pinpoint practices which 
logically follow specifically from his theories. It is popular today to 
-identify everything that is new and different in twentieth-century educa-
tion with Dewey's educational philosophy. Yet Dewey writing at the 
tum of the century contrasted his views with both the "new education" 
and the traditional approach. He traced the "new education" to ideas 
1John Childs, Education and Morals, (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, Inc., 1950},:_-p. 152. 
2 
Robert Ulich, History of Educational Thought, (New York: American 
Book Co., 1945),p,. 333. 
3 
found in Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebe! and Herbart, and while he recog"".'. 
nized points of agreement he also was aware of fundamental differences. 3 
American education has experienced a revolution in theory and pri3,cttce in 
the twentieth century. It is difficult to ascertain the reforms which flowed 
from Dewey's educational philosophy and the reforms which have distinc-
tively different sources. "Progressive education II and the "activity move-
ment" were educational innovations influenced by Rousseau, Froebe!, 
Herbart and Dewey. It is not clear, however, to what extent Dewey's 
thought prevailed. Popular press and opinion equate practically every new 
educational innovation with the educational philosophy of John Dewey. 
The difficulty in pinpointing the sources of modern educational pri;ic-
tice to Dewey's influence may be ascertained to some extent by the his-
torical situation which led to educational reform. "In large measure, the 
early innovations were protests against the evils of the traditional 
school. 114 As the dissatisfaction, grew there was a tendency to accept any 
innovation as better than the old simply because it was new. There is a 
sense in which this represented the influence of Dewey's experimental 
educational philosophy but the point which is not so obvious is the degree 
to which the innovations were guided by Dewey's theories. The difficulty 
becomes pronounced When educational "innovators experiment indiscrimi-
nately with respect to theory, yet claim that their practices are de'rivations 
3R. Freeman Butts, A Cultural History of Education, {New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Co., 1947), p. 525. 
4John T. Wahlquist, PhHosophy....Q_f American Education, (New York: 
Ronald Press Co., ~942), p. 91. 
4 
from the ideas of Dewey. 115 
It is significant that this indiscriminate equation of Dewey's educa-
tional thought with current educational practices and innovations has con-
tinued right up until the present hour. Dewey's educational philosophy is 
popularly considered to be the source of all the difficulties caused by new 
approaches to education in the second h·alf of the twentieth century. The 
innovations have varied somewhat in the past fifty years and names have 
to some extent changed. However, one thing has remained constant, the 
consistent tracing of everything which reacts to traditional educational 
practices to the educational theories of John Dewey. 
The following discussion will seek to set in proper perspective the 
educational philosophy of "America's greatest philosopher and educator, 11 
the late. John Dewey. The presentation of Dewey's educational philosophy 
will be undertaken against a background of contemporary criticisms of 
modern American education. 
The problem of the thesis is to ascertain what validity contemporary 
criticisms have which equate the educational philosophy of John Dewey 
with what will herein be called the educational philosophy of the Dewey-
ites. The Deweyites are modern educationists whose implementation of 
so-called "democratiic" educational techniques have been attributed to the 
ed1.1.cational philosophy of John Dewey.· The Deweyite may be either an 
SM elvin C. Baker, Foundations of John Dewey's Educational Theory, 
(New York: Columbia University King's Crown Press, 1955), p. 3. 
. ,, 
5 
avowed follower of the' Deweyan philosophy or in some cases the Deweyite 
may have denied affinity to Dewey's basic educational thought. The sig-
niJicance of the Deweyite is that he is mistakenly considered to be a 
representative of the position of John Dewey by the contemporary critics. 
Contemporary criticisms emanate from sources which decry the drift of 
school curriculum away from subject matter orientation to life-adjustment 
practices. The contemporary critic has argued that the educational phil-
osophy of John Dewey is the source of theories of activity, interest, sub-
j ect matter and democracy which have led to a lowering of educational 
efficiency and standards. 
It will be the purpose of this thesis to defend the hypothesis that the 
educational methods and techniques of the Oeweyites arE;i not derived from 
nor consistent with the educational philosophy of John Pewey. In order 
to accomplish this the thesis will prove that contemporary critics have 
presented an erroneous image of John Dewey by equating his educational 





Contemporary critics are alarmed at what they consider to be the 
collapse of the educational system in American public schools. American 
education is being thre9-tened by a spirit of anti-intellectualism and its 
consequent disregard for subject matter orientation; lack of educational 
goals beyond growth itself; a corrupted conception of democracy; emphasis 
on interest as an end in itself; and the activity craze. The weaknesses, 
as has been intimated above, are the outgrowth of the educational philos-
ophy of John Dewey. 
· Each of the contemporary critics, under consideration, speaks with 
. the same voice in regard to what he considers to be the faults and short-
comings of modern American public school educa,tion. A survey of the 
major themes of the critics will clearly set the stage and become a sound-
ing board against which a subsequent appraisal of th~ educational philos-
ophy of John Dewey will be presented. It will be seen that democratic 
education. (life-adjustment), activity programs, capricious interest, and 




John Keats in Schools ·without Scholars, criticizes modern education 
on the basis of what he considers to be a complete disregard for the intel-
lectual heritage. Modern education, he says, has renounced mental dis-
cipline and on the basis of a pragmatic philosophy substituted social life-
adjustment. The person primarily responsible for this shift in educational 
direction was John Dewey. Keats says that the life-adjustment theory of 
education has .a hidden meaning. He maintains that, "It is the name to 
call an educational philosophy now widely accepted. The philosopliy is 
composed of the pragmatic thoughts of the late John Dewey ... 111 
On the basis of Dewey's fundamental philosophy everything in modern 
education is relative. There are no absolutes, no abiding values and 
everything takes place in the always changing continuum of experience. 
In this changing world of experience the mind cannot be disciplined by 
assigned tasks but it can and must be conditioned to meet the problems of 
life. 2 
Human life must have some direction and modern educators have hit 
upon the Deweyan conception of .democracy as their ideal. Keats satirizes 
the position of modern educators in regard to what has elsewhere been 
called "democratic education. 11 
1 
John Keats, Schools· Without Scholars, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1958), p. 83. . 
2Ibid., p. 85. 
8 
Believing there is nothing more important than decent human relation$--
the absence of which would be impossible anarchy--the educational 
pragmatist tries to reproduce in his school those conditions which 
will control human behavior along lines he thinks best. Democracy 
being our way of life-,-at least in theory--the educational pr9gmatist 
pervades his classroom with his idea of democratic processes. He 
regards children as people with human rights equal to those of any-
one else, as people whose ideas deserve courteous attention. Thus, 
the children are encouraged to suggest their tasks, to do their school-
work in committees of their formation, to elect their leaders, and to 
respect one another's work and opinions ... Everywhere, the emphasis 
is on the group; the password is cooperation. 3 
The messianic aim of this type education, according to Keats, is to 
make all youth conform to a middle of the road standard where there is no 
place for individual differences. This corrupted democratic conception 
realizes its goal by means of the educational technique known as the aore-
4 curriculum. 
The criterion of the core-curriculum is activity. By activity, Keats 
understands the followers of Dewey to mean the doing of useful things. 
Since learning is ·going, and present reality the only context, the 
idea in all cases, in all grades, is to bring the 'real world•· into the 
classroom in every possible "'f:11Y, or--in some cases--to take the 
classroom out into the world. · 
The vehicle that the modern educator uses to approach his goal of 
social life adjustment is student interest. · Each child is 1;rnsigned a com-
mittee task in which he already has an interest. Keats is of tpe opinion 
that Dewey's interest theory is predicated on something the child already 
3Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
4Ibid., p. 58. 
5Ibid., p. 86. 
9 
likes to do. The modern educator as a result of the newer methods believes 
that several beneficial effects· follow. 
Instead of being asked to come up to some arbitrary standard of 
accomplishment in which some woulo excel and some would fail, 
everyone succeeded, or at least grew. Everyone realized his best 
self. This is just like real life •.. because in civil life all people do 
not compete at the same task. Instead, each of us chooses some 
area of competition from among society's more than 20, 000 jobs. So 
in Miss Alpha's class, each child followed his interest. 6 
· Since life-·adjustment is the goal and student interest and activity 
set the pace, it is not strange, says Keats, that strong logically-arranged 
subject matter should be cast aside. But without solid subject matter or~ 
ientation there is no school. 
A school is not a child, a teacher and a building. A school is 
essentially what it teaches, and the first emphasis must be on con-
tent, on purpose, on individual quality performance. If the school 
teaches nothing, it is nothing. No curricull\m, no school. This 
choice of curriculum is the hub about which most of the piercingly 
vocal educational argument whirls ... 7 
Keats is confident that Dewey was the first to advocate curriculum without 
strong subject matter content. As a result of this emphasis schools today 




Mortimer Smith concurs with Keats in placing the bla.me for what he 
Qlbid, I p. 28. 
7 Ibid., p, 8. 
8Ibid., pp. 88, 99-100. 
10 
considers the weaknesses of modern education on the Deweyan philosophy. 
Smith says that the decline of learning evident in American education is 
the result of " .•. flaws in the Deweyan philosophy ..• 119 Mr. Smith says 
that he has written: 
A book whic·h aims to present evidence in support of the thesis that 
learning, in the traditional sense of disciplined knowledge, is 
rapidly declining in our public schools, not through fortuitous cir-
cumstances but by deliberate, and almost invariable well-intentioned, 
d.esigp0of those responsible for setting the direction of public educa-
tion. · 
Smith assumes that Dewey's view of democratic education and life-
adjustment theory of education, which seeks to undermine standards and 
11 
blur every student into a dull gray, are sy~onymous. In contrast to 
Smith's opinion th9-t the primary task of the school is transmission of the 
intellectual and cultural heritage; modern educators appear to believe that 
social conformity and vocational proficiency are the goals of education. 
The controversy today is between tho~;e who continue to believe that 
cultivation of intelligence, moral as well as intellectual, is inex-
tricably bound up with the cultural heritage and accumulated knowl-
edge of mankind, and those who feel that education;1 s primary task 
is to adjust the individual to the group, to see that he learns to re-
spond 'satisfactorily' to the stresses and strains of the social 
order .12 
Smith argues fl)at in throwing out mental discipline the modern school 
9Mortimer Smith, The Diminished Mind;:__ fl Study .Qf.Planned 
Mediocrity in our Public Schools, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), 
p. 14. 
101bid • t p • 2 • 
11Ibid. I pp, 18, 25-27 • 
l 2Ibid. , p. 2 0. 
11 
has fo ' leJ. to see tha t activity guided solely by the whim of the student 
is inadequate. Child interest is capricious and education must give some 
direction to the educational pursuits of the young or it is failing in its re-
. 'b ' l't 13 spons1 1 1 y. 
One of the primary flaws in the Deweyan philosophy, its failure to 
set up ends, its insistence that "the educational process has no end 
beyond itself·· and that the essence of education is no more than 
·•vital energy see.king opportunity for effective exercise' --which 
statements seem to imply that one experience is as good as another- -
has undoubtedly had unfortunate classroom repercussions. As a 
corollary to this the progressives have often perverted the valid 
doctrine that the educational program ought to take account of the 
child's needs and interests into a mere catering to what the student 
thinks he wants . And the conception of the discipline all too com-
mon to progrJssive education has sometimes. amounted to an a~an-
donment ~f adult responsibility for the guidance of the young. 4 
The result, says Smith; of this inadequate view o( education is 
lowered educational standards and anti-intellectualism. This is illus-
trated by the Deweyan ahandonment of solid, consecutively-graded sub-
ject matter. 
I think the primary function of the school is to transmit the intellec-
tual and cultural heritage and knowledge of the race, and in the 
process to teach young people to think, and to buttress moral values 
. .. Most professional educators do not seem to believe in this c on-
cept.ion of the school's function , or at least they a re ~oubtful of the 
ability o f the majority to 'take' e ducation and feel that the di sci- 15 
pline of exposure to the cultural heritage is a luxury for the gifted. 
Life-adjustment educatio~ , originati.-og on the highest level through 
a 194 7 report of the United States Office of Education, has struck the 
13 Ibid, I p, 18, 
14 Ibid. 
15Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
12 
death knell to traditionally conceived education of the subject matter var-
iety. 
The commission wants an education which will equip all American 
Youth to live democratically as home members, workers, and citi-
zens; it is concerned with ethical and moral living, mental and emo-
tional health, wholesome recreational interests; it believes in the 
dignity of work and the importance of personal satisfactions and 
achievement; it makes the regulation bow to 'the importance of fun-
da m-e n ta 1 ski 11 s . ' 16 
Smith concludes that modern educational practices completely do away 
with subject matter as traditionally conceived . 
Whatever the nomenclature, these 'programs' are !:?imilar in aim in 
that they abandon formal subject matter in favor of integration of 
all subject matter towards an overall objective, towards what the 
educat~rs like to call 'dynamic, functional learning.• 17 
The fundamental philosophy behind the new edµcation is . Deweyan 
pragmatism, sometimes called Instrumentalism. Educational practices 
are built on a theory of experience, and a theory of value which is com-
pletely relativistic. 18 
Albert Lynd 
Albert Lynd in Quackery in the Public Schools, asserts "progres-
sivism is chiefly and properly associated with the name of John Dewey 
as founder. 0019 Dewey, through the medium of progressive education has 
16Ibid, I p, 24, 
17 
Ibid. , p. 21. 
18Ibid. , pp. 14-17. 
19 
Albert Lynd, Quackery ~the Public Schools, (New York: Grosset 
and Dunlap by arrangement with Boston: Littl~, Brown and Co., 1950), p. 169. 
13 
been responsible for the anti-intellectualism i_n modern ed4cation. As a 
result teacher training colleges are equipping prospective teachers with 
eJucational techniques rather than strong content or subject matter 
20 courses. 
Mr. Lynd is of the opinion that today's educationists are the di-
rect heirs of the educational philosophy of the late John Dewey. He as-
sumes that what he considers the confused state of American education 
is related directly to Dewey's concept of the nature of man and the uni-
verse. Modern education is simply an implementation of Dewey's In-
strumentalism, "Progressivism is !ogicaHy consistent with instrumental-
ist philosophy right down the line. 1121 Lynd concludes, "I make no 
a.)o!ogy for the inclusion of his Lf'5ewey' J name and doctrines in the 
volume concerned with 'quackery in the public school. ' 1122 
Lynd says that perhaps some of Dewey's followers have been con-
fused but that Dewey himself was very clear and aw9re of the implica-
tions of his philosophy. Dewey's philosophy .cuts the traditional 
foundations of objective moral and spiritual valueE; whicr. have been 
! 
traditional in western culture. 
Li5ewey's philosophi7 ... excludes God, the soul, and all the props 
of traditional religion. It excludes the possibility of immutable 
20Ibid. 
21 Ibid. , p. 2 0 3 • 
22 Ibid., p. 208. 
truth, of fixed natural law, of permanent moral principles. It in-
cludes an attitude toward social reform v.hich is anti-communist, 
but unmistakable socialist. 23 
Dewey, according to Lynd, has a completely unorthodox view of 
14 
democracy. Hcwever, the continual use of the word democracy has duped 
many of the uninitiated. Educators have a right to their philosophical 
points of view but they have no right in the name of de mocracy to pawn 
off on an unsuspecting public a fundamental philosophy which most of 
them would whole-heartedly reject if they knew its true meaning . 
. . . it. is not right. .. to slip into the schools of the community a 
philosophy of education which, if understood, would be rejected by 
the great majority of the people to whom the school be long. That 
is travesty of 'democracy. '24 
Lynd says that parents of American public school children have not 
been advised of the implications of the Deweyan view of democracy. The 
vast majority · would reject the sh~ft of rre aning that Dewey advocates. 
The modern educationists seem to be renouncing the fundamental as-
sumptions of democratic processes. 
How many parents would agree that his ideas, if they understood 
them, are those which should determine the formation of their own 
children? How many have ever been aske d? 'Democracy' is a 
ritual word in the New Education, but has any community ever been 
consulted about educational theory in any meaningful way? . . . 
In my experience with such discussions , this . is the point at which 
a New Educationist may forget his theoretical devotion t o de mo-
cracy: he may rush in with the statement that 'ordinary people ' 
are not competent judges of philosophical or educatio nal theory. 
That may be true, but it begs the next question: if we must have 
one dominant philosophical influence upon the reform of our schools, 
23Ibid., p. 206. 
24Ibid., p. 209. 
15 
who voted for Dewey? 2 5 
Lynd suggests that the New Educationists have perverted the meaning of 
the democratic principle to mean a conditioning process which seeks to 
condition pupils. to the point ot view of the educationists. Educationally 
it functions toward the goal of wiping out all individual differences 
through "the holding back of better-:--than-average boys and girls in 1the 
grip of a notion of 'equality•; contrary to plain facts. ' 112 6 
In the democratic educational process advocated by the New Edu-
' 
cation the pupil becomes the center and end of thought and little atten-
tion is given to disciplined subject matter. Activity is conceived in 
terms of doing things. 
The bare intellectual backsides of many public school children have 
been remarked by parents, employers and college instructors. Their 
complaint is that, while neo-pec;:lagoges palaver more and more about 
'real needs,. of youngs;ters, the pupils are learning less and less 
about the arts of word and number; and the rest of the painfully ac-
cumulated culture of this harassed civilization. 
The complaint is answered by the assertion that the modern 'acti-
vity,. program for the schools , which may include anything from 
care of IE ts to the rit.es of hair-doi~«,, is more directly related to 
the living problems of the children. 
Coupled with the activity movement in the modern school is the pre-
dominant emphasis on the necessity that the activities must be interest-
ing. It is felt by the educationists that interest arises out of the pupil's 
felt-needs. There are a great many statements, Lynd says, made about 
25 Ibid., p. 188. 
26Ibid., p. 97. 
z 7 Ibid., p. 14. 
16 
the purposes of the New Education "but most of them are built around the 
theme of 're-al' or 'felt' needs. 1128 This represents not only a change 
. ~11:~_ .. , ,.,,: .. 
in educational theory and practice but a revolution. 
In practice, the change has been from formal study in skill and ab..-
stract principles to activities arising fr0m problems alleged to be of 
immediate concern to children. In the new view, learning proceeds 
__ best with 'felt needs and a present problem';, hence the switch from 
a direct attack on things like the three R's to such concerns as how-
can-I-,make-my-room-more-attractive. 29 
Lynd states that the modern educator is talking "gibberish" when he assumes 
that a student will make progress in fundamental learnings when all he has 
to guide him is native interest inspired by "felt-needs" and student in-
terests coupled with an inherent disregard for structured subject matter 
courses has lead American edu·cation into a position of anti-inteHectual-
30 
ism. 
Lynd asserts that illiteracy is no longer deplored in certain Educa..-
tionist circles. He says that some educators suggest that "we shall 1;1ome 
day accept the thought that it is just as illogical to assume that every 
boy must be able to read as it is that each one must be able to perform on 
the violin ... 31 In the field of mathematics, Lynd contends, some educ~-
tors argue that "more than 50 percent of the arithmetic, .. taught in our 
28Ibid,, .P• .26. 
2 9 Ibid . , p • .19 • 
30Ib'd 1 ., p. 179. 
@ 1: 
lbid o I P o 4 6 :· · 
17 
typical old-style schools has no practical value to the average child. 1132 
Adding to the tragic state of decline in American education is the 
process by which teachers are trained. Lynd says Educationists not only 
fail to insist on children learning the fundamentals but even teachers are 
not offered a thorough grounding in logically arranged subject matter. He 
says traditionally there were three elements in the educational process: 
a teacher, a student, and a subject which the teacher taught to the 
student. Under the old system even a poor teacher could measure some 
objective results. But in the New Ed4cation there is no such objective 
base. 
Under the new dispensation the teacher's job is to help the children 
with the 'reconstruction of experience" .•• There is more wisdom in 
the 'subject matter' or {sic) mathematics, of literature, of history, 
than in any teacher or body of teachers, however wise. In depreciat-
ing 'subject matter' the Educationist is removing frorn the curriculum 
that which even the worst teacher can only partially spoil; when a 
poor teacher teaches without it, everything may be spoiled. 33 
H. G. Rickover 
Admira 1 H. G. Rickover is interested in the American sch oo 1 be ca use 
he feels that the school possesses the tools for human survival. However, 
the American public school system is failing. The responsibility for the 
inadequate educational system is to be found in the educational philos-
3 2 Ibid. , p • 4 8 • 
33Ibid., pp. 69..-70. 
18 
ophy of John Dewey. 34 Rickover says that educators faced with growing 
numbers of young people to be educated found that not all students could 
succeed in a liberal arts curric;ulum. Faced with this difficulty the 
theories of John Dewey offered an easy escape, and our educational 
leaders went over to him en mas se. 
His. [Dewey' sJ emphasis on fitting curricula to the desires and 
interests of the children, his deprecation of absolute values, his 
demand for education which will be 'useful" to the child, and his 
revolutionary thesis that the scho?l must 'condition beha.vior' ... 
all this offered a simple solution. 5 
Rickover asserts that through the influence of Dewey American educ;:a-
tion works on the assumption that the child should be permitted to express 
himself freely. He says that, "Dewey has had a profound effect on Ameri-
can education •.•• LThe educational philosophy he fostereglusually calls 
forth a picture of teaching methods which permit the child to express him-
self freely. 1136 Because of "his LDewey' iJ hatred of school discipiline" 
the school is failing to discipline the new generation and consequently 
juvenile delinquency is on the increase. 37 
The Deweyan philosophy is also responsible for a de-emphasis on 
subject matter. When the interests of the child sets the curriculum and 
daily life is the medium of educational development it is reasonable to 
34H. G. Rickover, Education and Freedom, (New York: E. P. Dutton 
and Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 136-140~1,1 198. 
35Ibid., p. 136. 
36Ibid., p. 137, 
3 7 Ibid., p. 138. 
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expect a lack of concern for intellectual pursuits. Dewey's concern for 
self expression and his emphas:j.s on utility have aided this deterioration 
of solid traditional subject matter emphasis in education. 
Two of Dewey's principles have profoundly influenced curricula. 
The first is his insistence that teaching must begin with subjects 
already known to the child and in which he expresses interest. .. 
Dewey's insistence on making the child's interest the determining 
factor in planning curricula has led to substitution of know-how 
subjects for solid learning. . . 
The second item ..• is Dewey's insistence that each child should 
be taught only what will be ··useful' to him ... In the name of 
making the schooJ8usefuJ, many solid liberal arts subjects have 
been eliminated. 
This emphasis by Deweyan educationists has tended to rob the talented 
young people in our country of initiative and merge all students into an 
unchallenging middle of the road. Rickover believes that the average 
student could accomplish much more intellectually if adequate challenges 
were presented. 
Today we must have schools which develop in all children--talented, 
average, and below avera,ge--the highest level of intellectual com-
petence of which they are capable, .. This means that our schools 
must return to the traditional task of formal education in Western 
civilization--transmission of the nation's cultural heritage, and 
preparation for life through rigorous training3§'f young minds to 
think clearly, logically and .independently. 
Rickover feels that life-adjustment education does not meet the 
demands of an atomic age. Such education only tends to make a dull 
gray mentality. There is great reed he says to reverse this trend and 
bring out the highest potential in all young people. 
38Ibid., pp. 138-140. 
39Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
20 
Our schools are the greatest ·•cultural lag' we have today. When 
I read the official publications put out by men who run our educa-
tional system--booklets such as 'Life Adjustment Education for 
Every American Youth' ... I have a strange feeling of reading al:x:)Ut 
another world, . . . I am worried about the chances which young 
people, so poorly equipped to deal with modern life, will have wren 
things bec~we more complex and difficult I a S they surely Will before 
very long. 
Redden and Ryan 
John D. Redden and Francis A. Ryan in A Catholic Philosophy of 
Education express:, from the perspective of professional philosophy of 
education, a similar equation of Dewey's educational philosophy with 
Deweyite educational thought and practice. Redden and Ryan make no 
distinction between John Dew(;ly' s educational philosophy and the 
practices of "progressive education II in general. They assume that pro-
gressive education adequately and consistently implement Deweyan 
thought. "Progressive education is the instrumentality by which the 
experimentalist philosophy and its consequent educational theory are 
implemented and actua.lized. 1141 Redden and Ryan assume that John 
Dewey worked out the .hnplications of pragmatic philosophy based on 
verifiability of consequences in experience, workability, and potential 
change within the framework of an exclusive .. dynamic material nature." 
They assert, "These sources have been merged by Dewey and fused in.to 
40Ibid. , pp. 23-24. 
41 John D. Redden and Francis A. Ryan, A Catholic Philosophy of 
Education. Revised Edition. (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co. , 
1956) I p, 527 • 
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a philosophical system which i·s commonly termed experimentalism, or 
the,philosqphy of change. t,4'.2 
Redden and Ryan assert that the "John Dewey Society for tne Study 
of Education and Culture", working on the premises of John Dewey's ed.-
ucational philosophy, believes that democracy can be fully rea1ized only 
through a complete soctal reqonstruction. The school must be the moving 
force in this reconstruction. Schools for democracy must literally in-
doctrinate the youth of the nation in terms of democratic socialism . 
. . . the school can no longer remain neutral. •. it must definitely at-
tempt, through indoctrination, to capture the minds of the nation's 
youth and stimulate them so that the youth will strtve for the crea-
tion of a collectivist •.• if not a communistic .•• society. 43 
Redden and Ryan assume that Dewey advocated an activity school 
based exclusively upon student interest. Student interest purportedly 
has had one criterion--felt-needs. On the basis of felt-needs a student 
was free to pursue any activity which would lead to satisfaction of the 
particular felt-need. 
Thus, the child is thought ready to learn only 'when the angel stirs 
the water, ' that is, when the child experiences a 'felt-need·· for a 
specific learning activity or situation. The only worth-while motiva-
tion, therefore are nascent interests and immediate values. 44 
According to Redden and Ryan, immediate Si:ltisfaction of felt-needs 
is all important. There is no place allowed in the educational philosophy 
42 Ibid., p. 515. 
43 Ibid. , p. 565. 
44Ibid., pp. 511-512. 
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of John Dewey for deferred values. "Deferred values are of little or no 
consequence • .,4 5 Dewey does not provide training in moral values. 
LThe Deweyany desire to indoctrinate with their own <;ioctrin~. The 
values that inhere in sequential curriculums, desirable attitudes, 
knowledges, and skills, and all universc;illY accepted moral values, 
are thrown overboard ... Yet suc;:h values have beh~1sd them the weight 
of the centuries of race experience and tradition. 
Because of lack of concern for the funded values of the race and the moral 
values, Redden and Ryan assert that Dewey made no provision for solid 
subject matter offerings. The methods of Deweyan philosophy, they 
assert "oppose logical and sequential curriculums with their requisite 
teacher authority and substitute in their place free activity in response 
to "felt needs. 114 7 
Rc;,bert M. Hutchins 
Robert M. Hutchins is to a degree more guarded in his equation of 
Dewey's educational philosophy with the educational thought and practices 
of the Deweyites. Hutchins said, for example, that the leading theory 
of education in American education today is the theory of adjustment. 
The doctrine of adjustment, as implemented by modern educators, is a 
misconception of John Dewey's understanding of the meaning of adjust-
ment. 
45 
Ibid. , p. 512. 
46Ibid. 
47 
Ibid., p. 527. 
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.•• the doctrine of adjustment .•• results from a misconception of John 
Dewey. Since he is not a clear writer, his followers may perhaps be 
excused for their failure to notice that when he talked about adjust-
ment to the environment, he meant that the environment should first 
be improved. 48 
However, Hutchins is in no mood to exonerate Dewey of the responsibil~ty 
for what he considers to be the sad pl!ght of American education. Dewey's 
emphasis on child-centered education is th~ real source of the present 
educational dilemma. 
The principle reason for the popularity in the United States of what is 
called Progressive Education, in which Mr. Dewey also had a hand, 
is that th,e children have a good time in school. In a child-centered 
society ... any effort to insist on painful work .tn school naturally en-
counters resistance. 49 
The edu9ational philosophy which stands behind the child-centered 
emphasis receives an even mere rugged castigation by Hutchins. Hutchins 
is of the opinion that every valid philosophy of education ha$ a fundamentalc 
philosophy behind it. However, he says, the confused state of American 
education is indicative of the fact that there is no valid fundamental 
philosophy from which it receives its inspiration. 
Pragmatism, the philosophy of Dewey •.• is not a philosophy at all, 
because it supplies no intelligible standard of good or bc;1d. Prag-
matism and positivism hold that the only ~nowlec;ige is scientific 
knowledge. As Mad Hatter and the March Hare in Alice in Won4erlan9 
celebrated unbirthdays, so pragmatism and Eositivism are unphilos-
ophies. They are even anti-philosophies. 5 
Hutchins asserts that the anti-intellectual tendencies of modern 
48Robert M. Hutchins, The Conflict in Education ln a Democratic 
Society,. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 15-. -· 
49 Ibid. , p. 86. 
501bid. , P~ 53. 
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educational practices flow out of the failure of educators to fqrm objective 
standards of excellence based on valid philosophical premises. Instead 
of developing a philosophy of education on a fundamental philosophy 
modern educators resort to Deweyan conceptions of need. Hutchins dif-
fers from the other contemporary critics in suggesting that immediate needs 
point not to the demands of human nature but to things considered prag-
matically use.ful by society. The greatest need, he says, that modern 
educators seek to provide for are monetary needs and the things that . 
money will buy. Education loses its historic function of developing the 
intellect to the proliferation of "ad hoc" training activities wh!ch will 
equip students to perform some occupation through which they may be able 
to earn a living. The result is expansion of educational activities and 
the curtailment of serious intellectual study. 
The .. inevitable result is that the course of study is jammed with eve1;y 
conceivable subject on the ground that the pupil might find that he 
needed to know 1about it, or society might need to have him know 
about it •.. the doctrine of needs, or of the ad hoc, has promoted 
the disintegration of the program of the schools ... 51 
Traditionally American education was built on the foundation of the 
cultural heritQge. Subjects were taught to insure that the young would be 
literate in the great traditions of the western wor~d. However, Hutchins 
says that attending an American school or university is no guarantee of a 
liberal education. The pr~gmatic emphasis on immediate needs and stu-
dent interest has undermined the meaning of the word education. 
51 rbid., pp. 35-36. 
11Education," has meant, 11the development of the intellectual powers of 
men ... 52 But many "American educators believe that the intellectual 
powers of most men are so slight that it is not worthwhile to try to develop 
them ... 53 Since modern educators do not feel students can profit from a 
solid subject matter orientation through which the traditions of the race 
are perpetuated many students are leH ignorant of the heritage of western 
culture., 
... graduation from an American university is not a guarantee of lit-
eracy. It is no guarantee that the American has any knowledge of 
the tradition in which, whether he knows it or not, he lives. This 
tradition is the Graeco-Hebrew tradition. 54 
Hutchins is of the opinion that this low estimate of American intellectual 
capacity is robbing Americans of the possibility of receiving an education 
which the proponents of "democratic education" have emphasized as a 
right. If education is intellectual in nature and the majority of Americans 
are intellectually incapable then education must be re-defined to insure 
Americans of their right. This is exactly what has happened according 
to Hutchins in American education . 
. . . the syllogism runs like this: Everybody has a right to education. 
~ut only a few are qualified for a good education. Those who are not 
qualified for a good education must be given a poor education, be-
cause everybody has a right to education. Anybody who favors a 
good education must, therefore, be anti-democratic, because only a 
few are qualified for a good education, and the true democrat insists 
52 Ibid. , p. 62. 
53 Ibid .. 
54Ibid. , p. 61. 
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on education for all. The consequence is that those who believe in 
the capac.i,ty of the people are called reactionary and anti-democratic, 
whereas those who doubt the capactty of the people revel in the name 
of democrats and Uberals. 55 
Hutchins concludes that "our conception of the aims of education 
depend upon our philosophy in general ... 56 Therefore, since American 
education is built on the approach of "Dewey, whose philosophy is not, 
as I have suggested, a philosophy at all, .. 57 is it strange that content 
should become educationally suspect? 
There is also in America: .. a deep underlying conviction that content 
of educc;ition is irrelevant. 58 
When the doctrine of no doctrine at all is in full swing, the educa-
tional program that emerges is determined by the tension between 
the interests of the teachers and those of the taught, Since w~ do 
not know what to teach our students, they might as well do what 
interests them .•.. In many American institutions of higher learning 
... it is now popular to say that there is no curriculum. 59 · 
Summary 
The contemporary critics, Keats, Smith, Lynd, Rickover, Redden 
and Ryan and Hutchin$, are unanimous in their opinion that the educational 
philosophy of John Dewey is responsible for what they consider to be 
flaws in modern American education. The particular weaknesses receiv-
55Ibid., p. 63. 
56Ibid. , p. 55. 
57Ibid. 
58Ibid., p. 5.6. 
59 
Ibid. , pp. 58-59. 
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ing most attention by the critics are: a false conc;:eption of democratic 
education, the activity school, intere$t theory based on felt-needs, and 
the abandonment of solid consecutively arranged subject matter. Each 
of these weaknesses is r~-inforced, according to the critics, by a 
monopoly-like capture of teacher training institutions by modern "educa-
tionists. " 
CHAPTER III 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN 
DEWEY'S EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 
The previous discussion has provided background for an objective 
consideration of the educational philosophy of John Dewey. However, 
before attempting to ascertain Dewey's educational philosophy it will be 
profitable to consider the philosophical foundations of Dewey's th.ought. 
Dewey's philosophical thought is pervasive--it reaches into every con-
sideration of life. His approach to knowledge, metaphysics and value 
are reflected in his views of education, politics and science. He pegins 
his philosophy in reaction to the traditional approach of fixed essences 
and immediate knowledge but moves from the reaction to a positive 
methodology set completely within the framework of human experience, 
The following discussion will seek to establish the authenticity of Dewey's 
philosophical thought. This will be accomplished by pointing out the 
_reason for his rea,ction to tradition.a lism and by examining the results and 
assumptions of his own experimental methodology. 
Nature of Philosophy 
As noted above Dewey's philosophy has been called both a reaction 
and a reconstruction. His reaction was to fixed separations in natur~ and 
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views of knowledge based on immediate apprehension. Such views 
usually have led to an unnecessary "bifurcation" in nature between 
. thought and reality. Dewey's reconstruction was in terms of a proper 
recognition of "facts of nature" on the one hand, and the "thought proc-
esses" on the other. He felt that man must be looked upon as a being 
continuous with nat~re if man is to dissolve the fixed separations between 
the "thought" and "thing" of traditional philosophy. He believed that the 
epistemological dead-end streets evident in the history of philosophy have 
been the result of building on a faulty metaphysics. 
Dewey's reaction to the separation of the ideal from the real is fund-
amenta.l to his positive philosophy. The traditional separation was based 
on an assumed reality--fixed and unchanging--more fundamental than the 
world encountered in everyday experience. These a priori categories 
. which provide the separation of the world into "thought" and "things of 
reality" present a dilemma which has been most unproductive in the his.,-
tory of thought. lf reality possesses a knowledgable structure independent 
of thought then thought is without a reason for existence. On the other 
hand, if reality does not possess a knowledgable structure thought being 
a private affair has nothing valid to say about reality . 1 
LThe difficulty wi!Jy placing the standard of thought and knowledge 
in antecedent existence is that our thought makes no difference in 
what is significantly real. . It then affects only our own attitude 
toward it. Th.is constant throwing of emphasis back upon a change 
made in ourselves instead of one made in the world in which we live 
1John Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago.Press, 1903), p. 72. 
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seem s to me to be the essence of what is objectionable in 'subjecti-
v ism. ,2 
The way out of this unproductive dilemma is to take the world of 
common sense experience at face value. That is--accept it without try-
ing to fit it into pre-conceived dualistic notions. On the basis of this 
approach it will be the business of thought--the task of philosophy--to 
make discriminatirms--judgments between the valid and the invalid., but 
the approach will be from one's own particular experiential situation and 
therefore the distinctions will be from one's own experience conditioned 
thought processes. 3 
Dewey contends that human preference for fixed reality, which 
transcends the processes of thought and treats the results of inquiry as 
some type of separate reality, is the source of metaphysical dualism. He 
further argues that metaphysical dualism is the foundation for the episte-
mological deadlocks which have characterized philosophical thought. 
Dewey says that it was on the basis of this strong pre-disposition for 
permanence that the early philosophers converted "the eventual into some 
kind of Being, somethi~ which i s , even if it does not exist. .. 4 He says 
when one reads a defense of permanent existence "there is ground for 
suspecting that an artificial simplification of existence has been per-
2John Dewey, The Quest for Certain ty, (New York: Minton Balchand 
Company, 1929), p. 275. 
3John Dewey, "Some Implications of Anti-In tellectualism, " Journal 
of Philosophy, VII (September 1, 191 O), p. 4 79. 
4John Dewey, Experience and Nature, (Chicago: Open Court Pub-
lishing Co., 1925), p. 33. 
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formed . ,.5 
Philosophy down to the present c entury has sought to build on this 
erroneous static structure. Empiricism takes "what is given in the thought 
situation for the sake of accomplishing the aim of thought as if it were 
given absolutely, or apart from a particular hi storic con text. 116 Rational-
ism, on the other hand, argues "tha t ultimate principl e s of a un iversal 
character are the objects of immediate knowledge and that reason is the 
organ of their apprehension." 7 Both the empir ica l and ra tionalistic 
schools build a system which separate s things of everyday experience 
from the assumed fixed, static world of form outside experience. 
Dewey denied the conception of a static world of "real form" separ-
ate from the world of common everyday experience. He attacked "super-
naturalism" because he said its adherents believe in "consideration which 
do not follow from the course of experience as that is judged in terms of 
itself, but which have a significance independent of the course of exper-
ience as such. 118 Dewey ' s reaction to such a position is based on the 
"bifurcation" of reality and the no tion that there are sacred precincts 
closed to experimental v erification . He sa ys, in s uch instance "men 
5Jbid. 
6Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory , p . 61. 
7John Dewey, Logic: The Theory 0 Inquiry, (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1938), p. 139. 
8 
John Dewey, The Problems.Q!. Men, (New York: The Philosophical 
Library, 1946), p. 287. 
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lf>ecom_ei.7 careless of their inspection of existing conditions. ,,9 
Dewey con tended that traditional philosophy offered no logical ev-
idence from experience for judging between differing but equally coherent 
viewpoints. Inquiry, which is Dewey's philosophical methodological 
approach, must have a more significant role to play than simply to func-
tion in the capacity of agreement maker in a philosophy which disconnects 
thought processes from verification in experimental situations. On such 
a basis truth, goodness and values are "given." Philosophy, from this 
approach, is short-circuited and its assumptions conform exclusively to 
the customs and prejudices of traditional institutions. Philosophy in the 
traditional approach is simply a theory of recognition. But the inherent 
error in such philosophical thought has been its failure to see that the 
source of custom and tradition came out of some type of previous inquiry--
worked out in the crucible of human experience and not handed down ready--
made from above. 1 O 
Dewey was of the opinion that the task of philosophy is to rescue 
knowledge from the epis temological nonsense which has grown out of 
metaphysical dualism. He believed this could be accomplished by plac-
ing knowledge at th,e conclusion of experimentally based logical process 
of reflective thought. ;Logic, for Dewey, is "an account of the ways in 
which valid inferences or conclusions from things to other things are 
9John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1930), p. 232. 
lODewey, Problems Qf Men, p. 213. 
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made . 1111 
Dewey's reconstruction in philosophy would recognize the validity 
of the methods of science in the development of knowledge. Man in 
search of meaning must conceive of knowing "as active and operative, 
after the analogy of experiment guided hypothesis, or of invention guided 
by the imagination of some possibility ... 12 The subject matter to which 
thinking man directs his attention is the gross, macroscopic, crude "non-
cognitive" elements in experience . In the process of life difficulties are 
encountered and man must develop "instrumentalities of inquiry, measure-
ment, symbolization, calculation and testing. 1113 This is necessary to 
deal adequately with the problems which man faces in his environment. 
The distinction between the Deweyan and the traditional approach 
to philosophy now stands in bold relief. Traditional philosophy assumed 
a metaphysics and sought to build an epistemology that would explain the 
dualism inherent in the sys tern, Dewey's approach took the original ele-
ments in one's experience to be "non-cognitive. " Therefore, on the basis 
of this approach if Dewey has a metaphysics--which some critics deny but 
this thesis affirms--hi s metaphysical assumptions will grow out of his ex-
perimental logic. In other words metaphysical viewpoints will come at the 
11John Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1916), p. 221. 
12John Dewey, Recons truction in Philosophy, (London: University 
of London Press, 1921), p . 123. 
l 3John Dewey, "Philosophy, " Whither Mankind, ed. Charles Beard, 
(New York: Longmans, Green a nd Co., 1937), p. 320. 
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end o f the process of inquiry rather than at the beginning as the tradition-
alis ts believed. 
Perhaps the task of philosophy may best be defined by contrasting 
it with science. It will be remembered that both philosophy and science 
use the same methodological approach. However, there is a different 
motivation for each discipline. Philosophy enters the field in search of 
meaning in the specific area of human preference . Physical and biological 
sciences "deal only with what might be experienced; with the content of 
experience .. .. " 14 Philosophy offers guidance and direction in the movement 
from hypothetical experience to meaning in individual lives. Its task is 
the "contribution in however humble a way to methods that will assist us 
in discovering the cause of humanities ills ... 15 · Sci'ence states its con-
clusions "in terms of mathematical relations which are non-qualitative." 16 
Science, therefore, is a discipline which is interested primarily in the 
outcomes of specific relational and quantitative factors--its primary aim 
is knowledge. Philosophy uses the results of science but relates thE;?m 
to the problems and needs o f human life--its primary interest is in the 
area of value--seeking through inquiry to ascertain guide lines to mean-
ingful and fruitful human experience. 
14John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1910), p . 269. 
15 
Dewey, Reconstructionl!!_ Philosophy, p . 177. 
16 Dewey, Logic: The The ory .Qf Inquiry , p. 7 6. 
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Nature of Reality 
The previous discussion referred to the basic approach of Dewey in 
the area of metaphysics. In this section, what has already been implied 
will be made specific .. It was suggested that John Dewey's view of re-
ality comes not as a presupposition of fixed supra-natural structures but 
from intelligent assumptions growing out of man's reflective evaluation of 
events within the continuum of experience. Dewey, nontheless, comes 
up with the conclusion that nature has a certain structure. However, as 
noted above, he rejects structure in nature which stands outside the pro-
cess of becoming. In other words, Dewey's view of nature recognizes 
structured change and not a structure plus change. Structure, for Dewey, 
is always in the context of actual features of existence. Through a pro-
cess of interaction, specific existences (structure) realize particular 
changes . 
. It has also been noted that Dewey's metaphysical assumptions are 
an outgrowth of reflections in experience. This is another way of saying 
that Dewey's view of the world comes out of his experiences of the world 
itself. His world-view is not something given; rather it is the result of 
a quest. On the basis of the search for knowledge and meaning in the 
continuum of experience certain assumptions about the nature of the world 
and experience itself are made .. The following discussion will seek to 




Dewey's contention that assumptions about nciture must grow out of 
man's experience necessitates a clarification of what he means by exper-
ience. This will involve a new methodological approach to philosophy. 
Dewey rejected inherent nature and argued that empirical differences are 
discernible only through methodology. Consequently; experience is con-
textual and denotative in character. Experience includes the whole of en-
countered reality but it is always based on particular instances. The 
denotative character of experience implies, Dewey says, a methodological 
approach to things rather than. the traditional technique of looking for 
"real" essences. 
The value of experience as method in philosophy is that it compels 
us to note that denotation comes first and last, so that to settle any 
discussion, to still any doubt, to answer any question, we must go 
to some thing pointed to, denoted, and find our answer there. 17 
The philosopher is in the same methodological tradition as the scientist. 
He-mu&t renoonce- "inquiry abGut ab solute origins and absolute finalities 
in order to explore specific values and specific conditions that generate 
them." 18 
Dewey's methodological approach to experience begins with an 
acceptance of the common-sense world of everyday things and events. 
This world is the sole and determinate basis for the objectivity of thought. 
"Concrete experiences, not logical conceptions by themselves, warrant 
.·. , .. , ~. ,. ' (. . . '{~: . --~ ~- ' 
17 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 10. 
18 Dewey, The Influence of Darwin QB_ Philosophy, p. 13. 
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statements about matters of existence. "19 Included within the dimension 
of experience besides physical existences are the experienced features 
of the human enterprise--joy, sorrow, success, failure, science, history, 
politics and religion. These things and events express qualitative fea-
tures of the world in which man lives. In accepting the world as the 
foundation for the thought processes, qualitative factors must be taken 
into consideration as part of "reality. " 
·.When.we say that experience is one point of approach to an account 
of the world in which we live, we mean by experience something at 
least as wide and deep and full as all history on this earth, a history 
which, since history does not occur in the void, includes the earth 
and the physical relatives of man. 20 
Everything we encounter in this world must be given a hearing. Nature, 
including things and human events, must be allowed to speak impartially 
without submission to preconceived ontological structures. "Inquiry 
should follow the lead of its subject matter and not be subordinated to any 
end or motive having ah external source. "2 l 
Dewey makes a distinction between experience and nature. Nature, 
as we shall see subsequently, is an element in experience. Experience 
may in some sense be equated with what William James called the "stream 
of consciousness." Dewey said simply that experience is "things inte.r-
19John Dewey, Characters and Events, ed. Joseph Ratner, (New 
York: Henry Holt and· Co., 1928), p. 64. 
20 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p, 81 
21 Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 200. 
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acting in certain ways ... zz · Such interaction involves relationship between 
an individual self or organism and the :world. "The self, the 'subject' of 
action--is a factor within experience and not something outside of it to"' 
which experiences are attached as the self's private property ... 23 
Growing out of this approach to experience is the Deweyan concep-
tion that experienced things and events are a product of interaction between 
the self and the environment. Also, implied in this approach is the idea 
that man, because of his interrelatedness with the world, plays a creative 
role in evolving experience. This approach also suggests that experience 
is an "active-passive" affair. As an "active-passive" affair objects of 
experience are a creation of the interaction of the organism and environ-
ment--a termination, On the other hand, nature absorbs the object and it 
becomes part of a new environment in which subsequent interactions form 
new objects of experience. The object of experience is immediately ex-
perienced but the experienced object in turn provides the subject-matter 
for further interactions and new relationships. Nature contains the ca-
pacity for creative experience and is therefore not to be viewed as static 
existence. 
If existence were either completely necessary or completely contin-
gent there would be neither comedy nor tragedy in life, nor need of 
will to live. The significance of morals and politics, of the arts 
both technical and fine, of religion and of science itself as inquiry 
22D . d ewey, Experience an Nature, p. 1. 
23 John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," 
The Philosophy ..2.f John Dewey, ed. by Paul Arthur Schillip, The Library 
Qf_Living Philosophers, (Northwestern University Press, 1939), p. 532. 
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and discovery, all have their source and meaning in the union of 
Nature of the settled and the unsettled ..• Apart from this union, there 
are no such things as "end, " either as consummation or as those ends-
in-view we call purposes. There is only a block universe ... admitting 
of no change, or else a predestined march of events. 24 
Dewey's point is that the nature we experience is creative. Experience as 
an "active-passive" affair attests to the pulsating flow from static re-
sponse to absorption in new situations. Such experience is the life-proc-
ess : "for in the process of living both absorption in a present situation 
and a response that takes account of its effect upon conditions of later 
experiences are equally necessary. 11 25 
Nature 
By analyzing experience on the basis of the methodological approach 
Dewey has been able to move from the realm of conscious personal experi-
ence to inference about nature. In doing this he has accomplished a trans-
fer from method to metaphysics. The view of nature he assumes is a pul-
sating flow in which human organism use static distinctions for a purpose. 
Nature is the subject-matter or continuum of content. It is prior and 
neutral to man's distinctions which arise out of inquiry. "The stuff of 
the world .is natural events in themselves neither physical nor mental. 112 6 
Abandon completely the notion that nature ought to conform to certain 
definition, and nature intrinsically is neither rational nor irrational. 
24Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 243. 
25 Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value, .h Rejoinder, 11 p. 545. 
26 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 220. 
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Apart from the use made of it in knowing, it exists in a dimension ir-
relevant to either attribution, just as rivers inherently are neither 
located near cities nor are opposed to such location. Nature is in-
telligible and understandable. There are operations by means of 
which it becomes an object of knowledge, and is turned to human 
purposes, just as rivers provide conditions which mat be utilized to 
promote human activities and to satisfy human need. 7 
Nature then from Dewey's perspective is not an entity with inherent kn.owl-
edgable structure: "It is no cause or source of events or processes; no 
absolute monarch; no principle of explanation; no substance behind or 
underlying changes ... 28 
Nature has within itself the principle of continuity. There is con-
tinuity between lower and higher and between the organism and the envit~ 
onment. "No activity ... is confined to the channel which is most flagrantly 
involved in its execution. The whole organism is concerned in every act 
to some extent and in some fashion, internal organs as well as muscular, 
those of circulation, secretion, etc. 1129 There is in other words only one 
sphere of existence and everything that plays a part in experience is part 
of nature. This means that there is no "bifurcation" in nature or gulfs 
fixed between various modifications of the flow of life and things. There 
is only a continuing flow of history. Terminations are the result of logical 
objectification of the flow of nature when that flow of nature interacts in 
conscious human experience. Terminations are the points contributed by 
man through his active interaction with environing conditions--through 
28Dewey, Experience and· Nature, p . 73. 
29 
Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct , p. 150. 
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whid man reaches a purpose. 
Evolution, for Dewey, therefore is not simply a biological fact 
which is set in the past tense. It is a description of the continuing life 
process in both physical and human relationships. 
A belief in organic evolution which does not extend unreservedly to 
the way in which the subject of experience is thought of, and which 
does not strive to bring the entire theory of experience and knowing 
into line with biological and social facts, is hardly more than Pick-
wickian .... 
If biological development be accepted, the subject of experience is 
at least an animal, continuous with other organic forms in a process 
of more complex organization. An animal in turn is at least continuous 
with chemico-physical processes which, in living things, are so 
organized as really to constitute the activities of life with all their 
defining traits. 3o 
The human race has evolved, according to the Deweyan approach, through 
the interactions of human beings with their environments. This evolution 
through interaction has occurred because man has been able to conserve 
past successes in the continuum of experience by means of "habit", on 
the one hand, and the instrumentalities for advance crystalized by the 
processes of reflective thought, on the other. These useful instrumen-
talities or useful objects of thought may through memory be abstracted 
but one should never forget that they have grown out of the experience 
of the race. Such instrumentalities--useful objects of thought--owe 
their continuing existence to perpetuating successful solutions to prob-
lems arising in the continuum of experience. Dewey is simply stating 
30 
John Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, " Creative 
Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude, John Dewey et al , (New 
York: Henry Holt and co-:-;-1917), pp. 35-36. 
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that objects of thought ari se out of evolving human experience--physical 
and social. The race has evolved because intelligence has given man the 
ability to foresee new connections in novel situations. 
The evolutionary process suggests then the possibility of new ex-
periences growing out of continuing interactions between the organism and 
the environment. This implies the possibility of other environmental 
situations not yet experienced. Prior to in teraction--neither the or-
ganism nor tbe environment is in a meaningful relationship--there is only 
nature. · The organism finds its existence when it interacts with an en-
vironment and effects experience. Experience, therefore, is to some 
extent selective--taking from the total field of nature. Consequently, 
while experience is selective and particular it is related in context to the 
total dimension of nature. This means that experienced objects are the · 
products of interaction between the organism and environment. Person-
ally experienced objects do not exhaust nature but are selected from the 
total field of nature. They are in no sense absolute but relative to the in-
strumentalities we may make of them in the continuum of experience . 
.Experienced objects are "taken out of the context of direct experience 
and placed in the context of material within discourse for the purpose of 
meeting the requirements of discourse. 1131 
Criticisms of Dewey's philosophy have indicated that "experience" 
in the Deweyan use of the term is purely subjective with no objective basis 
31 oewey, "Experience , Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," p. 548. 
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in fact. It will be recalled that Hutchins, arguing from the as sumptton 
that objective and absolute are somehow inseparably united, asserted 
that Dewey's thought did not even merit the name philosophy. Such is 
not the case , however, because in the interaction between organism and 
environment Dewey does provide for objective criteria. 
The failure to understand Dewey at this point grows out of inability 
to recognize Dewey's conception of the dual capacity of experienced 
objects in the continuum of experience. From one perspective, object s 
of experience are conclusions, but from another they are hypotheses. 
Nature is in the pr©cess of living continuity; consequently our experience 
has this double capacity: (1) to be involved in the future, and (2) to be 
individualized and relatively conclusive. Life moves from nature in its 
qualitative vitality to objects which bring equilibrium and then on to new 
quali tative data. Each point in the life process is the object or con-
summation of a previous process and in turn the material or data for the 
process which follows. Dewey cites the prqcess of mining for ore as 
illustrative of the point he is making. During the course of the centuries 
nature's processes produce a completed object--for example, iron ore. 
However, the miner looks on the ore not as a completed object but as 
data or material for his object--pig iron. The manufacturer in turn does 
not look on the iron as a completed object but rather has in mind some type 
of cooking vessel. Each process has a conclus ion and a beginning. What 
is object in one becomes the means in another process. All of life par-
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tic ipa tes in t he flow of experienc e . 32 
Selection and discrimination are key concepts in the progressive 
movement from the first encountered immediate (non-cognitive) experience, 
to a recognition of qualitative factors in nature, to the third phase of ob-
jects of knowledge. 
Is there any basis for selection of qualitative factors in nature, or 
is the process guided simply by subjective feeling? Dewey, contrary to 
some criticism, argues th,at there are objective criteria that transcend the 
simple personal feelings of the organism involved in a search for personal 
ends. He taught that both culture and nature have structures which 
either encourage or discourage certain approaches. So that besides the 
personal factor, there are also social and physical limitations coming from 
the environment. Selection, therefore, has besides the personal interest 
aspect of the organism--cultural conditions such as habits and customs 
as well as physical limitations imposed by nature. Dewey says that some 
have thought that his inclusion of social limitations proved his instru-
mentalism inconsistent but he points out that such an opinion only il-
lustrates the failure of the critic to understand the objective basis of his 
philosophy . 
. . . the indispensableness to the instrumentalist theories of truth, 
even as working empirical theories, of a recognition of the social 
implications of ideas and beliefs. This indispensableness appears, 
to Professor Royce, fatal to the instrumental conception, to me it 
32 Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 35-36. 
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seems its essence. 33 
The objective criteria in the flow of life from initial experience, 
through inquiry to knowledge, are the limitations imposed on the organism 
by that part of nature which is antecedent to the particular process of 
selection. It exists prior to experience and is subject-matter for the 
objec.t of knowledge. The object of knowledge does not exist prior to the 
experience and subsequent inquiry but the subject-matter (nature's ante-
cedent reality) does exist. As Dewey forcefully points out, we never 
doubt existence of that which we experience; we simply accept it. If 
doubts arise, they come from later considerations of a cognitive nature 
when objects are checked as consequences. 
While scepticism may be in place at any time about specific intel-
lectual belief and conclusion, .•. scepticism as to things which 
we have and are is impossible. Its pretentiousness is concealed, 
however, by the failure to distinguish between objects of knowledge 
where doubt is legitimate, since they are matters of interpretation 
and classification, (of theory), and things which are directly had. 34 
That which we experience directly is not subject to doubt. But when the 
subject matter of experience is translated by inquiry into objects of 
knowledge then one may legitimately question the processes of thought. 
Dewey reinforces the point just made when he says we should remember 
that we "doubt some received piece of knowledge about some specific 
thing of that world, and then set to work as best we can, to rectify it ... 35 
33John Dewey, The Philosophical Review, XX! (Jam.ary 1912), p. 69. 
34 
Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 21. 
35 
Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 301. 
Dewey is sugges ting that (1) there is a real a ntecedent nature to 
the thought process 36 and (2) th i s antecedent nature has objective 
qualities which affirm or deny the objects of knowledge produced by the 
process of inquiry. Looking at nature from this perspective it is proper 
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to assert that nature has objective structure. It is this relatively stable 
element in nature which make both inquiry and knowledge possible. It is 
this aspect of nature which is the basis for the ideal logical forms which 
grow out of inquiry. Nature provides the subject-matter (non-cognitive 
but qualitative) which provide criteria against which our logical construe-
tions or ideas may be tested . 
. . . necessity implies the precarious and contingent. A world that 
was all necessity would not be a world of necessity; it would just 
be ... The stable and recurrent is needed for the fulfillment of the 
possible; the doubtful can be settled only through adaptation to 
stable objects. The necessary is always necessary for, not neces-
sary in itself; it is conditioned by the contingent, although a condi-
tion of the fu 11 determination of the latter. 3 7 
If it is possible to check our logical constructions (ideas) by as-
serting that the world resists or approves our conclusions, then Dewey 
is saying that nature has objective qualities which act as criteria for 
judging the processes of inquiry. In tact he is asserting that inquiry 
is reliable because it can be tested. Dewey's experimental logic has 
led him to a metaphysical assumption. He says, "If experienced 
36John Dewey, "The Realism of Pragmatism, "Journal of Philosophy, 
II {June 8, 19 05). 
37 Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. '64-65. 
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things are valid e vidence , then nature in having qualities within itself 
has what in the lite ra l sense must be called ends, terminals, arrests, en-
38 
closures." 
Dewey is careful to point out that the structure of nature is not 
something fixed in a realm of reality beyond change. This was the error 
of traditional philosophy, "The conversion of the logic of reflection into 
an ontology of rational being ..... 39 However, structure in nature is always 
in the context of actua 1 events which interact and bring about change. Any 
approach to the structured aspects of nature must be made from the meth-
odological approach in the continuum of experience--never as a separate 
entity. 
The fact is that all structure is structure of something; anything de-
fined as structure is a character of events, not something intrinsic 
and per se, .•• Structure is constancy of means, of things used for 
consequences, not of things taken by themselves or absolutely. 40 
Dewey has shown that structure in nature is relational in the contin-
uum of experience. These natural relations have objective standing. How-
ever, their objectivity is not fixed or unchanging. Rather the structure in 
nature is progressive a nd is i n a me ans-end-means relationship; it changes 
from structure to function and back again. "Faculties are definite direc-
tions of development: elements a re starting points for new processes; 
bare facts are indices of change; static conditions are modes of accom-
38Ibid., p. 96. 
39 Ibid., p, 68. 
4;Q 
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plished a djus tment, .. 41 In the tra nsformation from t.li.e problematic to the 
resolved situation we find, according to Dewey, the only basis for the 
type of metaphysical objectivity that has any valid meaning in terms of 
human experience. 
Dewey has moved from "non-cognitive" origina 1 experience--thtbugh 
the intellectual processes of inquiry to metaphysical assumption. The 
process of inquiry, leading to knowledge, will now be discussed. The 
purpose will be to show how "non-cognitive" experienced things are ob-
jectified via quantitative relationships into logical constructs and then 
when validated become objects of knowledge. 
Theory of Knowledge 
The purpose of this discussion is to clarify what John Dewey means 
by knowledge. Three terms will be discussed: inquiry, knowledge and 
truth. It will be shown that Dewey conceived of inquiry as the method 
employed by the human organism to redirect a confused problematic state 
growing out of the interaction of the organism and the environment into a 
harmonious relationship. Inquiry i s the intermediate phase between im-
mediate experience and mediated knowledge. Knowledge, it will be seen, 
comes at the conclusion of inquiry . Knowledge and the things of direct 
experience are not identical. Things of direct experience exist prior to 
knowledge but knowledge "qua object of knowledge" is the result of 
tested and verified logical constructions which have grown out of the 
41 Dewey, The Influence of DarwinQ!l_Philosophy, p. 259. 
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process of reflective inquiry. Since knowledge is the outgrowth of in-
quiries which have their origina 1 source in problematic situations, truth, 
according to Dewey, must be conceived in terms of the workability {sue-
cessful verification) of the . ideas which form the hypotheses in the process 
of inquiry. The hypothesis or idea which guides the reflective process of 
inquiry to satisfactory (verifiable) consequences is the true idea. The 
test of the truth of an idea lies in the instrumental capacity of an idea 
{hypothesis) to remove some specific trouble or perplexity. 
Methodology 
It has been established in the previous discussion that Dewey as-
serted that method has priority in the effort of the organism to know nature. 
This is based on the recognition that each reflective inquiry grows out 
of a particular problem with a conclusion that has validity in a specific 
context. If the value of our conclusions are to be perpetuated they must 
be involved in new problematic situations. In the new processes of in-
quiry, the old conclusions take on the character of categories or habits 
which have grown out of other situations . The se categories or habits are 
really attitudes which represent "a point of view, a schedule, a program, 
a heading or caption, a n orientation , a poss ible mode of prediction. 114 2 
These habits or categories are the result of prior analyses and have been 
verified in a particular context of experience. When it was suggested 
42 Dewey, Art as Experience . (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 
1934), p, 120. 
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above that nat ure has structure, it wa s pointed out that our knowledge has 
grow n out of the re s u lts of inte ra ctions in our expe rience, and on this 
basis assumptions a re always subject to revision. 
The validity of our assumptions about nature lies in the recurrence 
of s ituations which are similar and which yield similar conclusions. 
Standardized views, categories or habits are never ... final. They are like 
bridges, intermediate in position, by which we come to a fuller meaning 
of life and existence. They are instrumental and functional _hypotheses 
which have been validated in particular situations. Each inq1uiry has a 
particular referent in a unique biological or cultural situation. When we 
move to '1'lew situations we take our funded experiences with us but since 
the conclusions of prior in~uiry have grown out of a particular contextual 
situation they must be v iewed only as hypotheses in new situations. Dewey 
is saying simply that c onclusions of particular inquiries are functional 
and always subject to re-appraisal. 43 
Philosophy mus t move out of this particular situational approach to 
life if it is to make mea ningful connections. Dewey says that philoso-
phica 1 inquiry must a dopt t he methodology of science to accomplish this 
transition from individual ins tances of successful terminations of inquiry 
to inferences about relationships in genera l. The method of science 
which Dewey advocates for philo s ophic a l discussion is an extension in 
the domain of inquiry . Inquiry for science moves i nto the dimension of 
43 Dewey, Logic: The The ory of Inq ui ry , p. 168 . 
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the 'nihcation of know edge by a bstra cting individual qualitative features 
of the experiential situation into quantitative relationships. Scientific 
methodology, for Dewe y , means "those methods of control of formation 
of judgment . .,44 Philosophy must use such an approach if it is to deal 
meaningfully with the problems of human life. Otherwise, one may ex-
pect philosophy to stay in an ivory tower out of touch with rea 1 existence. 
If philosophy declines to observe and interpret the new and char-
acteristic scene, it may achieve scholarship; it may erect a we 11 
equipped gymnasium wherein to engage in dia lectica 1 exercises; it 
may clothe itself in fine literary art. But it will not afford illumina-
tion or direction to our confused civilization. 45 
Philosophy will be beneficial if it uses the methodology of science. Such 
a methodology seeks out constant relationships in a changing world with 
a view to identifying recurrent meaningful relationships. Science collects 
materials of qualitative experience and then selects and modifies them so 
that certain relations are experienced. Science translates qualitative 
factors which grow out of "non-cognitive" experience (particular in nature) 
into quantitative factors which have inferential value. 
_trhe quantitative approach recognizey broad smooth highways by 
means of which we can trave 1 from the thought of one part of nature 
to that of any other . In ideal, at least, we can travel from any mean-
ing--or re lation--found anywhere in nature to the meaning to be ex-
pected anywhere else. 46 
Dewey has recognized two important points in his methodology: 
44 
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(1) the structure of nature has qualitative factors which may be instrumen-
tal in the formation of hypotheses about nature; (2) scientific method ab-
stracts qualitative factors in order to provide hypotheses for the solution 
of new problems in the dimension of "intelligence." Science is always 
aw~re, however, that the quantitative relationship which is basic to its 
inference has an original qualitative reference which grew out of particular 
experience. Science, therefore, sees the unification as a whole in the 
continuum of experience. Man and nature are in a union of experience. 
Man and nature--the possible and actual, personal and materia 1--are 
united. Science uses this approach with a view to defining desired re-
lationships which may be tested. Scientific method is an instrument which 
distils the qualities found in experience into quantitative relations so 
that the process of inquiry can reach its goal--objects of knowledge--or 
the solution to the problem. 
Dewey takes this scientific rriethodology and makes it the basis for 
his experimental logic. By selection, it recognizes qualitative factors in 
human experience and through the reflective thinking process "projects 
methods by which future thinking shall take advantage of the operations 
which lead to success and avoid those which result in failure. 114 7 
Knowledge 
Dewey's methodology as outlined above suggests a process whereby 
47 
Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 135. 
53 
the qua lita tive factors i n experience are given the s tatus of quantitative 
relations through the extension of the process of inquiry to logical con-
structions and relationships. There are three major aspects in the process 
of inquiry, whether the organism is involved in dealing with immediate 
particular situations or making logical relationships: (1) there is an ex-
perienced difficulty; (2) formulation of a problem with a proposed solution;. 
and (3) verification. The process of inquiry is not knowledge but it is 
instrumental in creating objects of knowledge. Knowledge is never im-
mediate, for Dewey; rather it grows out of a completed process of inquiry 
on the level of intelligence. In other words, knowledge is not finding 
existences in nature which answer the problem but knowledge is the 
verified conclusion of a systematic complex set of data--ideas or hypoth-
eses--which have ins trumental value in settling experienced difficulties. 
It may be admitted that there is a rea 1 sense in which knowledge 
(as distinct from thinking or inquiring with a guess attached) does 
not come into existence till thinking has terminated in the experimen-
tal act which fulfils the specifications set forth in thinking ... Now 
this conclusion--as the word denotes-- is thinking brought to a close, 
done with. 48 
This statement sugge sts that Dewey recog nized knowledge to be the end 
product of an experiment which has been thought through and validated. 
He says in fact "that all knowledge, as issuing from reflection, is ex-
perimental (in the literal sense of experimenta l) ... ,.49 
Knowledge then is not a process nor is it to be equated with think-
48Dewey, Essays l!l.Experimenta l Logic, p, 15 , 
4 9 Ibid . , p . 13 . 
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ing or inquiry. It is end of a proce ss of re flective thinking which has 
been critically tested and validated by experimental procedures. There-
fore , "knowledge in the emphatic sense does not exist till inference has 
ceased. 115 O That which leads to experimentally verified knowledge is 
the process of critical inquiry--reflective thinking--but the process 
must not be confused with the conclusion . 
From this point of view, the subject- matter of knowlecjge is precisely 
that which we do not think of, or mentally refer to in any way, being 
that which is taken as a matter of course, but it is nevertheless 
knowledge i n virtue of the inquiry which has led up to it. 51 
Knowledge is the outgrowth of a scientific methodology set in the 
framework of experience. The things we experience directly exist prior 
to being known in a "non-cognitive" experiential context. The experi-
enced thing, however, is distinct from the subsequent object of knowledge. 
The experienced thing is subject-matter for knowledge, but the object of 
knowledge is the product of the process of logical scientific reconstruc-
tion of experience through inquiry. 
I, . too, conceive that things had in direct experience exist prior 
to being known . But I deny the identity of things had in direct ex-
perience with the object of knowle dge qua object of knowledge. 
Things had in experience exist prior to reflection and its eventualiza-
tion in an object of knowledge ; but the latter, as such is a deliberately 
effected rearrangem ent or re-disposition, by means of overt operation, 
of such antecedent existe nces. 52 
The thought process is the intentional direction of the organism 
5 0rbid. , p. 16 • 
51 Ibid. 
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\,vhich guides the inqui ry to anticipated consequences. Thought is the in-
strument which converts anticipated consequences into knowledge. The 
anticipated consequences are the controls which thought uses in select-
ing ingredients from the field of nature. 
flhinking mus.!7 obtain that meaning or conceptual structure which 
is best adapted to instigate and direct just those operations of ob-
servation that will secure as their consequences just those existen-
tial facts that are needed to solve the problem at hand. 53 
Consequences are logical directives for the experiment. These proposed 
conseque nces grow out of anticipations based on past experience. But this 
is only one side of the picture because consequences are also proposals 
for experimental verification. As proposals they are hypotheses which di-
rect the process and as consequences they test the anticipated results. 54 
The final phase of inquiry comes into focus when we see the crude 
subject matter of original experie nee trans lated into a logica 1 construe-
tion--object of knowledge. As we have seen, out of the "non-cognitive" 
elements in experience, the organism experiences difficulties which set 
the process of inquiry into motion. 55 Moving beyond particular qualitative 
responses, the organism may use th e scientific approach to expand con-
trol. That which moves the process along is the idea or hypothesis. The 
idea must be formulated into propos itions of the if-then variety so that 
the effectiveness of the hypothes i s or its alternatives may be ascertained. 
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These universal propositions of the if-then variety are simply hypotheses; 
they have no existence in the nature of things. 5 6 The idea, which is the 
logical instrument by means of which an abstraction or selection of cer-
tain conditions or relations in nature, is accomplished. The idea is em-
bodied in a proposition and then subjected to verification in experience. 
Dewey says, "While inquiry into inquiry is the cause cognoscendi of 
logical form, primary inquiry is itself cause essendi of the forms which 
inquiry into inquiry discloses. 115 7 In more simple language Dewey says, 
"forms regularly accrue to matter in virtue of the adaptation of materials 
and operations to one another in the service of specific ends. 1158 Forms 
are represented by the propositions; matter is represented by nature, and 
the specific end is represented by the idea. The proposition imposes it-
self on nature and is subject to verification. The idea then has accom-
plished a re-organization from selected subject matter to logical instru-
mentality (idea) which may be verified. Knowledge has been crystalized 
into verifiable objects. The object of knowledge is a logical construe-
tion but must never be isolated from the original subject matter of experi-
e nee which gave it birth because its verification depends on the existen-
tial referent. 
Truth 
56Dewey, Logic: ~ Theory of Inquiry, pp. 272-280, 471. 
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All knowledge is the result of the satisfactory culmination (conse-
quences) of a process of inquiry. Knowledge is not in things; rather, it 
grows out of a functiona 1 methodology which controls a situation for the 
purpose of solving a problem. The consequence has practical individual 
significance. It is not isolated or eternally fixed. 
The idea which guides the process of inquiry is originally hypothet-
ical. It is an hypothesis until the problem is worked out and verified in 
an experimental situation. When the idea satisfies the natural demands 
of the situation--biological or cultural--which gave rise to the problem, 
it becomes an object of knowledge, a verified consequence of the process. 
But what is truth1? The idea or hypothesis which guides us to the 
satisfactory fulfilment of our aim is the true one. Ideas are instrumen-
talities to the solution of a problem situation. True ideas are those which 
lead to successful resolutions. They may be tested only by reference to 
the original problem oriented situation. 
If an idea (hypothesis) succeeds in clarifying a problem situation, 
it is reliable, valid, good, true. If it fails to accomplish this end, it is 
false. The truth of any idea is related to the disturbed experiential situa-
tion and must prove its validity by reference to the situation which gave 
it birth. When we experience the resolved consequence, we call the 
idea that led to the solution a true idea. Truth and knowledge are to be 
distinguished; truth has reference to the successful idea while knowledge 
refers to the consequences--object of knowledge. Until we experience 
a satisfactory consequence, our proposition (idea) is hypothetical--part 
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of the process of inquiry. When the hypothesis (idea, proposition) is 
verified, it becomes true. Its truth is dependent upon the capacity of the 
idea to satisfy personal needs and the objective nature which made up the 
original experiential situation • 
• • • when there is a specific need for thinking, and a specific hypoth-
esis emerges in response to the need, it is needful that we should 
have some way of testing its value, of developing it to the point of 
being true or false. · And acting upon the hypothesis to select and 
collect data, to predict, to guide new observations and reflections, 
to organize the seemingly discrepant and to illuminate the hitherto 
obscure in the way. The success of the hypothesis upon and along 
this way is its truth. 59 
Dewey's approach to knowledge has kept the continuity of experience 
in tact. Man in the solution of his problems never goes out of the dimen-
sion of human experience and thought to solve his problems. He abstracts 
qualitative factors from existent reality (nature) when problems arise in 
order to make quantitative relational inferences. But the .inferences must 
always be checked for validity by observable experiments in the situation 
which gave it birth. 
Theory of Value 
· In the discussion above it was observed that truth is the effective-
ness of an idea to guide a process of inquiry and that such an idea is 
finally verifiable with reference to ah experimental situation. It would 
be incomplete to leave a discussion of the Deweyan viewpoint with veri-
59John Dewey, "A Reply to Professor Royce's Critic of Instrumen-
talism," The Philosophical Review, XXI (January, 1912), p. 75. 
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fication in terms of material items alone. The needs and problems of man 
are not exhausted by biological and physical knowledge. The following 
.discussion will seek to show that reflective thought involves verification 
in terms of human satisfaction, harmony, appreciation, happiness and 
goodness. When we understand "good" as that which ameliorates exist-
ing human problems, then the term: "good" may be more appropriately ap-
plied to the successful hypotheses of inquiry than the term "true." How-
ever, the true is the good and the good is finally the true .. The terms are 
essentially interchangable. 60 
A discussion of "value" introduces us to the moral sphere of human 
intercourse where the process of inquiry is viewed in the reconstruction 
of personal and social action. The moral problem asks whether intelli-
gent guidance of conduct is possible. It affirms that intelligent guid-
ance is possible but only on the basis of continual revision in accordance 
with changing conditions. 
The term Dewey uses to identify the forward looking or future ori-
ented inquiry is "value." Value theory looks to the future and asks what 
is "valuable." The terms knowledge, true, and good have reference to 
the end of a process of inquiry. When a transfer occurs from the present 
"good" to what will be "good" in the future, when reference shifts. from a 
present valid consequence growing out of inquiry to the question of how 
may we apply the valid (static) consequence to new situations, then 
60Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 211. 
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Dewey changes his terminology to a cons,ideration of "val\le. " To apply 
the term value means that it "is never complete in itself, but always in 
behalf of determining what .is to be done ••• Judgments of value imply that 
value is not anythinJ previously given, bµt something to be given by 
future action itself conditioned upon the judgment. 1161 Dewey is suggest-
ing that values are the point at which thought and action, theory and 
practice meet. Conclusion of previous inquiry is the source of judgments 
about value but such conclusions are valuable only if they continue to be 
instrumental in present and future situations. 
Moral Philosophy 
John Dewey's approach to moral philosophy is basically the same 
as the philosophical orientation outlined earlier in this discussion. He 
is of the opinion that morals and philosophy are one in the sense that the 
integrity of inquiry is demanded. The moral problem begins with the 
question as to whether intelligent guidance in the pursuit of life with its 
problems is possible. The answer to the question must be approached 
from the point of view of a methodology consistent with inquiry in the 
context of human experience. Verification of proposed moral solutions 
must be constantly applied within the continuum of experience as both the 
human being involved and the particular environment undergo change. 62 
61 Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 361. 
62 · 
John l)ewey, "The Objects of Valuation," Journal of Philosophy, 
XV, (May 9, 1918) pp. 253-258. 
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Dewey says conclusions must be subject to revision "as we find observa-
tional data which supply better evidence, and as growth of science pro-
vides better directive hypotheses to draw upon ... 63 
The Deweyan approach to morals is clearly a reaction to traditional 
formulations of a fixed immutable good which has been handed down from 
above. Dewey suggests that the absolute criterion of "good" which gains 
its authority from a realm outside human experience,,has no basis in fact. 
Traditionally conceived moral systems have erred, he says, in assuming 
that :judgment of good and bad from empirical sources are somehow ''in-
ferior" to supposed transcendental sources of value. He says that when 
traditional philosophy relegated the criterion of value to sources outside 
human. experience they became academic and unrealistic. 
Unless philosophies are to be Edens of compensatory refuge, reached 
through an exercise of dialectic ingenuity they must face the situa-
tion which is there .. It is their business to bring intellectual order 
out of the confusion of beliefs. 64 
The business of moral philosophy finds its referent in human exper-
iential situations. It must use all the human disciplines of ]<now ledge in 
its search for values--it must "converge all the instrumentalities of the 
social arts, of law, education and political science upon construction of 
intellectual methods of improving our common lot. 1165 Moral philosophy 
begins then with experienced difficulties in the conduct of human life and 
63Dewey, The Quest for Certaintv, p. 173. 
64 · 
Dewey, The Influence Qf Darwin 2E Philosophy, p •. 17. 
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brings funded human experience together into a methodological approach 
to the problem. 
flhe task of moral philosophy is tw become a method of locating and 
interpreting the more serious conflicts that occur in life, and a method 
of projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of moral and po-
litical diagnosis and prognosis. 66 
Such an approach will lead to a restoration of harmony between belie'fs 
and practices. Men customarily seek empirically oriented activities in 
the solution to problems arising out of unrest in social and natural prob-
lems and catastrophies. Then they turn right around and suggest that 
somehow, they know not how, they were guided by transcendental direc-
tives. Dewey asserts, "the problem of restoration and cooperation be-
tween man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs.· 
about the values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deep-
est problem of modern life. "6 7 
Dewey was never content to dwell in a state of reactfon. He sug-
gested that science already possesses the methodology and means "of 
effecting the needed integration in the wider field of collective human 
experience. 1168 Science revolutionized knowledge of the physical world 
when it extricated its discipline from ontological considerations and 
"when material of direct and uncontrolled experience was taken as prob-
lematic; as supplying material to be transformed by reflective operations 
66 Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 69. 
6 7 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 2 56. 
68Ibid., p. 255. 
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into known objects~' 11 •6-9 Science made significant progress when conse-
quences of operations became the criterion of judgment rather than appeal 
to immediate knowledge. Likewise, Dewey argues that escape from 
"transcendental absolutism" in morals will come about when scientific 
method is put into practice. On such a basis value will not be separated 
from human experience. Contrary to some criticisms, Dewey never said 
that values are identical to immediate pleasurable experiences. Values 
come into focus, he said, when "enjoyments .•• are the consequences of 
intelligent action. Without the intervention of thought, enjoyments are 
not values but problematic goods, becoming values only when they re-
issue in a changed form from intelligent behavior. ,. 70 
As indicated in the opening remarks of this section, Dewey makes 
a terminological distinction between "good" and "value." Good and bad 
are terms which refer to ideas in moral situations which have been found 
either satisfactory (good) or unsatisfactory (bad). Satisfactory solutions 
which have been designated "good" always refer to a particular process 
of thought. They have been found instrumental in a completed inquiry, 
however, they do not necessarily possess such standing in new moral 
situations. When attention is shifted from what has been "good" to what 
might be "good",-Dewey uses the term "value." 
I'r9p9siti-qns,abbµLwh,at is or has been Uked :are.qf''instrum~rrtal .value 
in reaching judgments of value in so far as the conditions and conse-
69Ibid. 
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quences of the thing liked are thought about. In themselves they 
make no claims; they put forth no demand upon subsequent attitudes 
and acts; they profess no authority to direct. 71 
Dewey makes this contrast between "good"' and "value" explicit. He says, 
"a judgment about what is to be desired and enjoyed is, on the other hand, 
a claim on future action; it possesses de jure and not merely de facto 
quality ... 72 
When Dewey's moral philosophy is viewed in proper perspective, 
one immediately recognizes that such an approach, beginning as it does 
with concrete experience, is in no sense a cunningly devi$ed plan to 
cast aside time tested moral principles. Dewey said that, in the frame-
work of his methodology, many traditional values would continue to be 
effective and instrumental. His hope was that ethical formulations would 
one day be viewed from the experiential situations which gave them birth 
rather than ascribing them transcendental relationships which have no 
basis in experience. To point out the conservation of current values in 
the Deweyan approach, Dewey suggests that such moral qualities as 
truthfulness, honesty, chastity and amiability are moral in the emphatic 
sense. However, they are in no sense transcendental. Such traits con-
tinue to be instrumental because they are pivotal--that is, they carry 
other attitudes with them. They persist, not because they are inherent 
in the universe, but because they are related as instrumentalities in a 
7lrbid. t p, 259, 
72 Ibid., p. 262. 
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variety of situations. 
They are moral in an emphatic sense not because they are isolated 
and exclusive, but because they are :so intimately connected with 
thousands of other attitudes which we do not explicitly recognize--
which perhaps we have not even names for. 73 ._ 
In the Deweyan approach to moral philosophy, moral laws received their 
significance from tpeir effectiveness. 
A moral law ••• is a formula of the way to respond when specific con-
ditions present themselves. Its soundness and pertinence are tested 
by what happens when specific conditions present themselves .•• Its 
t:,laim to authority rests finaliy upon the meritiveness of the solution 
that has to be dealt·wtth, not upon its intrinsic nature--as any tool 
achieves dignity in the measure of the needs served by it. 74 
Dewey's moral philosophy has as its primary aim the intelligent 
forecast or suggested guide-lines for moral action. Such guide-lines grow 
out of a reflective evaluation of past successes (good actions) but with 
a view to their possible instrumentality in future moral situations. Con-
' 
sequently, Dewey's moral philosophy moves to a consideration of "value" 
in the creative development which is life •. 
Valuation 
In the following discussion Dewey• s concept of value will be anal-
yzed. The purpose of this analysis is to show how Dewey approached the 
problem of human moral directives and to suggest what constitutes the 
nature of value. Different value systems wl 11 be contrasted wl th the 
~3John Dewey, Democracy and Education, (New York: 'l'he Mac-
Millan Co., 1922), p. 415. 
74Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 278. 
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Deweyan approach. The aim is to show that valuation is built on the basis 
of scientific methodology. Scientific methodology must be applied to moral 
problems if moral concerns are to be meaningful in evolving human experience. 
A survey of natural science, Dewey says, shows that value-facts or 
conceptions do not enter the field of discussion. However, when human 
conduct becomes involved and the question of "should" enters, conduct 
"seems to be influenced, if not controlled, by estimates of value or worth 
of ends to be attained." 75 Consequently, with the rise of value theory 
separate from the facts of natural science, the legitimacy and test of 
"value-facts" becomes an important phase of human inquiry. 
Dewey rejects the idea that values are based simply on feelings 
which have no objective basis. Values arise in the continuum of experi-
ence and are observable. Since value judgments and the results which 
flow from such judgments are observable, Dewey concludes that values 
are open to public examination and test. Being public, values are there-
fore set in a social context. Values being observable and open to the 
public test of social examination take on the nature of propositions. 76 
The question is raised as to the legitimacy of calling activities by the 
name value when such activities are set in existential situations. It 
will be recalled that Dewey classifies existence under the heading of 
7 5John Dewey, "Theory of Valuation, "International Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science, Vol. II, Foundations of the Unity of Science, No. 4, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 2. 
7 6rbid . , p . 12 . 
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immediacy or that which is experienced directly while knowledge is taken 
to be mediated. Dewey's value theory recognizes the interaction between 
the individual and his environment. Values in the same manner as knowlr-
edge-facts arise out of a person's encounter with disturbances in his en-
vironment. Dewey says that propositions which arise out of such activi-
ties ''refer directly to an existing situation which it is intended and de-
sired to produce. ,,77 The designation "value" is applied to the interme-
diate conditions which produce a desired change in the future. It is in this 
context that Dewey distinguishes between scientific knowledge and value 
knowledge. Scientific knowledge reflects solutions to problems arising 
out of natural phenomena while "value-facts" refer to interpersonal goal 
directed desires. Scientific knowledge is pronounced valid or invalid--
true or false. Values are classified as good or bad. The criterion of a 
"value-expression" is. to be found in the consequences that follow from 
a given activity. 
It is· 'bad' in the sense that it is objected to, while a future situation 
is anticipated ••• what emerges are propositions assigning a relatively 
negative value to existing conditions; a comparatively positive value 
to a prospective set of conditions. 78 
Two problems emerge, according to Dewey. One problem is in the 
area of active or behavioral attitude and involves--liking and disliking. 
The other problem is in "the relation of valuation to things as means-end. ,,79 




Liking as a behavioral attitude involves, in contrast to wishing which 
occurs in the absence of effort, prizing or caring for c). change strongly 
enough to put forth effort to realize the desired goal. Valuation in this 
first sense of liking, therefore, involves desiring. There is something 
lacking which is desirable and effort is put forth to realize it in experi-
ence.80 "When •.• 'valuation' is defined in terms of desiring, the prerequi-
site is a treatment of desire in terms of the existential context in which 
it arises and functions •11- 81 Desires, therefore, are not purely personal 
in the sense of fellings alone; desires are set in the framework of personal 
and existential encounter. It is at this point that desires as values may 
be checked public ally, according to Dewey . 
. . . valuation in its connection with desire is limited to the existential 
situation and ..• it differs with differences in its existential context 
•.. the adeq~acy of a given desire can be stated in propositions. The 
propositions are capable of empirical test ..• 82 
Dewey is suggesting here that desires are like disturbances which the 
human organism endeavors to remedy through changing the situation to a 
condition which comes closer to fulfilment of proposed need. Therefore, 
instead of being mysterious inherent feelings, desires arise in the con-
tinuum of experience and may be checked according to the usefulness of 
the fulfilled de sire in the situational consequence. 
Dewey not only reacted to building a theory of valuation solely on 
80rbid. , p. 15. 
81Ibid. , p. 16. 
82 
Ibid. I p. 16-17. 
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feelings separated from the existential situat~on which stands behind de-
sire, but he also criticized the view that "a desire is any object of any 
interest. 1183 Interest is intermediate in nature for Dewey, not some 
quality in and of itself. He says, "The word 'interest' suggests in a 
forcible way the active connection between personal activity and the con-
ditions that must be taken into account in the theory of valuation. 1184 A 
person has an .interest when something is at stake, when that person is 
involved to the degree that the final outcome makes a difference person-
ally. In order to ascertain the "valuation-capacity" of interest, one must, 
as with desire, check the existential context in which the interest arises. 
Dewey concludes that both desires and interests are activities which 
take place in the world and have an effect on the situation which origin-
ally called forth the activity. 
The first problem of valuation under consideration--that of the ac-
tive or behaviorai attitude of liking or dis.liking--has shown that desires 
and interests involve matter-of-value-fact propositions. Such propositions 
are the foundation on which the science of value theory rests. This leads 
to Dewey's second problem: the relation of valuation to things as "means-
ends" or :to_. the problem of the nature of appraisal or evaluation itself. 
Dewey says that in pursuit of a desired goal some activities are intelli-
gently rejected (in contrast to blind trial and error), while others are 
83rbid, I p, 18, 
84 rbid. , p. 17. 
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accepted as useful in realizing the end-in-view. "Examination of •.. ap-
praisa ls discloses that they have to do with things as they sustain to 
each other the relation of means to ends or consequences."85 
Valuation, therefore, is in a means-end relationship. He saj.dl that 
traditionalists argue that on the basis of this approach there is no way to 
point out ends which are intrinsically good or bad in themselves. Tradi-
tionalists insist that evaluation must distinguish between the intrinsic 
value {that which is prized) and means (that which is appraising). Dewey 
says the "problem as to the relation between appraisal of things as means 
and prizing of things as ends 118 6 must ask if in the nature of things ends 
can really be separable from means. He concludes that the separation is 
falacious. 
For what is deliberation except weighing the various alternative dl;;l-
sires (and hence end-views) in terms of the conditons that are the 
means of their execution and which, as means, determine the conse-
quences actually arrived at? l'here can be no control of the opera-
tion of foreseeing consequences (and hence of forming ends-in-view) 
save in terms of conditions that operate as the causal conditions of 
their attainment. The proposition in which any object adopted as an 
end-in-view is statable (or explicitly stated) is warranted in just the 
degree to which existing conditions have been surveyed and appraised 
in their capacity as means. 87 
Dewey is here insisting that means-ends are inseparable on a cause and 
effect basis. He rejects ends as intrinsically good and separable from 
action. The notion of separation of means-ends by traditionalists, ac-
85 Ibid., p. 23. 
8 6Ibid. , p. 2 5 . 
87 Ibid. 
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cording to Dewey, "does not, in any case, state a self-evident truth. 1188 
If~ as Dewey suggests, means-ends are inseparable and there is no 
intrinsic separable ends, what then becomes the basis of judgment or eval-
uation? Dewey says that common sense shows some things are "short-
sighted, 'blind', and others, in contrast, ... enlightened, farsighted. 1189 
He adds that the criterion of value is simply the ability of the approved 
course of action to be a useful "conditioning means to further conset ·· 
quences."90 Common sense, he says, has always judged action on the 
basis of continuing usefulness. Dewey argues that the notion of the im-
mediate, intrinsic, inherent nature of an end resulted when the end-in-
view was mistakenly separated from the means which produced the. orlginal 
E;!nd. The same procedure has been followed when the terms "intrinsic" 
and "extrinsic" are used when applied to values. 
Relational properties do not lose their intrinsic quality of being just 
what they are because their coming into being is caused by something 
'extrinsic' .... The trouble, once more, is that a dialectic of concepts 
has taken the place of examination of actua 1 empirical facts. The 
extreme instana:e; of the view that to be intrinsic is to be out of any 
relation is found in those writers who hold that since values are 
intrinsic they cannot depend upon an~ relation whatever and certainly 
not upon a relation to human beings. 1 
Dewey suggests that the way to escape the erroneous value theories 
of the past and to make valuation an object of scientific knowledge lies 
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in the recognition of two important factors: (1) value theory must involve 
knowledge based on "an ascertained correlation of changes ..• beyond the 
possibility of denial. •. " ;92 (2) equally important-- "anything taken as an 
end is in its own content or constituents a c:rorre lation of the energies, 
personal and extra-personal, which operate as means ... 93 
An end as an actual consequence, as an existing outcome, is, like 
any other occurrence which is scientifically analyzed, nothing but the 
interaction of the conditions that bring it to pass, Hence it follows 
necessarily that the idea of the object of desire and interest, the end-
in-view as distinct from the end or outcome actually affected, is war-
ranted in the precise degree in which it is formed in terms of these 
operating conditions. 94 
On the basis of the above criterion Dewey points out the importance 
of deferred values. He accomplishes this by distinguishing between "de-
sired" and "desirable." On the basis of experience and reflective intel-
ligence, Dewey says, the individua 1 finds that not everything desired has 
the value of being desirable. That which is desirable does not come from 
supra-human realrnsbut arises exclusively within the framework of human 
experience. Human experience is social in nature because man is a social 
animal. 
The 'desirable, ' or the object which should be desired (valued), does 
not descend out of the a priori blue nor descend as an imperative from 
a Mount Sinai. It presents itself because past experience has shown 
that hasty action upon uncriticized desire leads to defeat and to catas-
trophe. The 'desirable' as distinct from the 'desired' does not then 
9 2 Ibid . , p . 2 9 . 
93 Ibid .. 
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designate something at large or a priori. It points to the difference 
between the operation and consequence of unexamined impulses and 
those desires and interests that are the product of invesUgation of 
conditions and consequences. Social conditions and pressures are 
part of the conditions that effect the execution of desires. 95 
Valuation is limited to goals which are set up as ends-in-view when 
problem situations are involved. Dewey points out that much human activ-
ity is carried on without recourse to purpose or ends-in-view. The vital 
impulses and habitual action are examples of unreflective action which 
no longer involves conscious goal seeking or value. Reflex actions and 
what modern psychologists call "over-learning" (walking) would be illus-
trations of activities minus conscious ends-in-view. Dewey says,. "These 
rudimentary examples are typica 1 of much human activity. Behavior is 
often so direct that no desires and ends intervene and no valuations 
96 
take place. " 
Dewey makes provision for changing circumstances. Desire and 
an end.;.;in-view may become operative in a situation which has been based 
on habitual action if the common ways of acting are disturbed. In such 
an eventuality valuation replaces the non-intellectual forms of activity. 
Such activity is predicated on the need of the organism for change; "val-
uation takes place only when there is something the matter ..• there is 
present an intellectual factor--a factor of inquiry--whenever there is 
95Ibid., 32. 
96Ibid. , p. 34. 
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valuation. ,.97 The actual successful completion of an inquiry directed 
toward the goal of relieving a problem situation which has previously 
blocked the path of desire carries with it a sense of satisfaction. Satis-
faction signifies that the tension has been released and the end-in-view 
has been reached. 
Satisfaction of desire signifies that the lack, characteristic of the 
situation evoking desire, has been so met that the means used make 
sufficient, in the most literal sense, the conditions for accomplish-
ing-the end. 98 
Dewey reacted to subjectivistic interpretations of need-satisfactions. 
Valuation, he said, is always "a relation between a personal attitude and 
extra-personal things~- 1199 So-called felt-value is a contradiction to hu-
man experience. Felt-value implies an immediate, direct experience 
which according to the Deweyan analysis of valuation is impossible. lOO 
Dewey's theory of valuation, as his theory of knowledge, makes 
provision for change and open-endedness on the one hand and relative 
stability on the other. The realized ends are warranted values as long as 
they maintain the characteristic of usefulness. Values which act as guides 
to action receive the designation "good" when successfully tested as 
consequences in experiential situations. Values are projections of prob-
able satisfactory actions. Good is applied to actions already validated 
97Ibid. 
98 
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in experience. Neither "the good" or "the valued" may be separated 
from the situation which gave them birth. They are not ontological realities, 
Dewey in this sense objects to the notion of "finality" as such but rec-
ognizes that a value may be final in the sense of providing a legitimate 
solution to a particular concrete problem. 
A value is final in the sense that it represents the conclusion of a 
process of analytic appraisals of conditions operating in a concrete 
case, the conditions including impulses and desires on one side and 
external conditions on the other. Any conclusion reached by an in-
quiry that is taken to warrant the conclusion is 'final' for that case 
... There is a fundamental difference between a final property or 
quality and the property or quality of finality.101 
Summing up Dewey's value theory, it is important to remember that 
for Dewey valuation, in the same manner as inquiry in matters of fact, in-
volves an intellectual factor which begins when a person in an environ-
ment finds the situation disturbed or troubled. Values are literally ends-
in-view held as goals for the resolution of human problems set in a social 
context. Without tension there would be no desire; and without desire 
there would be no conscious effort or interest in changing the particular 
problem situation. The ends-in-view or potential values are appraised 
"good or bad on the ground of their serviceability in the direction of be-
havior dealing with states of affairs found to be objectionable because of 
some lack or conflict in them ... lOZ The end:...in-view is good, right or 
proper in proportion to the ability of activities which it originates to ac-
lOlibid., p. 45. 
lOZibid., p. 47. 
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complish satisfactory consequences, Bad, wrong or improper are adjec-
tives used to describe activities which fail to bring satisfactory results 
in the accomplishment of the proposed goal. 
The end-in-view is an intellectual operation. The content of the 
end-in-view is set in an experiential frame-of-reference. To realize the 
end-in-view or satisfactory consequence, according to Dewey, one can-
not separate the organization of activities from the .end itself. 
The content of the end as an object held in view is intellectual or 
methoddl:ogtcal; ..••.. 
The end-in~view· is that particular activity which operates as a co-
ordinating factor of all other subactivities involved. l 03 
The means are those activities in the continuum of experience and 
action which iead to the end-in-view, Consequently, it is impossible to 
separate means and ends, except functionally, because they stand in a 
cause-effect relationship, 
The attained end or consequence is always an organization of activ-
ities, where organization is a co-ordination of all activities which 
enter as factors. The end-in-view is that particular activity which 
operates as a co-ordinating factor of all other subactivities in-
volved. l 04 . 
Dewey's value theory is a consistent attempt to articulate a value 
system set in the framework of experiential considerations without refer-
ence to supra-human criteria, Dewey's naturalistic value system builds 
on both his naturalistic metaphysics and problem oriented theory of knowl-
edge. Dewey's value system, therefore, accepts the non-purposeful 
l 031b1' d. , 48 49 p, - • 
l 04Ibid. 
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factors of human existence on the one hand, and the goal directed ends-
in-view of the human organism on the other. Dewey considers man to be 
basically a social animal. Therefore, the problems of value for man, set 
in an environment of inter-personal experiential reality, are basically 
social in origin. Man's social evolution has resulted because of the 
capacity of man to project values and experimentally validate them in 
the progressive continuum of experience. 
Summary 
The philosophy of John Dewey is set completely within the frame-
work of human experience. He does, however, make metaphysical as-
sumptions which have grown out of his methodological approach to ex-
perience and the problems encountered by man in his environment. The 
critics suggest that such an approach is somewhat less than philosophical. 
They react to an explanation of knowledge and value which does not neces-
sitate reference to a realm of permanent reality which is separate from the 
change and flux of human experience. 
Robert M. Hutchins suggests that Dewey's pragmatic philosophy 
"is not a philosophy at all, because it supplies no intelligible standard 
of good or bad. "105 Hutchins' criticism is at the heart of the entire con-
temporary critic's dissatisfaction with the Deweyan approach. The con-
temporary critics, in the traditionalist approach, are of the opinion that 
105Hutchins, The Conflict in Education, p, 53. 
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objective intellectual standards conceived in terms of fixed essences are 
essential to both education and philosophy. Dewey, as the foregoing 
' 
analysis has shown, emphasizes that intellectual standards never stand 
alone. He argued that the intellectual process is part of a means-end re-
lationship which cannot be artifically separated into a so-called fixed 
immutable world of "truth" separated from the world of "experience". 
In the following discussion the educational philosophy of John Dewey will 
be analyzed. The tension between Dewey and the traditionalists with re-
spect to basic philosophy will, if possible, be even more pronounced in 
the area of educational philosophy. 
CHAPTER IV 
DEWEY'S EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: 
DEMOCRACY, ACTIVITY, INTEREST AND SUBJECT MATTER 
John Dewey felt that philosophy and education were two sides of the 
same coin, Philosophy, he felt, has played only a minor role in the 
course of human events because it has been looked upon as a game of 
words for starry-eyed dreamers. To be vital and instrumental, philosophy 
must get into the stream of life. The point of entrance into life for phi-
losophy, Dewey taught, must necessarily be education. Education brings 
philosophy out of the ivory tower and d(;lmands that the presuppositions of 
the philosophy be put to the test of human experience. 
The educational point of view enables one to envisage the philosophic 
problems where they arise and thrive, where they are at home, and 
where acceptance or rejection makes a difference ..• philosophy may 
even be defined as the general theory of education. Unless philos-
ophy is to remain symbolic--or verbal--or sentimental indulgence 
for a few, or else arbitrary dogma, its auditing of past experi(;:lnce 
and its program of value must take effect in conduct. 1 
Dewey suggested that education should provide educational situations 
in which the child and his environment are given serious consideration. 
One of Dewey's key conceptions is that of growth. Growth within the 
1Dewey, Education and Democracy, p. 383. 
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Deweyan philosophy of education has a specific and guarded meaning. 
Growth is not as the critics assume completely without adult concern or 
reference to the cultural heritage. Nor is undirected growth a cure all for 
all the ills of education as some modem educationists assume. Growth 
is held out as the ideal by many school people without the faintest idea 
of what Dewey really meant by growth. 
Anobher key concept of Dewey which is closely associated with the 
idea of growth is experience. This concept will receive a fuller treatment 
when Dewey's view of subject matter is considered ; however, it is 
important to recognize that Dewey has a specific meaning for the word 
experience. Many educators appear to assume that any educational ex-
perience is valuable just so the child is .interested. Dewey repudiated 
the extreme progressive position which fostered this view. He said some 
modern educators had reacted to traditional education to the point where 
they had failed to recognize those enduring values in traditional educa-
tion . 
. . . I am sure that you will appreciate what is meant when I say that 
many of the newer sahools tend to make little or nothing of organized 
subject-matter of study ... as if the idea that education should be 
concerned with the present and future meant that acquaintance with 
the past has little or no role to play in education .•. these defects 
Lfn progressivisrn7 at least illustrate what is meant by a theory and 
practice of education which procee2s negatively ... rather than by a 
positive ... theory of experience ... 
A positive theory of educational growth in experience is a vital part 
2John Dewey, Experience and Education, (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1938), pp. 9-11. 
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of Dewey I s educational philosophy. But critics have misunderstood the 
Deweyan viewpoint when they assume that Dewey meant by growth the 
3 
accumulated experiences of undirected childhood fancies. On the basis 
of such misconception the critics seem to have a valid question when they 
ask "growth toward what? 11 The apparently unanswerable riddle is not 
derived from the Deweyan position but from the failure to understand 
exactly what Dewey meant by educational growth. 
Dewey's educational philosophy begins as a reaction to traditional 
approaches to education. But after the reaction Dewey erects a positive 
educational philosophy for dealing with the problems of education. Tra-
ditional educational philosophy had set up goals which its adherents felt 
were. inherently valuable and unaffected . by human whims and change. 
Dewey, on the other hand, argued that educational values are just the 
same as any value--ends-in-view. The particular educational value that 
the school wishes to make a vital part of a child's life cannot then be 
separated from growing developing hµman experience. Educational goals 
or values are the result of human interests and desires. The continuing 
validity of a goal or value educationally is its ability to produce satis-
factory solutions to problems which spurred it in the first place. · Those 
goals persist, continue to be valuable, according to Dewey, not because 
they are handed down from some supra-human realm but because they 
continue to satisfactorily fulfil.. the desires and interests. of people. Not 
3Rickover, pp. 136, 137, 138. 
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only do they, on the basis of satisfactory consequences, meet problems 
from the past, but valid warranted educational goals or values provide a 
legitimate and valid foundation for prospective problems in the future. 
Dewey means by growth the capacity of the individual to project 
ends-in-:-view (educational values in this point of reference) and then on 
the basis of intelligent action and reaction which results from practiced 
ability in the art of inqu{W to reach the goal or value. While this is 
growth, it is not finality, because Dewey argu:es that reaching a goal, 
while it is useful and may continue to be useful, also provides for richer 
and more meaningful experience in other areas of understanding. The in -
dividual will be able to see other goals (ends-in-view) when he has thus 
grown and will reach toward new and even broader fulfilments. That there 
is no final end for growth is in reality the means to richer and fuller living. 
Therefore, Dewey says that growth is in a means-end relationship toward 
an increasingly more meaningful life . 
.. The·'critetioq· of ·.a g_oah":'e·ducaUonal value. or end~-in ... vie.w-,.- is that it 
provides the capacity or ability for further growth. Growth, therefore, 
in '.the best Deweyan sense of the word cannot be defined as to a specific 
content which is universally the same for every person. There are to be 
sure, Dewey would say, general goals which educators must provide as 
challenges, but growth is a personal quality ·set in the framework of an 
individual series of fulfilments each of which leads to wider understanding 
and development. · Dewey says that such growth builds on previously laid 
experiential foundations. This is his famous principle of continuity. 
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Growth sets up the conditions for {urther growth: "grON th ..• is one exem-
plification of the principle of continuity. 114 On the basis of this principle 
of continuity Dewey suggests that only those activities which condition 
future successful solutions to problems leads the individual to continuing 
growth. Satisfactory growth then has, for Dewey, the condition of being 
able to produce broader continued growth. 
Growth as an end of education has a specific meaning for Dewey. 
ILdoes not mean, as the subsequent discussion will show, undirected 
activity guided solely by the whim of the child. It does not mean any 
activity so long as the activity in question is pleasant. Growth, for 
Dewey, means a developing capacity to deal successf1,11ly with richer and 
more meaningful areas of life. Such meaningful experiences reached 
thro1,1gh the process of growth in turn become the ground and springboard 
for further development. 
It will be our task in the following discussion to show the educational 
implications of Dewey's theory of growth as a legitimate end of education. 
The arrangement of topics will follow the principle topics and concepts 
criticized by the contemporary critics in the preceding chapters. 
Democracy 
John Dewey conceived of democracy in terms of the intelligent 
social intercourse of men. An injustice is done to his basic conception 
4 
Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 2 8. 
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of democracy when social action is limited to the special interests of any 
section of society. Man to be human must be social, and the most mean-
ingful definition of social takes into consideration two significant points. 
The two points selected by which to measure the worth of a form of 
social life are the extent in which the interests of a group are shared 
by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts 
with other groups. An undesirable society, in other words, is one 
which internally and externally sets up barriers to free intercourse 
and communication of experience. A society which makes provision 
for participation in its goods of all members on equal terms and which 
secures flexible .adjustment of its institutions through intera<stion of 
the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. 
Dewey makes a distinction between the democratic community and 
society. He assumes that there is a unity in community that is lac1<ing in 
society per se. In a pluralistic society, for example, there are special 
interest groups which do not fulfil the two criteria of democratic social 
life outlined above. They have exclusive and narrow aims and purposes 
whii.ch do not mix well with united community life. The aims and purposes 
of the thief are illustrative of this segment of society which fall short 
of the ideal. 
On the surface it appears that Dewey is seeking to conform society. 
Such is not the case. It was his contention that the varied but legitimate 
concerns of a pluralistic society was the leaven in the lump which made 
growth and development possible. 
Dewey argued, from an historical analysis of the present state of 
democratic society, for the need of the individual's rebirth to selfawareness 
5Ibid., p. 115. 
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through the finding of his true humanity in small groups .. It was his con-
· tention -that modern society which promised the individual so much has, 
through its organization of society., and by the rule of experts, made man 
little more than a conforming puppet. · Dewey's consistent position was 
that society does not advance, en masse, by the handing down of crumbs 
from the high to the lowly. Democracy came into existence as a social 
force by the exact opposite means, from the low to the high. ·However, 
one of the dangers of modern life is a false social consciousness, a 
consciousness which is sub-human because it has lost its meaning. It 
has lost its meaning because of lack of communication. In order to 
restore th'e lost meaning and communication, society must re-discover man 
in the small group in order to get at his needs from the grass roots rather 
than. from some expert's office, 6 
The character of our cities, of organized business and the nature of 
the comprehensive associations in which individuality is lost, testify 
also to this fact. Yet there are.contrary signs. 'Community' and 
community activities are becoming words to conjure with,,. The un-
answered question is how far these tendencies will reestablish the 
void left by the dis integration of the family, church and neighborhood. 
We cannot predict the outcome. But we can assert with confidence 
that there is nothing intrinsic in the forces which have effected uniform 
standarq.ization, mobility and remote invisible relationships that is 
fatally obstructive to the ret~rn movement of their consequences into 
the local homes of mankind. 
Unless local communal life can be restored, the public cannot ade-
quately resolve its most urgent problem: to find and identify itself. 
·. ~John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, (New York: Henry Holt 
and Co., 192 7) pp. 215-217. 
7 
Ibid., p. 215. 
But if it be reestablished, it will manifest a fullness, variety and 
freedom of possession and enjoyment of meanings tnd good:s un-
known in the contiguous associations of the past. 
Dewey's insistence on a return to smaller units of social life is 
not only basic to his. understanding of democracy but to his concepticm 
of education and .life in general. Without the dynamic interaction of 
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individuals in society we have less than democracy. · Pre-digested capsl,].les 
of information handed out by an authority is not communication or educa-
tion; it is propaganda. Ideas have to be shared to be vital and alive. The 
frozen words of some written speech must be replaced by the give and take 
of debate. 
In a word, that expansion and reinforcement of personal understanding 
and judgment by the cumulative and transmitted intellectual wealth 
. of the community which may render nugatory the indictment of democracy 
drawn on the basis of the ignorance, bias and levity of the masses, 
can be fulfilled only in relations of personal intercourse in local 
community. 9 
· Dewey is optimistic about the role the school can play in the return 
to a truly intelligent democratic way of social life. This can be accom-
plished if the school can give its students the tools for successfully 
meeting and solving the problems of corporate life. Basic to this goal 
is an awareness that man is the product of his own decisions. He makes 
his own destiny. He is not the result of some divine decree or some law 
of nature. He is the sum of the products of his organic needs and drives 
plus the situations with which he finds himself faced in social life. 
8Ibid., p. 216. 
9Ibid.; p. 218. 
Man's education and growth develop out of the solution to problems 




Today it is generally admitted that conduct proceeds from conditions 
which are largely out of focal attention, and which can be discovered 
and brought to light only by inquiries more exacting than those which 
teach us the concealed relationships involved in gross physical 
phenomena. What is not so generally acknowledged is that the under-
lying and generative conditions of concrete behavior are social as well 
as organic; much more social than organic as far as the manifestation 
of differential wants, purposes and methods of operation is concerned. 11 
The task of education is to provide situations in which the student 
can encounter the experiences of the ages in the shortest possible time 
with a view to being an effective, intelligent citizen--a citizen who is 
capable of meeting his own personal problems and also effective in the 
larger problems of social life. Such a life will require free and intelligent 
choice between alternatives without recourse to king or bureaucratic 
experL 
Since a democratic society r(;:lpudiates the principle of external 
authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and 
interest; these can be created only by education ..• A democracy is 
more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated 
living, of conjoint communicated experience •.• LEducation has a 
tremendous task in modern society becausil A society which is 
mobile, which is full of channels for the distribution of a change 
occurring anywhere, must see to it .that its members are educated to 
personal initiative and adaptability. 12 
Education can fulfil this responsibility by giving attention to the devel-
10 
Ibid., p. 103. 
11Ibid,, p. 104. 
12 
Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 101-1Q2. 
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opment of intelligent reflective problem solving methods of inquiry in the 
school. 
Democratic education, according to Dewey, must be as broad in the 
area of opportunity as in the pluralistic _society which gives :iit birth. De-
mocratic education will use the resources of the past but will add to 
these the resources of the present. Then on the basis of the dynamic 
interaction of students new problems <;1nd their solutions are discovered. 
Democratic-education is not narrowly nationalistic. To be vital it 
must be based, as shown above, on meanings communicated between rel-
atively small groups. However, it must reach out into the larger sphere of 
international concern through "world community." "One of the fundamental 
problems of education in and for a democratic society is set by the con-
. flict of nationalistic and a wider social aim. 1113 The intercourse and 
communication, in short the social aim of love, fellowship and concern 
which characterize the family, must come to play a significant role both 
nationally and internationqJly. 
Discussion of subsequent educational concepts will attempt to show 
how Dewey planned to implement his educational ideals of growth through 
inquiry. 
Criticisms of Dewey's Concept of Democracy 
John Keats has equateq. Dewey's view of democracy with what has 
13 ; 
Ibid. , p. 113. 
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been called "Life-adjustment" education.14 He states that "democracy 
being our way of life ... the educational pragmatist pervades his classroom 
with his idea of democratic process ..• Everywhere, the emphasis is on the 
group; the password is cooperation." l 5 Another critic Mortimer Smith 
says Dewey felt that "education's primary task is to adjust the individual 
to the group. 1116 · Life-adjustment education according to Smith, has as 
its goal the conditioning of school children into an uncritical conformity 
to the educator's philosophy of life. It has been made clear in the 
above discussion that this is exactly one of the dimgers Dewey warned 
against. He said modern man must recapture the ability to think for 
himself. "The problem is to extract the desirable tra!ts of forms of 
community life which actually exist, and employ them to criticize un-
desirable features and suggest improvement. 1117 
Admiral Rickover assumes that Deweyan philosophy is seeking to 
erase individual differences as much as possible and bring everyone into 
a dull grey intellectual conformity. · Rickover says what is needed are 
"schools which will develop in all children--talented average and below 
average--the highest level of intellectual competence of which they are 
capable. "18 
14Keats, Schools Without Scholars, p. 83. 
15Ib'd 1 . • I pp. 85-86. 
16 
· Smith, The Diminished Mind, p. 20. 
17 
De.iv ey, Democracy and Education, p. 9 6. 
18 
Rickover, Education and Freedom, p. 17. 
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On the contrary, Dewey taught that the gifted were always out in front of 
the majority intellectually but that through education the insights of the 
gifted would be more rapidly disseminated to the masses. 
There i.s no limit to the liberal expansion and confirmation of limited 
personal intellectual endowment which may proceed from the flow of 
social intelligence when that circulates by word of mo1it~ from one 
another in the communications of the local community. 
Dewey I s emphasis was not on conformity of action or attainment 
but on freedom of opportunity. His goal for democratic education was 
education for all. The nation cannot reach its goal half-slave and half-
free. 
In order to have a large number of values in common, all the members 
of the group must have an equable opportunity to receive and to take 
from others. There must be a large variety of shared undertakings 
and experiences. Otherwise, the influences which educate some 
into master, educate othei;-s into slaves. And the experience of each 
loses in meaning, when the free interchange of varying modes of 
life-experience is arrested. A separation into a privileged and a 
subject-class prev:ents social endosmosis. 20 
Activity 
John Dewey never extolled activity simply for the sake of activity. 
In fact he says that "mere activity does not constitute experience. 1121 
His concept of activity can be understood only in the context of the 
meaning of "experience." The controlling influence on activity was 
l 9Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 219. 
20Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 97-98. 
21 Ibid. , p. 16 3. 
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always the problematic situation. Out of the interaction which results 
from attempting to relieve an imbalance in the environment there is of 
necessity activity . 
. . . The combination of what things do to us (not in impressing qualities 
on a passive mind) in modifying of actions, furthering some of them 
and resisting and checking others, and what we can do to them in 
producing new changes constitutes experience. 22 -.--
Experience, then, is the name given to the active-passive relations which 
subsist between a person and his social surroundings. "In just the degree 
in which connections are established between what he does to his envi.-
':!, 
ronment and what iLdoes in response to him, his acts and things about 
him acquire meaning ... 23 
Dewey taught that purposive education should present an environment 
in which interaction would effect an acquisition of meanings that are so 
important that they in turn would become instruments of further learnings. 
He felt that activities out of school are sometimes important but many 
times ineffective. ''Activity out pf school is carried on under conditions 
which have not been deliberately adapted to promoting the function of 
understanding and formation of effective intellectual dispositions. 1124 
It is not the business of the school to transport youth from an envi-
ronment of activity into one of cramped study of records of other 
men's learnings; but to transport them from an environment of rela-
tively chance activities (accidental in relation they bear to insight 
and thought) into one of activities selected with reference to guid-
22Ibid., p. 317. 
23Ibid., p. 319. 
24 
Ibid., pp. 319-320. 
25 
ance of learning. 
92 
Dewey thought that the reasons of many e4ucators who advocated 
activity in the school were too narrow. He said they advocate activity 
because it engages child interest and spontaneity; or it keeps the child 
alert and active and has some effect on preparing them for practical duties 
in later life. In contra~t to this point of view, Dewey states: 
We must conceive of them (activities) in their social si9"nificance 
•.. in shi.xt, as instrumentalities throught which the school itself 
shall be made a genuine form of active communi~ life, instead of 
a place set apart in which to learn lessons ..• 2 In educational 
terms, this means that these occupations in school shall not be mere 
practical devices or modes of routine employment, the gaining of 
better technical skill •.. but active centers of scientific insight into 
natural materic;1l and processes, points of departure whence children 
shall be led out into a realization of the historical development of 
man. 27 
Dewey's goal was to make education scientific. He was fascinated 
by the advances of physical science and thought that education should 
use the methods of science. He argued that activity in the school situa-
tion should exemplify the experimental problem solving rnethod of science. 
Physical inquiry has been taken as typical of the nature of knowing. 
The selection is justified because the operations of physical knowl-
edge are so perfected and its scheme of symbols so well devised, 
But it would be misinterpretation if it were taken to mean that sci-
ence i;:; the only valid kind of knowledge; it is just an intensified 
form of knowing in which are written large the essential characters 
of any knowing. · It is in addition the most powerful tool we possess 
25Ibid., p. 320. 
26Jbhn Dewey, The School and Society, (Chicago: Tne University 
of Chicagb Press, :1900), p. 14. 
27Ibid., p. 19. 
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for de veloping other modes of knowing. 2 8 
Activity is not to be equated with undirected gross bodily movement. 
It is the organism interacting with the environment toward the solution of 
a problem. 
When trying, or experimenting, ceases to be blinded by impulse or 
custom, when it is guided by an aim and conducted by measure and 
method, it becomes reasonable--rationa 1. When what we suffer from 
things , what we undergo at their hands, ceases to be a matter of 
chance circumstance, when it is transformed into a consequence of 
our own prior purposive endeavors, it becomes rationally significant 
--.enlightening and instructive ... Practical activities may be inte 1-
lectua lly narrow and trivial; they will be so in so far as they are 
routine, carried on under the dictates of authority, and having in 
view merely some external result. 29 
Dewey's theory of activity does not involve taking a "known" and 
through use in some external activity making it become a "know how." 
Knowledge, as outlined under the discussion of Dewey's theory of knowl-
edge, is always the result of the activity of the whole organism and its en-
vironme nt in a problem situation. He said that the two extremes of every 
unit of thinking are a perplexed and troubled situation at the beginning and 
a cleared- up resolved situation at the conclusion. The first phase is pre -
reflective and sets the problem to be solved. In the final phase the doubt 
has been disspe lled. Between these two extremes Dewey outlined five , 
phases or aspects of reflective thought. 
(1) Suggestions, in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solu-
tion; (2) An inte llectua lization of the difficulty or perplexity that has 
28John Dewey, The Quest for Ce rtainty , pp. 25 0-251. 
29Dewey, Democracy and Education, p, 319. 
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been felt (directly experienced) into a problem to be solved, a question 
for which the answer must be sought; (3) the use of one suggestion 
after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis, to initiate and guide 
observation and other operations in collection of factual material; 
(4) the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or 
supposition (reasoning, in the sense in which reasoning is a part, 
not the whole, of inJorence); (5) testing the hypothesis' ,J::,y..:,overt or 
imaginative action. . 
Dewey shows explicitly how the five steps outlined above are related 
to activity as he understood the term. Reasoning, he says, shows us that 
I 
if the idea to be accepted is valid, then certain consequences will follow. 
The conditions demanded by the theory will all be fulfilled. The traits 
suggested by alternative hypotheses will be lacking. Consequently, there 
will be an irresistable tendency to believe. 31 
However, he points out, sometimes verification does not follow. 
Sometimes instead of corroboration there is failure. Such reflective 
activity, as described above, even in the face of failure, is more than 
failure. The reflective method, even in failure, points out to the person 
guided by more than blind chance what further observations may be nec-
32 
essary to be successful. 
Nothing shows th.e trained thinl<er better than the use he makes of his 
errors and mis takes. What merely annoys and discourages a person 
not accustomed to thinking, or starts him out on a new course of 
; . . 
aimless attack by mere' cut-a~~-try methods, is a stimulus and a 
guide to the trained inquirer. . 
30 John Dewey, How We Think, (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 
1933), pp. 106-107. 
31 Ibid., p. 114. 
32 




Critici sms of Dewey's Activity Concept 
Mortimer Smith has assumed Dewey advocated that any joy and 
liking of a situation was purposeful. Smith says that Dewey was responsi-
ble for having " ... perverted the Vqlid doctrine that the educational program 
ought to take account of the child's needs and interests into a mere catering 
to what the student thinks he wants. 1134 This was not the case. Dewey 
never; advocated that activity was good or bad on the basis of its pleas-
antness. His conception of activity was grounded, as has been shown, 
in the problematic situation of experience. 
The emotional aspect of responsive behavior is its immediate quality. 
When we are confronted with the precarious, and ebb and flow of 
emotion marks a disturbance of the even tenor of existence. Emotions 
are conditioned by the indeterminateness of the present situations 
with respect to their issue. Fear and hope, joy and sorrow, ::.aversion 
and desire, as perturbations, are qualities of a divided response. 
They involve concern, solicitude, for what the present situation may 
become ..• Emotion is a hindrance or an aid to resolute will according 
as it is overwhelming in its immediacy or as it marks a gathering 3 
together of energy to deal with the situation whose issue is in doubt. 5 
Dewey warns that it is a relatively easy thing to believe an idea 
when one feels good about it or when there is a partial validation. Pre-
mature juqgments often result when one jumps to conclusions which are in 
harmony with his beliefs. The difficulties "all spring from confusing the 
feeling of certitude with a certified situation. 1136 True knowledge comes 
34smith, The Diminished Mind, p. 18. 
35 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 225-226. 
36Ibid., p. 227. 
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through intelligent activity and not "fortuitous" pleasure seeking. 37 
Robert M. Hutchins, another contemporary critic, assumes that 
Dewey condoned the position that the school is the place where just any 
activity goes on. He said, ".the principle reason for the popularity in the 
United States of what is called Progressive Education, in which Mr. Dewey 
also had a hand, is that the children have a good time in school. .. any 
effort to insist on painful work in school naturally encounters resistance. 1138 
Dewey argued, however, that the school is the place where problem solving 
activity should be undertaken to secure and resolve problematic situations. 39 
He taught that the best solutions lead to the solutions of other problems. 
It was his opinion that the schools should provide for this type activity . 40 
Interest 
Dewey taught that no activity can be called forth unless the organism 
is interested. 41 In the school situation the child must be viewed as a 
living growing person . To take a living growing person out of his natural 
37 
Paul A. Schilpp, The Philosophy 0 John Dewey, pp. 567, 568, 579, 
602. 
38 
Hutchins, The Conflict in Education, p. 86. 
39Dewey, The Quest for Certain ty, p. 225. 
40John Dewey, Logic: The Theory 0 Inquiry, (New York: Henry Holt 
and Co., 1939), p. 12. 
41 John Dewey, "Interest in Relation to the Training of the Will,'' 
Second Supplement to the Herbart Yearbook .!2£_ 1895, (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1903), pp. 7, 12, 16. 
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environment and force him into someone else's mold without showing any 
neces sary connections is the basis of the school's disciplinary problem. 
The child cannot abide being a spectator; he wants to participate. The 
difference between a spectator and a participant is found in the fact that 
the former is indifferent, the latter is involved; the rerults make a dif-
ference. A participant has two attitudes: (1) anxiety concerning con-
sequences; (2) a tendency to act in an effort to assure better and avert 
worse consequences. "Interests and aims, concern and purpose, are 
necessarily connected. 1142 
Traditi,malists, Oewey said, have failed to see the essential nature 
of aims. Aims are not imposed from without. Aims are intelligent personal 
purposes. By nature, therefore, interest is en inherent part of aim. But 
interest is not capricious. Interest, on the contrary, is directed toward 
a goal. 
It is ... fatal to an aim to permit capricious or discontinuous action 
in the name of spontaneous self-expression. An aim implies an orderly 
and ordered activity ... Progressive completing of a process ... An aim 
means foresight in advance of the end or possible termination. Aim ... 
gives direction to activity. 4 3 
To act with an aim is to act intelligently. To act intelligently is 
to act with a mind. Mind is precisely intentional purposeful activity 
controlled by perception of facts and their relationships to one another. 
Mind is capacity to refer present conditions to future results, and future 
42oewey, Democracy and Education , p. 119. 
43Ibid., .p. 120. 
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consequences to present conditions. "Mind appears in experience as 
ability to respond to present stimuli on the basis of anticipation of fl.lture 
possible consequences, and with a view to controlling the kind of con-
sequences that are to take place . ..44 In a very real sense a~m and mind 
are two sides of the same coin because aim is to act with meaning .• 
The difficulty with forced interest, Dewey comments, is that. there 
is no such thing. 11 Interest. •. means that self and world are engaged with 
each ohher in a developing situation ... To be interested is to be absorbed 
in, wrapped up in, carried away by, some object. 1145 Etymologically, 
interest denotes "what is between." Educationally, what is between covers 
the difference between the student's present powers and the teacher's 
aims. When interest is forced, these intermediate conditions fail to 
connect with what the child perceives. 
To make it interesting by leading. the child to realize connections 
that exist is good sense, to make it interesting by extraneous and 
artificial inducements deserves all the bad nam~g which have been 
applied to the doctrine of interest in education. 
Discipline, on the other hand, is "a very large part of the every-day 
meaning Gf -will--... the deliberate or conscious disposition to persist and 
endure in a planned course of action in spite of difficulties and ccmtrary 
solicitatiGns. 114 7 A disciplined person is one who carries out his aims. 
44Ibid., p. 153. 
45Ibid., p. 148. 
46 
Ibid., p. 150. 
47Ibid, I pp, 151-152, 
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It is not a cowing of the spirit to subdue inclination, compel obedience 
or make a subordinate do uncongenial tasks. Interest and discip.line are 
the successive heartbeats of a vital, growing, planning individual. 
Dewey did not accept the notion that physical activity is necessary 
to establish educational aims and objectives. He escaped the usual in-
terest-effort dilemma by denying that the educational aims and ends are 
external to the self. Dewey taug~t that interest refers to the fact that 
the self and the proposed course of action become identified into a unity; 
the self and the activity become one. The self, therefore, as well as the 
aims and ends are not something ready-made. Both are in the process of 
becoming. 
We arrive at true conceptions of motivation and interest only by the 
recognition that selfhood (except as it has encased itself in a shell 
of routine) is in the process of making ..• There is no one ready-made 
self behind activities. There are complex, unstable, opposing atti-
tudes, habits, impulses which gradually come to terms with one anotper, 
and assume a certain consistency of configuration ... 48 
Dewey does not mean to indicate that the self is not in some sense 
a unity. 49 The self or organism is in part that which has experienced and 
that which continues to experience . Life moves and activities go on 
routinely until the balance is upset by a problem . Interest is aroused 
and effort is made to remove the disturbance. The end or object of in-
terest, traditionally so called, instead of calling forth interest is itself 
determined only as effort brings it into being. The end is the fi'nal step 
48Dew e y, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 137-138. 
49Ibid. 
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of the activity, and interest is simply what is meant by the process itself. 50 
The task of education is the development of serial subject matter 
structured in such a manner that the student recognizes the connection be-
tween the mediated subject matter and the end or object. 51 The more in-
trinsic the relation of means to ends in the curriculum the more likely the 
student will become interested in the means. 52 Interest in the means 
will be more meaningful if a balance can be maintained between the simple 
or emotional and the intellectual qualities of interest. Emotional qualities, 
as has been shown, are the immediate reactions, while the intellectual 
qualities develop out of the problem itself. 
In the degree that responses take place to the doubtful as the doubt-
ful, they acquire mental quality. If they are such as to have a directed 
tendency to change the precarious and the problematic into the secure 
and resolved, they are intellectual as well as mental. 53 
In the educational task Dewey sees nothing wrong with using the 
. 54 
present interests of the child as starting points. However, they are 
merely starting points and not ends in themselves. Momentary interests 
are to be rejected as serious educational criteria. There is no reason to 
object to strong means to get the child in consecutively directed activity 
50Dewey, How We Think, pp. 107-118. 
51 
John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1913), pp. 94-95. 
52 
Ibid., p. 39. 
53 
Dewey, The Quest for Certainty , p. 225. 
54 Dewey, The School and Society, p. 92. 
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of an intellectual nature. The only proviso is that the child must come 
to see the problem as his own. 55 The objectives and ends are then in-
ternalized and educational growth takes place. Dewey concludes that 
external restraint will usually not be needed if the child sees the ends as 
his own. 
Dewey recognized the value of interest in terms of means for accom-
plishing an end. He referred to this as "mediated interest.. .. 56 It may be 
illustrated by the mastering of a technique like fingering in piano playing 
or typing. Its purpose is the accomplishment of some specific end like 
playing a song or typing a letter. 
Dewey's interest theory was a reaction to nineteenth century psy-
chology and all theories which conceive of interest as being ready made. 
One of the most important responsibilities of the teacher is to recognize 
present interests in students that can be used as a means to the educational 
end of the school. This requires skill in understanding both the child 
and the subject matter. 57 
There was an attempt on the part of Dewey to relate his interest 
theory to the means and ends of the educational enterprise. Subject 
matter is not learned as a body of truth to be mastered ,but as an object 
of knowledge. Dewey reacts to the n<;>tion that subject matter is set and 
55Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education, p. 42. 
56 
Dewey, Herbart Yearbook, 1895. 
57Dewey, Inter.est and Effort in Education, pp. 43-44. 
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final. Subject matter is the raw material for the solution of problems. As 
such there is an interaction {activity) between ~the person and his problem, 
The person becomes involved (interest) and incorporates the raw material 
(subject matter) in the solution of his problem, 58 
The teacher can evaluate his success in terms of the engagement of 
student interest which leads to objects of knowledge which are instrumental 
in character. In the school situation. the teacher seeks to guide students 
into use of materials that will be useful in subsequent problem situations. 59 
Criticisms of Dew!3y 1 s Interest Theory 
Mortimer Smith suggests that the seeds of anarchy are in Dew!3Y' s 
interest theory. He says Dewey contends that education is nothing more 
60 
than "vital energy seeking opportunity for effective exercise, 11 Dewey, 
however, never equated educationally fruitful prac;tices with strictly per-
sonal satisfacticm and pleasantness. 61 As suggested above, Dewey advo-
cated logically organized subject matter. While he saw the vaiue of be-
ginning with the child's present interests and expressed great faith in 
the school's ability to lead students into intellectual pursuits, he still 
made room for benevolent coercion. 
58Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
59Ibid. 
60smith, The Diminished Mind, p. 18. 
61 John Dewey, "What Does Pragmatism Mean: by Prac,tical," Journal . 
of Philosophy, Psychology~ Scientific Method, 5:93-'-94, 1908. 
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Redden and Ryan assume that Dewey's interest theory accepts, as 
worthy of honoring, any interest that a child might express in the school 
situation. They say Dewey was of the opinion that "the only worth-while 
. . . d . d' 1 1162 R' k motivations ... are nascent interests an 1mme 1ate va ues, 1c over 
says Dewey's emphasis "was on fitting curricula to the desires and inter-
ests of the children ... 1163 Dewey's position, as outlined above, was 
that interests are never good or bad in themselves but only as points of 
departure. 
With the development of reflective attention comes the need and the 
possibility of a change in the mode of the child's instruction ... (To 
this point) we have been concerned with the direct spontaneous atti-
tude ... This attitude is typical of what some writers call spontaneous 
attention ... The child is simply absorbed in what he is doing ... He 
gives himself without reserve. Hence, while there is much energy 
spent, there is no conscious effort; while the child is intent to the 
point of engrossment, there is no conscious attention. With the 
development of remote ends, and of the need of directing acts so as 
to make them means for these ends ... we have the transition to what 
may be termed indirect, or ... voluntary, attention. A result is imaged, 
and the child attends to what is before him or what he is immediately 
doing because it helps secure the result. Taken by itself the act 
might be indifferent or even repulsive. But because it is felt to 
belong to something desirable or valuable, it borrows the latter's 
attraction and holding power. This is the transition to 'voluntary' 
attention but only the transition. The latter comes fully into being 
only when the child entertains results in the form of problems or 
questions, the solution of which he is to seek for himself. 64 
Redden and Ryan argue that Dewey's interest theory gives no con-
62 Redden and Ryan, A Catholic Philosophy QJ Ed_ucation, p. 512. 
63 Rickover, Education~ Freedom, p. 136. 
64 Dewey, The School and Society, pp. 145-146. 
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65 sideration to deferred values but only to immediate concerns. It should 
be remembered that Dewey's theory must be understood from within the 
framework of his own basic philosophy. The traditional philosophical 
basis, which does not take into account the developmental concept of 
Dewey with its emphasis on the individual (organism) interacting with his 
world (envirnnment), is easily misled a L this point. 
The point around which criticism has centered is the assumption 
that Dewey encouraged activities solely on the basis of ability to produce 
immediate satisfaction. From the above discussion and within the frame-
work of his philosophy Dewey advocated only a carefully prepared and 
66 ordered content. 
Subject Matter 
In order to deal more adequately with Dewey's conception of subject 
matter it will be necessary to make explicit his view of educational ex-
perience. Some have understood Dewey to mean that all experiences are 
educative. However, this is contrary to Dewey's clear teaching on the 
matter. 
The belief that all genuine education comes about through experience 
does not mean that all experiences are genuinely or equally educative. 
Experience and education cannot be directly equated to each other. 
For some experiences are mis-educative . Any experience is mis-
educative that has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of 
65Redden and Ryan, A Catholic Philosophy of Education, p, 513. 
66 Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 285 , 292. 
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f h . 67 urt er experience. 
Dewey's view was constructive. He said that experience which is 
truly educative is experience which is useful and possesses the capacity 
to control future experience toward educational goals. There are certain 
experiences which though they give immediate satisfaction fail to provide 
for continued meaningful growth in experience . 
. 
LPewey excludes experiences whic.fi7 produce lack of sens itivity--
increase a person's skill ... yet tend to land him in a groove or rut; 
--may be immediately enjoyable and yet promote formation of a slack 
and careless attitude; may be 'interesting, ' and yet their discon-
nectedness may artificially generate dispersive , disintegrated, cen-
trifugal habits. 68 
Dewey says, "the consequence of formation of such habits is inability to 
control future experience . . 1169 
Dewey, in his reaction to traditional education, never suggested 
that the traditional forms of education failed to provide for educational 
experience. He said the experiences of the old school were inadequate 
because of failure to take into consideration such psychological laws as 
"agreeableness and disagreeableness" 70 and failure to provide for "con-
tinuity of experience. 1171 Adequate educational experience , Dewey taught 
67Dewey, Interest and Effort, p . 11. 
68 
Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 13. 
69 
Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
701bid, t p, 16, 
71 Ibid., p. 17 .. 
106 
must provide for both of these factors. 
Dewey's principle of continuity involves his conception of habits. 
Habit, for Dewey is "deeper than the ordinary conception of habit as a 
more or less fixed way of doing things. 117 2 Habit covers attitudes that 
are formed both emotionally and intellectually. It involves our ways of 
meeting conditions which have arisen in the process of living. Habit 
then is vitally instrumental for Dewey in his understanding of the principle 
of continuity. He says, "The principle of continuity of experience means 
that every experience bo,.th takes up something from those (experiences) 
which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which 
come after. " 7 3 
Growth is essential to Dewey's conception of experience which is 
genuinely educative. Dewey has often been attacked for his suggestion 
that the end of education is growth. Those who criticize him, as seen in 
the opening s ta temen t of this chapter, fail to understand that Dewey in 
advocating growth as the end of education is simply stating that it is 
impossible to separate the end from the means. He says, "The educative 
process can be identified with growth when that is understood in terms of 
74 
the active participle, growing. 11 
Quality of growth is all important in its educational ramifications. 
72Ibid., p. 27. 
73Ibid. 
7 4Ibid. , p. 2 8. 
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By quality of growth Dewey means successfully dealing with all situations 
in the past which will not limit legitimate growth in other directions in the 
' 
future, The means of growth are for Dewey universal rather than special"."" 
ized in their application. He asserts, " ... only when development in a 
particular line conduces to continuing growth does it answer to the cri-
terion of education as growth. 1175 The continuity of experience is in it-
self no warrant of acceptability in educational growth and experience. 
Continuity of experience, Dewey says, may be either positive or negative. 
A "spoilt child" is an example of the latter. Such a child demands that 
', 
others cater to his desires and this gives the child a fee ling that he should 
be able to do what he feels like doing without regard for others. Such an 
attitude "renders him averse to and comparatively incompetent in situa-
tions which require effort and perseverance in overcoming obstacles. 1176 
Inadequate continuity of experience, such as this, arrests development 
and incapacitates the child for subsequent growth. On the positive side 
of the continuity of experience it may be noted that valid educational 
experience arouses curiousity and sets up de sire strong enough to enable 
a person to reach the envisioned goal in spite of reverses and difficulties. 
"Every experience is a moving force. Its value can be judged only on the 
ground of what it moves toward and into. ,.77 An educator having more 
75 Ibid., p. 29. 
76 
31. Ibid. , p. 
77 Ibid. 
108 
mature experience has a moral responsibility to guide the child into posi-
. tive experiential situations and away from the negative dead-end experi.-
ences. Dewey says, "The greater maturity of experience which belongs 
to the adult as educator puts him in a position to evaluate each experi-
ence of the young in a way which the one having the less mature exper-
ence cannot do.,, 79 
Genuine experience has besides the personal inward factor an ac-
tive obj(i:lctive aspect. Modern society, in contrast to the primitive, with 
its tools, roads, transportation and commerce is an illustration of the 
change in objective circumstances which condition present day educa-:-
tional values. Dewey argues 'in this context that experience is not com-
pletely an inward activity which occurs in a vacuum. Objective factors 
condition experience and in turn are conditioned by the growing develop-
ing experience of individuals. 
Every·. genuine experience has an active side which changes in some 
degree the objective conditions under which experiences are had.,. 
When this fact is ignored, experience is treated as if it were something 
which goes on exclusively inside an individual's body and mind. It 
ought no7~o be necessary to say that experience does not occur in a 
vacuum. 
The second factor beyond "continuity of experience" which makes 
exper:ience genuinely educative is "interaction". Interaction is the factor 
which takes into consideration both outward and inward aspects of ex-
78Ibid. ,· pp. 31-32. 
79Ibid., p. 34, 
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perience. Dewey says interaction assigns equal rights to both factors of 
experience--objective and internal conditions. 1180 Traditional education, 
according to Dewey, gave exclusive attention to the objective factor and 
neglected the internal. Some representatives of the new school, Dewey 
says, having swung to the other extreme and emphasize exclusively the 
internal factors of experience. 
The .trouble with traditional education was not that it emphasized the 
external conditions ... but that it paid so Utt.le attention to the in-
ternal factors ... But this violation is no reason why the new educa-
tion should violate the principle from the other side.,. 81 
· A valid educational experience must take into consideration the interac-
tion between what a person is in himself and the environment external to 
him--whether the external environment be composed of persons or things. 
An experience is always what it·is·becaus'e·of a transaction taking place 
between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environ-
ment ... The environment. .. is whatever conditions interact with per-
sonal needs, desires, purposes, and capacities to create the experi..-
ence which is had. 82 
The two aspects of educationa 1 experience compliment each other. 
Different situations follow one another but because of the continuity of 
experience the person brings to each succeeding experiential situation 
something not possessed in the former. As an individual moves from one 
experience to another, his appreciations, world, environment and life in 
801bid., pp. 38-39. 
8 l Ibid • , p . 3 9 . 
82Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
110 
general will expand or contract depending on the educational quality of 
his experiences. The individual's growth in truly educative e;x:perience 
will give the individual instruments to deal more satisfactorily with ex-
pahding challenges and situations. 
What he has learned in the way of knowledge and skill in one situa-
tion becomes an instrument of understanding and dea Hng effectively 
with situations which fojlow. The process goes on as long as Hfe 
and learning continue. 8 
The educator has the dual responsibility of providing an educational 
situation which will provide objective challenges with special considera-· 
tion given to the particular individual who is to experience the new situa-
tion. "Continuity and interaction in their active union with each other 
provide the measure of educative significance and value of an experience." 84 
In the following discussion of subject~matter it will become increas-
ingly clear that subject-matter for Dewey must take into consideration 
both aspects of educational experience--the individual and the environ-
ment. Dewey stated that, "There is no subject that is in and of itself, or 
without regard to the study of growth attained by the learner such that in-
herent educational value can be attributed to it. .. ss 
Dewey does not regard subject matter as something external to be 
presented to a mind, nor is it evolved out of the mind like a spider weav-
ing a web. Traditionally, subject matter has been conceived as a dis-
83 rbid, Ip, 42, 
84rbid., p, 43. 
85 rbid, I p, 45, 
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tinct'body of truth to be mastered, and many traditionalists of the "ration-
al" persuasion have accepted a view of "recollection" whereby the mind 
brings truth into focus by means of memory. He reacts to subject mat-
ter taken in the Neo-Thomist sense of being possessed with an external 
essence or reality which is knowable by the mind or human reason. Sub-
ject matter is an instrumental arrangement of knowledge in the historical 
86 
development of the race, 
Subject matter is based on the assumption that knowledge is the re-
sult of the organism interacting with its environment. It is not exclusively 
giving attention to the outcome of inquiry. Subject matter, in Dewey's 
construction uses such material but in a different sense than in the tra-
ditional approach. Technically, subject matter refers to that part of ex-
istence which is undergoing inquiry. 87 
Subject matter is anything which "figures as a factor to be reckon-
ed with in the completion of a course of events in which one is engaged 
and by whose outcome one is affected. 1188 As such it "sets the conditions 
which give rise to thought. It is directly experienced in such a way as 
to set the conditions out of which awareness of the problem (or awareness 
of the nature of the problematic situation) arises. 1189 Subject matter then 
86Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 73-75, 
87 Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inguiry, pp. 118-119. 
88 Dewey, Democracy~ Education, p, 158. 
89 h k . Dewey, How We T in , p. 99. 
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is not a course of study (objectively the same for everybody which must 
be mastered) but rather resources available for the transforming of inde-
terminate situations into determinate ones. 9 O 
In the school situation logically organized subject matter refers to 
an organization. .of the terminations of previous inquiry. However, Dewey 
pointed out that the teacher's and pupil's approach to subject matter is 
different. The teacher has already experienced the subject matter but to 
the pupil it is only a potential experience. Logically organized subject 
matter represents the possibilities of the subject with which the learner 
is engaged. It does not yet refer to the learners existential status. 91 
Teachers need to have experienced logically organized subject 
matter to be effective. However, the subject matter is not to be looked 
on as a mass of knowledge to be poured into the "mind" of the student. 
The teacher should view subject matter as the logical organization of the 
experiences of others which the student needs to encounter. As such, it 
is the teacher's task to provide a situation conducive to such an encoun-
ter. 92 
Or to state the same point in a somewhat different manner: the teach-
er should be occupied not with subject matter in itself but in its in-
teraction with the pupil's present needs and capacities. 93 
90Dewey, Democracy~ Education, pp. 212-227. 
91 Ibid., pp. 214-215. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., p. 215. 
113 
From the standpoint of the educator, in other words, the various studies 
represent working resources, available capital. Their remoteness 
from the experience of the young is not, however, seeming; it is real. 
The subject matter of the learner is not, therefore to be, idE,mtical 
with the formulated, the crystallized, and systematized subject mat-
ter of the adult •.• Failure to bear in mind the difference in subject 
matter from the standpoint of teacher and student is responsible for 
most of the mistakes made in the use of texts and other expressions 
of pre-existent knowledge. 94 
The subject matter must be second nature to the teacher so that his 
attention can be focused on the possibilities of the logically organized 
subject matter in the immature and fumbling impulses of the child. The 
teacher must provide connective links between his mature experience and 
the immature frame-of-reference of the student. 
The points need to be considered from the standpoint of the instruct-
or and of student. To the former, the significance of a knowledge of 
subject matter, going far beyond the present knowledge of pupils is 
to supply definite standards and to rEg"sea 1 to him the po s sibili ties of 
the crude activities of the immature. 
The best organization of subject matter is logical rather than chrono-
logical. On the basis of the logical approach a teacher can best provide 
for the transfer of learning. Transfer does not automatically occur; pro-
vision must be made for it, Dewey felt that scientific organization is the 
most fruitful. It is especially valuable because it is suited to show con-
nections between objects in such a Wo.Y that one can be seen to follow from 
one another and to lead to still others. 96 
94Ibid. , pp. 214-215. 
95 
Ibid. , p. 214. 
96 
Ibid., pp. 214. 224. 
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Subject matter may be viewed both logically and psychologically. 
There is no contradiction between psychological and logical organization. 
Dewey explains the distinction by noting the difference between products 
of inquiry and process' of inquiry. Logical arrangement, it will be noted, 
is significant because it gives rise to reflective thought. 
The logical forms that characterize conclusions reached and adopted 
cannot therefore prescribe the way in which we should attempt to ar-
rive at a conclusion when we are still in a condition, of doubt and in-
quiry ••• The distinction between process and product of reflective in-
quiry is thus not fixed and absolute. In calling the process 'psycho-
logical' and the product 'logical', we do not mean that only the final 
outcome is logical or that the activity that goes in a series of steps 
in time and that involves personal desire and purpose is not logical. 
Rather, we must distinguish between logical form, which. applie~ to 
the produc~, and the logical method, which may and should belong to 
97 · the process ••. 
It should also be noted that Dewey viewed subject matter as a m~ans 
to the solution of problematic situations. The consequences of the solu-
tion are formulated as an object of knowledge having all the meanings 
found in means intentionally instituted in producing it. When means are 
selected in order to produce consequences amenable to formulation of ob-. 
jects of knowledge incorporating meanings indicating the connection of 
that object with prior experience and having a high evidential value in 
controlling future experience, then the object is called a valid or scien-
tific object of knowledge. 
The organism is a part of the natural world; its interactions with it 
are genuine additive phenomena. When, with the development of 
symbols, also a natural occurrence, these interactions are directed 
97 oewey, How We Think, pp. 74-77. 
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towards anticipated consequences, they gain the quality of intelli-
gence, and knowledge accrues. Problematic situations when they 
are resolved then gain the meaning of all the relations which the 
operations of thought have defined. Things that were casually ef-
fective in producing experienced results became means to conse-
quences; these consequences incorporate in themselves all the mean-
ings found in the causes which intentionally produce them. The sup-
posed grounds for opposing human experience to the reality of nature 
disappear. Situations have problematic and resolved characters in 
and through the actual interactions of the organism and the environ-
ment. 98 
Method refers to the sort of arrangement of subject matter which 
controls the development of experience in a fruitful, orderly way. The 
teacher's task is proper use of means. 
A primary responsibility of educators is that they not only be aware 
of the general principle of the sh9 ping of actual experience by environ-
ing conditions, but that they also recognize in the concrete what sur-
roundings are conducive to having experiences that lead to growth. 
Above all, they should know haw to utilize the surroundings, physical 
and social, that exist so as to extract from them all that they have to 
contribute to building up experiences that are worthwhile. 99 
Criticisms of Dewey's Subject Matter Theory 
John Keats ass1;mes that Dewey was not interested in subject matter. 
He says, "a school is not a child, a teacher and a building. A school 
is essentially what it teaches, and the first emphasis must be on content 
" 1 OO Albert Lynd says, "there is more wisdom in the 'subject matter' 
98 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 234. 
99 John Dewey, Experience and Education, (New York: The Mac-
Millan Co. , 1938), p. 35. 
lOOKeats, Schools Without Scholars, p. 8. 
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· 101 ... than in any teacher or body of teachers... H. G. Rickover ob-
serves that subject matter loses its meaning in the Deweyan approach and 
becomes based on "child interest" instead of "solid learning. 11102 
Such criticisms are based on a failure to recognize Dewey's view of 
subject matter. The critics have assumed that any adequate treatment of 
subject matter must be approached from a basis in "faculty psychology. " 
Dewey's approach based on scientific methodology recognized the valid 
use of subject matter. 
The net conclusion of our discussion is that the final reality of educa-
tional science is not found in books, nor in experimental laboratories, 
nor in class-rooms where it is taught, but in the minds of those en-
gaged in directing educational activities. Results may be scientific, 
short of their operative presence in the attitudes and habits of obser-
vation, judgment and planning of those engaged in the educative art. 
But they are not educational science short of this point. They are 
psychology, sociology, statistics, or whatever. 
This is the point upon which my whole discussion turns. We must 
di,stir1guish between the sources of educational science and scientific 
content ...• 
The first question which comes before us is what is the place and 
role of educative processes and results in school. .. when they are 
viewed as a source? The answer is (1) that educational practices 
provide the data, the subject-matter, which form the problems of 
inquiry. They are the sole source of the ultimate problem to be in-
vestigated. These educational practices are also (2) the final test 
of value of the conclusion of all researches.103 
John Keats accuses Dewey of being anti-intellectual. He says mental 
discipline has been abandoned and that there is no content in Deweyan 
lOlLynd, Quacker in the Public School, p. 70. 
102Rickover, Education and Freedom, p. 138. 
103John Dewey, The Sources of~ Scientific Education, (New York: 
Horace Liverright, 1929), pp. 32-33. 
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education. "No curriculum, no school •.• curriculum is the hub about 
which most of the piercingly vocal educational argument whirls ••• irl04 
The only way this can be done is by defining intellectual in a way which 
excludes Dewey's fundamental educational conceptions and then by de-
nouncing him from a completely different set of philosophical criteria. 
Mortimer Smith echoes Keats in asserting that Dewey was not inter-
ested in the transmission of the cultural heritage. He says., "The contro-
versy today is between those who continue to beli.eve that cultivation of 
intelligence, moral as well as intellectual, is inextricably bound up with 
the cultural heritage ••• and those who feel that education's primary task 
is to adjust the individual to the group ••• " !OS However, Dewey would 
agree that this is exactly the task of the educational enterprise. Social . . . 
worth is the criterion of what should be transmitted to future generations. 
With the wide range of possible material to select from, it is impor-
tant:that education (especially in all its phases short of the most 
specialized) should use a criterion of social worth. . 
All information and systematized scientific subject matter have been 
worked out under the conditions of social life and have been trans-
mitted by social. But this does not prove that all is of equal value 
for the purposes of forming the disposition and supplying the equip-
ment of members of present society. The scheme of a curriculum 
must take account of the adaptation of studies to the needs of the 
existing community life; it must select with the intention of improving 
the life we live in common so that the future shall be better than the 
past. Moreover, the curriculum must be planned with reference to 
placing essentials first and refinements second.106 
104Keats, p. 8. 
lOSsmith, The Diminished Mind., p. 20. 
106 Dewey, Howr We Think, pp. 83-84. 
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Robert M. Hutchins is especially critical of Dewey in the area of 
practical and vocational studies being introduced into the school. On the 
basis of the philosophical orientation of his educational philosophy he con-
siders knowledge of particular subjects to have a strengthening effect up-
on the mind. He says, " ••. the philosophy of Dewey is no philosophy at 
all, because it supplies no intelligible standard of good or bad. 11107 Sub-
ject matter that is of a practical or vocational variety fails to meet the 
test of being intellectual. It is true that Dewey's philosophical orienta-
tion did not so limit the curriculum. He did not feel that any particular 
subject has a corner on intellectual processes. 
Any subject, from Greek to cooking and from drawing to mathematics, 
is intellectual, if intellectual at all, not in its fixed inner structure 
but in its function - in its power to start and direct significant in-
quiry and reflection. What geometry does for one, the manipulation 
of laboratory aparatus, the mastery of a musical composition, or the 
conduct of a business affair, does for another.108 
Albert Lynd argues that Dewey's teachings are responsible for what 
he considers to be a lack of scholarship among teachers. He asserts that 
Deweyan philosophy does not advocate thorough grounding in subject mat-
ter fields. He says "the persons who have worked most effectively to 
isolate educationism from genuine scholarship ••• are those whose pro-
gressivist theories of education have freed them (in their opinion) from 
dependence upon traditional learning ... 109 Lynd has confused Dewey's 
107Hutchins, The Conflict in Education, p. 53. 
108 
Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 225. 
lOSLynd, pp~ 168-169. 
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emphasis on method and psychological understanding of the child with 
lack of concern for logically arranged subject matter. Dewey emphasizes 
the need for both: 
The practically important question concerns the condition under 
which the teacher can really be the intellectual leader of a social 
group, The first condition goes back to his own intellectual prepara-
tion in subject matter, This should be abundant to the point of over-
flow ... It must be accompanied by a genuine enthusiasm for the sub-
ject that will communicate itself contagiously to pupils ... The cen-
tral reason {why a teacher must have excessive foundation in subject-
matter) is possibly not always recognized. The teacher must have 
his mind free to observe the mental responses and movements of the 
student.. , The problem of the pupils is found in subject-matter; the 
problem of teachers is what the minds of pupils are doing with this 
subject matter, 110 
The problem of teaching is to keep the experience of the student mov-
ing the direction of what the expert already knows, Hence the need 
that the teacher know both sublect matter and characteristic needs 
and capacities of the student. 11 
The crux of the problem between Dewey and the contemporary critics 
is in the meaning and acquisition of knowledge. The critics, in traditional 
fashion, view knowledge as an objective clearly defined body of subject 
matter. Knowledge from this approach is independent of individual experi-
ence. Dewey, on the other hand, argues that intellectual quality is not 
in the inner nature of subject matter per se but in the function of subject 
matter as an aspect in human experience. 
Summary 
On the basis of the analysis in this chapter the following conclu-
llODewey, How We Think, pp. 274-275. 
llloewey, Democracy and Education, p. 216. 
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sions appear to be warranted. Dew~y has: 
(1) Championed democracy because only in the free intercourse 
of a free society can an individual gain the intellectual re-
sources necessary to deal adequately with the problems he 
must face. 
(2) Emphasized activity because doing is involved in knowing. 
(3) Emphasized child-interest because it indicates the present 
powers and tendencies of the child which are capable of en-
gagement in subject matter. 
(4) Emphasized interest as an integral part of learning process. 
(5) Emphasized both inner and outer experience to be important 
in the educational process. 
CHAPTER V 
SOURCES. OF THE CONTEMPORARY CRITICISMS 
IN THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 
OF WILLIAM HEARD KILPATRICK 
In the preceding chapter the educational philosophy of John Dewey 
has been outlined. On the basis of the discussion it is clear that many 
of the criticisms are based on generalizations from isolated concepts or 
misinterpretations of Dewey's basic philosophy. It is possible, on the 
basis of such a procedure, to quote DewE)y on either side of an issue to 
establish a particular point of view. Dewey used the concepts for which 
he is criticized but often times his meaning was different than that con-
tained in the critic's interpretation. 
If the educational philosophy of John Dewey is not to be equated 
with the Deweyite practices which have been criticized by the contemp-
orary critics, then it will be necessary to di.scover sources from which 
these criticisms emanate. Possibly some of the misunderstandings of· 
Dewey's educational philosophy can be traced to the implementation of 
Deweyan thought by William Heard Kilpatrick; Kilpatrick was a student 
of Dewey; however, in his own approach to the problems of education he 
added some ingredients not found in the basic approach of Dewey. A sum-
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mary of Kilpatrick's views based on the educational concepts criticized 
by the contemporary critics will serve to point out the areas where Kil-
patrick is in agreement with Dewey and where he goes beyond his teacher. 
It is in the implementation of these purely Kilpatrickan views by some 
modern educators that has led to some of the criticisms which have been 
discussed. In the next chapter an attempt will be made to ascertain other 
sources of criticisms erroneously attributed to John Dewey. 
Dembcracy 
William Heard Kilpatrick has had a share in the responsibility for 
the life-adjustment movement in American public education. Many of the 
objections raised by the contemporary critics, while directed to Dewey, 
would more appropriately be directed to Kilpatrick in their understanding 
of what constitutes a democratic education. However, Kilpatrick is re-· 
sponsible for the implementation of some irresponsible and radical prac-
tices which have on occasions plagued American public school education. 
Kilpatrick assumes that Abraham: Lincoln.'s£Amerio.an):iream of an· in-
dividual's ability to rise from poverty to wealth ist largely a thing of the 
past. This dream was based on an individual's initiative, on the one .hand, 
and the super abundance of free farm land on the other. Today, however, 
there is no longer a large undeveloped frontier with free land for the ask-
: l 
ing. America: has become an industrJalized society. "['he present sys-
tem pits man against man to the hurt of all in almost every way . 111 
lwilliam Heard Kilpatrick, Remaking the Curriculum, (New York: 
Newson and Co. , 1936), p. 2 O. 
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It is the resport,sibility of the American public school_, Kilpatrick 
taught, to train the young in a. spirit of social concern for others instead 
of participating in a "dog eat dog" attitude. '.'Giviliation actually depends 
on cooperation. 112 Such cooperation can only be 1learned in a school 
situation where the young are taught to appreciate _the likes and dislikes 
of others. 
Wher~ men in fact co-operate, each must understand what others are 
doing and fit his movements into the common process. There must 
then be exchange of common understandings, and common ways of 
acting together. It is the aggregate body of such common aims, common 
language, and common ways of co-:operating wi ~h reference to common 
ends that constitutes the customs and institutions of any group. When 
the culture of any group is thoroughly unified, the young are molded 
4nquestioningly to its model and men use their institutions with no 
more questioning criticism than we questio13 the pressure of the at-
mosphere or the beating of a healthy heart. 
It is out of the historical change from an agrarian society to a highly 
industrialized economy that Kilpatrick sees the need for democratic ed-
ucation which will enable the child not only to get along with oth.ers but 
learn to make decisions on his own. A democratic society, he said, that 
is intelligent in a time of rapid change must make conscious provision 
to improve its institutions and educate its citizens for intelligent action, 
A public system of education for a. democracy exists, largely at least, to 
serve just these two ends; to foster (especially through higher educa-. 
tion) the criticism of our institutional life and to Cultivate an intell~"'.' 
gent citizenship to act accordingly. 4 ·· 
2rbiq., p. 43. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. , p. 44. 
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Kilpatrick considered the essence of democracy to be respect for 
personality. 5 However, he would use social pressure and group consen-
sus to erase the unharmonious social prejudices which children bring with 
them to school. He would not be against punishment in the most extreme 
cases, but he felt that in a democratic society most of the conforming 
could be brought about through group approval or disapprove!. 
Only by mingling with people under normal conditions can one learn 
to 'get on' with them. The stimuli of social approval or disapproval 
are, after all, about the strongest spurs for directing conduct aright 
that we know. Child and adult alike, yield to the demand of their 
fellows. 6 
John Dewey was interested in the school's providing social settings, 
because only in this way could a child be placed in situations that would 
lead to possible solutions to the problems that the child would face. It 
has been suggested that Kilpatrick accepted this basic insight of demo-
cratic education but that he made some significant additions to it. Dewey's 
emphasis was on the intellectual factors of interaction whereas Kilpatrick 
stresses conformity. 
A contemporary critic John Keats objects to child manipulation in the 
,school through conformity to the group. His objection is based on both 
intellectual and social grounds. Dewey is accused of developing social 
5william Heard Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, (New York: 
The MacMillian Co., 1951), p. 138. 
6william Heard Kilpatrick, Th~ McntBssori System Examined, 
(Boston: '.Houghton Miffin Co. , 1914) , p. 2 5. 
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learning through group pressure, 7 However, it may be clearly seen that 
Kilpatrick, in a discussion of the Montessori system, advocated conditioned 
learning through group pressure, He said, "W.hat vie wish, then, is to put 
the children into such socially conditioned environment that they will of 
themselves spontaneously unite into larger or smaller groups to work out 
their life impulses, as these exist on their childish plane. 118 
Dewey never objected to teacher guidance. His concern was that 
the child be able to understand the situation for himself. He accepted the 
value of the group interaction, but only because through the interaction the 
child could see more clearly the is sues involved, and because he felt that 
learning was basically a social thing, The inconsistency between refusing 
teacher guidance and conforming to social pressure that one sees in Kil-
patrick does not appear in Dewey's system. 
Activity 
Kilpatrick, not Dewey, asserted that the inner nature of the child 
fixes the aim of education, gu:ides the process, and furnishes drive and 
inner motivation, 9 The criticisms of activity are leveled at the "hands 
off" policy of this view of child nature which stresses the inner urge of 
7Keats, Schools Without Scholars, pp. 85-100,i 
8 
Kilpatrick, The Montessori System ~xamined, p. 20, 
9william Heard Kilpatrick, "Dangers and Difficulties of the Project 
Method, and How to Overcome Them--A Symposium," Teacher's College 
Record, 72 :2 83 September 192 6, p, 22 8, 
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the child to the point of failure to recognize the importance of environment. 
Kilpatrick appears to draw inspiration for this point of view from the Italian 
educator Montessori rather than from Dewey. He asserts that he and 
Montessori are in essential agreement "that the relatively free expression 
of the child's natural impulses. , , is the efficient plan for proper rearing. 111 O 
On the other hand Kilpatrick is in the tradition of Dewey in his 
emphasis on making school experiences meaningful. He emphasizes the 
necessity of the student becoming .involved personally in the task he is 
performing, Life to be meaningful must be lived out, Kilpatrick says, it 
can never be handed down as a d.ictum to be mastered in some rote manner, 
He says, "\Ne learn what we live .•. If we wish our pupils to build the kind 
of character,, ,l\fesire]l'they must live what they learn so as to build it 
into character. ,, l l 
Interest 
Dewey is criticized stressing personal satisfaction as a sole 
condition of learning, The Dev,,eyan theory of interest is much too com-
plex for such an over-sirnpli.fication. Interest, for Dewey, involved dis-
cipline which ca.rries with it the idea of conserted effort even in the face 
of intervening difficulties. Kilpatrick g-ives little or no attention to effort 
in the face of obstacles. He feels that a psychological law of human na-
lOKilpatrick, 1'h§- Montessori Sy,stem ~r11J.rwd, p. 25. 
11william Heard Kilpatrick, J:hHosoJ?bx _of Education, (New York: 
The MacMillan Co., 1951), p. 296. 
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ture is involved which makes positive re-inforcement the exclusive in-
gredient in learning. Dewey, as suggested in the chapter dealing with his 
philosophy, recognized the superior value of satisfying and successful ex-
perimentation but, on the other hand, considered negative results and re-
inforcement as also truly educative. Kilpatrick does not apparently accept 
the Deweyan recognition of educational value derived from both positive 
and negative re-inforcement. 
We are ready now to state the Law of Satisfaction and Annoyance ... 
A modifiable bond is strengthened or weakened according as satis-
faction or annoyance attends its exercise ... Satisfaction strengthens; 
annoyance weakens .12 
Kilpatrick states that if a child feels interest in a broad area that 
the interest will be transferred automatically to small details. He suggests 
for example that interest in a play will lead to interest in the lighting neces-
sary to the production of a play. Dewey does not entertain such a: naive 
interest theory. Interest for Dewey never separates the knower and inter-
est. But this is exactly what Kilpatrick does. 
Suppose these children have decided to put on a pl9y of their own, 
then each thing felt to be necessary for the success of the play will 
take on, in good measure, the same interest they feel in the play it-
self and its success .13 
Subject Matter 
Kilpatrick' s treatment of curriculum content is quite largely a con-
12william Heard Kilpatrick, Foundations of Method: Informal Talks 
on Teaching, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1926), p. 30. · 
13Kilpatrick, Philosophy.Qi Education, p. 279. 
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sis tent interpretation of Dewey's concept of subject matter. Kilpatrick 
added his own unique twist in the development of the "project method." 
The following quotation suggests the parallel fundamental approach to 
subject matter contained in the philosophies of Dewey and Kilpatrick: 
This older curriculum was supported by a psychology that stressed 
even drill, and minimized creative thinking. It even doubted that 
most people can think anyhow. 'Motivation' (odious word, which 
starts with subject matter that this may get mastered) was to make 
the repetition palatable. The newer education finds its unit in terms 
of the newer psychology which starts with life as the pursuit of ends 
or purposes. A desirable educative experience is present then wher-
ever; a person faces a challenging situation and undertakes responsi-
bility to deal with it, Such an experience will have in it elements 
new to him. He must deal creatively with them. He will learn, all 
over and all through, as he puts himself wholeheartedly into what he 
does. Our part is to guide our pupils so that they become ever better 
self-directing in facing life's situations. This is the conception of 
recent psychology which must remake the curriculum.14 
Kilpatrick is in agreement with Dewey in his conception that life, 
experience, or growth is not something that takes place in a vacuum. 
Therefore, subject matter in the view of both thinkers is not something 
separated from life. Subject matter is not a course of study to be learned 
by rote by everyone in the same way. 
Life is the continual interaction between the organism and its environ-
ment. Something happens either within or without the organism, or 
between the organism and it s environment, which stirs the organism 
to action. Whether that action be to seek or to avoid, either is goal 
seeking. The organism thus res~onds to the situation it confronts 
and ... it responds as a who le. 1 
14Kilpatrick, Remaking the Curriculum , p. 33. 
15william Heard Kilpatrick, Group Education For a . De mocracy, (New 
York: Association Press , 1940), p. 77. 
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Kilpatric k' s summary of the curriculum is Deweyan. 
By contrasting the two italicized definitions of the old and the new 
curriculums we see the essential difference. The old consists of a 
systematically arranged content of formulated knowledge which the 
learner is to acquire. The new consists of the total living of the 
child so far as the school can affect it, living of a kind to build the 
desired all-round character. The old seeks knowledge and vaguely 
hopes that somehow from this the good life will ultimately follow; 
the new seeks as its immediate aim the highest and finest quality of 
living that it can help effect, relying on the fact that if children do 
really live this quality of life they will in that degree build the same 
quality of character; for they do learn what they live and what is 
truly learned is therein built into character. 16 
There is one area where Kilpatrick and Dewey develop tension. 
There is an emphasis on felt needs in Kilpatrick that is lacking in Dewey. 
Some modern educators who have gone to extremes (these will be discussed 
in .the next chapter) in the area of fulfilment of "felt needs" may have their 
source in this emphasis of Kilpatrick. 
Learning is increasingly seen as creative of its own subject matter, 
not simply an acquisition of what was already there. Education thus 
becomes primarily the conscious pursuit of personally felt purposes 
with ever more adequate self-direction as the goal. The unit 6f cur-
riculum construction likewise becomes an instance of self-directed 
purposive living, not as formerly a selected portion of subject-matter-
set-out-to-be-learned. 17 
Kilpatrick' s instructions to teachers summarize his distinctive in-
terpretation of interest and activity in education. He advocates that since 
the educational process should be as natural as possible ordinary subjects 
at all levels are to be done away with and that grade cards be discarded 
as a means of ascertaining student accomplishment. 
l6Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 314. 
17Kilpatrick, Remaking the Curriculum, p. 18. 
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This means that the curriculum is this fine quality of living as chosen 
by the pupils under teacher guidance .•• that in the elementary school 
and in the 'general ' education of the high school ordinary school 
subjects as such are not taught; that marks are not kept nor formal 
report cards given. 18 
John Keats, it will be re:c.aJ.le:d1, .. equated Dewey's philosophy with 
the view that students be permitted, in the name of democratic education, 
any activity that caught their imagination . 19 In the discussion of Dewey's 
educational philosophy it was shown that Dewey advocated no such posi-
tion. However, Kilpatrick indicates that student interest should be the 
first and last concern and that unpleasant demands should never be placed 
upon the child. By unpleasant, Kilpatrick means, requiring the student to 
perform tasks which he does not care to perform. He says, "Let the prin-
ciples of interest and purposeful activity set the pre.:iominant pattern ... 
As a rule no compulsion and no punishment ... "2 0 
Kilpatrick' s empha'sis 'on "felt-needs," mediated interest and activity 
are often more nearly equated with the contemporary criticisms of modern 
education than with the educa tional philosophy of John Dewey. Contem-
porary critics recognize Kilpatrick only as an interpreter of Dewey. They 
fail to see the differences betwe en Dewey and Kilpatrick. In reality it is 
the position of Kilpatrick (not Dewe y) which is being criticized in refer-
ence to radical (distorted) views of "felt- needs. " 
18Kilpatrick, PhilosophyqJEducation , p . 428. 
19Keats, Schools Without Scholars , pp . 85-86. 
20 
Kilpatrick, Philosophy ...2.! Education , p . 429 . 
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Kilpatrick 1s own enlargement of Dewey's educational philosophy in 
the areas of "activity" and "interest 11 and "felt-needs 11 is the source of 
some Deweyite educational practices. It would, however, be grossly un-
fair to assume that Kilpatrick is responsible for all that the contemporary 
critics suggest is wrong with the public school in these areas. The follow-
ing survey will seek to discover other sources of the false equation made 
by contemporary critics between Dewey and the Deweyites, 
CHAPTER VI 
DEWEYITE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: DEMOCRACY , 
ACTIVITY, INTER1EST ,AND SUBJECT 'MATTER 
The preceding chapters have presented the claims of contemporary 
critics of modern public school education. The criticisms have equated 
the purported weaknesses in modern education in a causal manner to the 
educational philosophy of the late John Dewey. Following the presenta-
tion of allegations, an attempt was made to set out the basic philosophical 
assumptions of Dewey and the educational theories which are related to 
his philosophical orientation. It was the purpose of this discussion to 
show that there is no causal relationship between Dewey's educational 
philosophy and what the critics call democratic education--stressing 
"life adjustment education;" school activity--emphasiz,ing gross bodily 
movement; interest--doing what the child wants to do when he wants to 
do it; and an anti-intellectualism--bringing subject matter into disrepute. 
There ha,s been no attempt to deny the existence of the educational 
practices described by the contemporary critics. Moreover, the degree to 
which the purported weaknesses have influenced educational thought and 
practice in America is a subject that is outside the scope of this disserta-
tion. Perhaps others will attempt an empirical study to ascertain the in-
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fluen c e of the educational practices which have in this discussion been 
des ignated Deweyite educational philosophy. Since the preceding analy-
sis of the educational philosophy of John Dewey clearly exonerates him 
of the e quation made by contemporary critics, it will be necessary to 
complete the task begun in the last chapter by tracing the causal relation-
ships of Deweyite educational thought and practice. 
Before proceeding, a clarification of the meaning of special terms is 
indicated. Deweyite educational philosophy is the name arbitrarily assign-
ed in this thesis to educational thought and practice--considered to be 
Dewey an in nature and origin by the contemporary critics--but as herein 
indicated not consistent with the educational philosophy of John Dewey. 
Deweyite thought uses many of the same words and expressions of Dewey 
but with different meaning attached. Progressivism refers to the move-
ment in American education which emphasized the necessity of giving 
consideration to the child--his needs and interests--in the school. The 
history of the progressive movement reveals that some educators became 
so reactionary that they emphasized child need and interest to the com-
plete exclusion of the intellectual heritage. John Dewey repudiated this 
radical wing of progressivism. He said, 
You will appreciate what is meant when I say that many of the newer 
schools tend to make little or nothing of organized subject matter ... 
as if the idea that education should be concerned with the present 
and future meant that acquaintance with the past has little or no 
role to play in education. 1 
1Dewey, Experience and Education, pp. 9-10. 
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The contemporary critics instead of attacking Dewey have in reality been 
criticizing the position Dewey repudiated. It is to this general radical 
progressive emphasis that the name Deweyite has been attached. Roman-
ticism, in this thesis, refers to the view of human nature which conceives 
of child nature as capable of unfolding completely from within without 
external restraint or ;interference. Dewey criticized romanticism specific-
ally. He argued that growth comes only as the result of a dynamic inter-
action between the individual and the environment. As such, educational 
growth and experience cannot be defined in some nebulus romanticist 
metaphysics of inherent energy seeking expression. 
Romanticism is an evangel in the garb of metaphysics ... Flux is made 
something to revere, something profoundly akin to what is best with-
in ourselves, will and creative energy. It is not as it is experience, 
a call to effort, a challenge to. investigation, a potential doom of 
disaster and death. 2 
Psychoanalytic s refers to that view of human nature, growing out of the 
Freudian analysis of human nature, which believes that behavi:or origin-
ates from instinctual energy and inhibition leads to personality difficulties. 
Freud said that psychoanalysis is "a dynamic conception which reduces 
mental life to the interplay of reciprocally urging and checking forces. 113 
The displacement of energy from one object to another is the most im-
portant feature of personality dynamics. It accounts for the plasticity 
of human nature ..• Practically all of the adult perso n's interests, 
preferences, tastes, habits, and attitudes represent the displacements 
2 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 51. 
3Fre ud, Sigmund, "Psychogenic Visual Disturbance According to 
Psycho-Analytica l Conceptions," Collecte d Papers, Vo . II, (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1925), p. 107. 
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of energy from original instinctual object-choices. They are almost 
all instinct-derivatives. Freud I s theory of motivation was based 
solidly on the assumption that the instincts are the sole energy 
sources fqr man's behavior. 4 
Psychoanalytics therefore is harmonious with romanticism in its emphasis 
on inherent instinctual energy as the sole cause for human behavior. 
With the meaning of terms clarified there will be an attempt to show 
the tension which existed historically between l;)ewey and the radical pro-
gressives. Margaret Naumberg, who founded an extremely progressive 
school in New York City, points out clearly the difference she had with 
Dewey . She maintained that Dewey did not give enough place to the 
individual and that Freud and the psychoanalists are much closer to the 
truth than Dewey. 
Trotter and Freud are nearer the truth than Dewey when it comes to 
dealing with the relation of the group and individual_ p~ycholqgy. 
They know that at present individuals are rulled down to the lowest 
common denominator of groups or crowds. 
The tension between Dewey• s basic concept of reflective thinking 
and the radical progressive , strongly influenced by romanticism is pointed 
out in Naumberg 's attack on Dewey's approach to intuition. She disagreed 
with Dewey's interpretation of intuition and reason. The reaction indi-
cates the fundamental difference between Dewey and radical romantic 
progressives with regard to mental operations. The contrast is evident 
4calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, "Freud's Psychoanalytic," 
Theories of Personality, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), 
p. 39. 
5Margaret Naumberg, The Child and the World, (New York: Harcourt 
Brace and Co., 1928), p. 59. 
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as is illustrated in the following exchange. 
The difference /J)ewey sayjl between an 'intuitive' and an analytic 
person is at most a matter of degree, a relative emphasis. The 
'reasoning' person is one who makes his 'intuitions' more articulate, 
more deliverable in speech, as explicit sequence of initial premises, 
jointures and conclusion. 6 
Naumberg's opinion of this statement is one of shocked amazement. She 
says, "How strange! Imagine any truly intuitive person agreeing to that 
definition! Who ever heard of calling intuition and reason the same thing? 
Not if you've had any profound experience of intuition as such. ,. 7 
It is clear that the radical progressives of which Naumberg was a 
vocal part did not agree with Dewey's interpretation of the emotional 
aspects of behavior. She attacks the Deweyan position directly by assert-
ing that Dewey gave more attention to objective factors than to the sub-
jective. 
Dewey says here that emotions are the reflex of actions ... Nobody 
can but agree with Dewey and the Behaviorists as if it were so. But 
how about the effect of emotion or action? Emotion does not appar-
ently take care of itself in our human lives. Dewey suggests that 
if right habits of action could be developed, the emotions would 
take care of themselves. Is it because no such perfect habits have 
ever been established that emotions have to take care of themselves? 
But there is implicit in this what he directly states in later books, 
that the objective (the non-emotional) is prior to the subjective (the 
emotiona 1). 8 
6Ibid. I p. 153 • 
John Dewey, Education and Nature, p. 300. 
7Ibid., p. 153. 
8Naumberg, The Child and the World, p. 114. 
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Deweyite Theories of Activity 
There is a definite affinity and historical connection between the 
radical progressives of the early progressive movement in American 
Education and the Deweyites whose practices have come under the con-
temporary critics' penetrating analysis. Dewey's basic position in the 
important dimension of activity was different from that of the Deweyites 
who were to be equated in basic orientation with the radical progressives 
of the earlier his tori cal period. 
Dewey, as has been shown, held that activity is involved in the 
very process of knowing. Deweyites, on the other hand, have maintained 
that through activity the "essential nature" of the child is unfolding and 
consequently should not be supressed. Gustav G. Schoenchen in his 
book, The Activity School, asserts that man has thrt;?e natures and that 
activity is essential to all. Margaret Naumberg takes the same view of 
activity but follows the analysts by insisting that to supress activity 
means to repress the child's natural urges which are seeking expression. 
In response to the question as to how psychoanalytic technique enters the 
modern school, Naumberg says, 
The practical problem, from the analytic viewpoint, in all human 
lives, is the adequate channeling of this energy into positive forms 
of work and personal expression. Civ ilization, for the analyst, is 
the result of infinite transformations of our personal energies in 
higher forms of cultural expression. This is called I sublimation. ' 
Education becomes in civilization a practical means to such change . 
But analysis concerns itself with the individuals as well as the social 
group who make up society. And one of its most important efforts in 
releasing the personality of children depends on freeing them from the 
excessive bonds of parental attachment. .. 
I ought here to include the teacher among those who may not regulate 
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emotional reactions in a way that is appropriate to the needs of her 
various pupils. My point i s that blocked, unsatisfied, or misdirected 
emotion in adults inevitably in terferes with the normal development 
of children to whom they are related. So that the great problem in 
education is to help those who have this responsibility to become 
more aware of themselve~. Only then can they begin to deal con-
sciously with education. 
The romantic, radical, progress ive, Deweyite approach was com-
mitted to a view of child nature whi ch de mande d absolutely free self-
expression. However, before the child could be assured of gaining his 
freedom for expression of "felt-needs , " the teacher must herself be free . 
This freedom could not come through any scientific approach to education 
as that proposed by Dewey. Science approaches the field from a single 
problem rather than from the unity of the field. 
Even though a cure of one symptom may give rise to others, they 
usually continue to treat our organism as a series of loosely asso-
ciated parts, and not as a single unit in which every individual dis-
position relates to every other part of the bodily state .••. The dif-
ficulty in the transmission of these techniques for education lies in 
the fact that oral methods of theoretical teaching don't transform 
organic maladjustments. You can't teach teachers how tO" apply' "the 
principles of physical coordination or technique of psycho-analysis 
by classroom lecture s . No. Teachers themselves have to go through 
the experience of being co-ordina te d . . . 1 O 
This Fre udian empha sis of letting the child do what he wants to do, 
so as not to damage his emotional nature, has been an integral part of the 
ph ilosophy of the a ctiv ity movement in education. Alexande r S. Neill 
shows one of the most r ecent implementation of this a pproach in England. 
9Margare t Naumberg, The Child and the World, pp. 208-209. 
lOibid., p . 262. 
139 
At Summerhill the child is permitted to do or say whatever comes into his 
mind. Never is the child scolded or shamed. If the child uses foul Gr 
abusive language it is the philosophy of the school to accept this as the 
child's way of releasing inner tensions. It is felt that inhibition at this 
point would in some sense damage the child's personality development. 
All activities are entered into by the child freely. He may or may not 
attend classes. It is entirely up to the child whether he attempts any 
of the activities provided by the school. Also, it is the child who directs 
what is accomplished if and when he attends classes. 11 
Inherent in the doctrine of the Deweyite l'Activity Movement" is the 
notion that feeling is a surer guide to grasp reality than the intellectual 
processes. Calvin Cady argues that the child must direct himself. In 
response to the traditional argument that the child does not have capacity 
to direct himself, Cady says, 
Are they really deficient in capacity ... or has the process of awakening 
been wrong. Being of that philosophical persuasion which rejects 
the dictum that all knowledge is derived from without and through 
the physical sense, it accurred to me that the failure to reach the 
child might lie in the process; that the appeals had not touched the 
intuitional power of mind,, .. 
Fortunately, not a part, but the whole of the kingdom of intelligence , 
knew ledge, power of knowing, understanding, and expressing, is 
the lordly heritage of every being. Not by external means, therefore, 
but by touching the hidden springs of intµition, is it possible to lead 
the child to discover and organize himself--the prime aim of education. 12 
11Alexander S. Neill, Summerhill: fl Radical Approach t;.Q Child 
Rearing, (New York: Hart Publishing Co. , Inc. , 1960), pp . 3-55 . 
12calvin B. Cady, "Functions of the Creative Principles in Education," 
Gertrude Hartman and Ann Shumaker , editors , Creative Expression, (New 
York: TheJohnDayCo., 1932), p. 133. 
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It should be pointed out that Dewey never once said that the aim of 
education was to discover one's inner nature and build on one's inner self 
alone. Growth, to Dewey, involved the interaction of the organism with 
the environment. As a result of the interaction growth, experience and 
knowledge resulted which could never have been realized simply by 
whimsical self-activity. 
In contrast to this interactionism of Dewey, Cady in the romanticism 
which so often characterizes Deweyite educational technique says, 
For real and effective work it is absolutely necessary that the child 
be left unqualifiedly to himself. .. It is not imitation that should be 
sought from the child ... but spontaneous expression ... of an inner 
urge that may be awakened ... The teacher must not tamper with the 
fruit of the child's imagination ... The teacher should not make his 
cultural experience the criterion for the primitive ideas of the child ... 13 
Francis D. Dugan suggested that the method of teaching is not at 
all important. The creative urge is so natural, she said, that the teacher 
should never suggest activities but simply step aside and watch the un-
inhibited expression of the child's desires. 
It seems so presumptuous to imply that any method of teaching has 
as much to do with that natural and strange force, the creative urge 
of the child. In so far as the creative spirit is simply one which sees 
the world in a new way , that spirit is an integr9-l part of any childhood 
that is natural--not inhibited too soon by conventions ... Too much 
interference with the manipula tions of the tools in the process will 
inevitably make the child disconnect what has just been seen or felt 
vividly and freshly from the expression of it. We have all seen the 
great danger in making skill in expression seem to be something 
valuable in itself. It seems much safer to let expression fumble and 
13Ibid. , p. 134. 
14 
fumble rather than interfere too soon and break the connection. 
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Jean Piaget and F. G . Macombe r argue that the child must be allowed 
to develop and learn naturally wi thout adult interfer ence. Adults do not 
think like children because they are on a different level . Human nature 
develops through a series of level s . The stages or lev els a re fixed to 
such a degree, that great harm may be done to the child by forcing attention 
to pursuits for which he is not adapted as yet. 15 Piaget is in the . same 
tradition of r oman ticism which sugge sts that the inner nature of the child 
determines the activities wh ich the child must freely follow. Dewey ob-
jected to adult activities for children , but, as indicated above, his reaction 
was from a completely different philosophical orientation. 
Deweyite educators have emphasized "know-how" in learning to a 
degree which excludes Dewey's basic concept of doing as being involved 
in the very process of knowing. Stanwood Cobb argued that "know-how" 
rewlts from activity. 16 C a rolyn Pratt develops the thesis that "knowing-
how" is essentially an activity in process of development. 17 Margaret 
14rrancis D. Dugan , "Nurturing th e Creative Spirit, AS ymposium o f 
Teachers, 11 Gertrude Hartman and Ann Shumaker, editors, Creative Ex-
pression, (New York: The John Day Co., 1932), p. 198. 
15 
Jean Piaget, The Child' s Conception QJ the Worl d, (London: Kegan 
Paul, French, Trubner and Co., Ltd . 1929), pp. l, 19 , 30-31. 
16r. G. Macomber, "Bes t Teachers Don't Maintain Discipline, 11 
Sierre Educational News, XX.XII , September 1936 . 
Stanwood Cobb, New Horizons for the Child, (Wash ington: The 
Avalon Press, 1934), pp. 100- 103, 144-145. 
17 Caroline Pra tt, LLearn From Children, (New York: Simon a nd 
Schuster, 1948), pp. 6-7. 
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Johnson expresses dissatisfaction with discussions relative to the nature 
of knowledge and epistemological pursuits. She asserts that children fulfil 
their spiritual end when they are active. Play, which is essentially 
learning by doing, is the proper means of education. 18 
· The Deweyites advance a theory of activ1ity far different from that 
of John Dewey. It is the unanimous opinion of the Deweyites that school 
should provide· an environment where activity is encouraged because only 
in the free expressive activity of childhood's fancy does nature unfold. 
Activity unguided and undirected is the method; unfolding of inherent 
nature is the goal. Thus, Deweyites do not agree with Dewey that in-
telligent, problem-solving activity is a necessary part of the interaction 
of the organism and its environment in the learning process. 
Contemporary Critics• Criticism of Activity 
One of the criticisms which was leveled at the educational philosophy 
of John Dewey was the accusation. that Dewey advocated undisciplined 
growth. The sources advocating undisciplined growth may be found in a 
variety of places but never does Dewey advocate such a positi0n. 
Hughes Mearns states, 
The newer education is learning the uses of the mysterious forces 
of the spirit through which one may literally educate oneself for 
all the important needs of living. It is like a heart beat; no one 
has found the source of its power but no one doubts that the source 
is within us. The creative spirit is another heart; it will keep us 
l 8Margaret Johnson, Some Adventures With ~ School, (London: 
Jarrolds Publishers, Ltd., 1934), pp. 94-95, 117. 
alive if we give it a chance to 1~eat for us; it may be stilled, but 
but there is then no more life. 
143 
Harriet Ayer Seymour is even more explicit in her espousal of un-
disciplined growth. She seeks to allay the fears of those who are dis-
turbed by the apparent lack of order and discipline. 
Sometimes friends of progressive education are fearful of tao much 
freedom which may develop into license. It is true that a certain 
lack of order and discipline is often apparent in experimental eo.u-
cation, but in classes of the childrenz1crarning music 1 the new way• 
the learning is in itself a discipline. 
Robert M. Hutchins claims that Dewey is responsible for lack of 
sequential study because he made a place for activity. Hutchins assumes 
· 21 
that 11 having a good time 11 is incompatible with sequential study. Dewey 
was of the opinion that B:equential study to be effective must involve 
activity in the early grades. Hutchins confuses Dewey's position with a 
group of educators who made activity an end in itself. In the section 
immediately preceding this there was a quotation from Cady in which this 
very process was advocated. It will be. recalled that effective work, 
according to Cady, could only be accomplished when the child was left 
11 unqualifiedly to himself 11 and the teacher must not suggest the cultural 
heritage as a guide to learning. The point has already been clarified 
19Hughes Mearns, 11 Childhood 1 s Own Literature, 11 Gertrude Hartman 
and Ann Shumaker, editors, Creative Expression, (New York: The John Day 
Co., 1932), pp. 17-18. 
20 . 
· Harriet A. Seymour, "Creative Expression in- Music," Gertrude 
Hartman and Ann Shumaker, editors, Creative Expression, (New York: 
The John Day Co., 1932), p. 82. 
21 Hutchins, The Conflict in Education, p. 86. 
144 
sufficiently showing that John Dewey recognized the vital par t which the 
cultural heritage plays in the education of the young. 
Redden and Ryan assume that Dewey is responsible for placing the 
immediate "felt-needs" of the child in an all important educational posi-
tion. They assume that Dewey taught learning should only take place 
"when the child experiences a 'felt need' for a specific learning activity 
or situation. 1122 It must be recognized that Dewey did place great stress 
on the child . He reacted to making the child the pawn of adult interests. 
However, Dewey never advocated placing the immediate desires of the 
child in an exclusive determinitive educational position. He saw clearly 
that the child must be directed and guided into the processes of reflective 
thinking. The Deweyites, on the other hand, emphasize the necessity of 
fulfilment of immediate needs guided exclusively by concrete experiences. 
FerrierE insists that the child be guided exclusively by concrete experiences 
and that abstraction is useless until a certain stage is reached. Perhaps 
the most obvious movemen t away from Dewey is the insistance that the 
immediate needs of the child are all important in the educational process. 
Ferriere states, . 
We must, then, see that the child lives in the concrete, that his 
reason awakens slowly through a constant contact with things, that 
he reacts ceaselessly on visible and tangible objects. His need 
for activity will thus find satisfaction. And this activity will carry 
with it actions and reactions out of which grow the natural sanctions 
which alone form the mind and bring out progress .. .fJJ is essential 
to recQgnize that fry children of seven to twelve years of age, manual 
22Redden and Ryan, ~ Catholic Philosophy Q! Education, p. 512. 
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work must remain the cornerstone of education. If this conforms to ·· 
the child's ancestral needs, it will equally meet his psychological 
needs; his mind will proceed from the concrete to the abstract by slow 
stages without the ha~~ premature intervention of the reflective 
thinking of the adult. 
H. G. Rickover equates Dewey's educational philosophy with the 
Deweyite 11 hands off 11 activity policy. He says Dewey's educatim al 
philosophy "usually calls forth a picture of teaching methods which permit 
the child to express himself freely. 1124 Rickover fails to take into account 
the fundamental difference between the two positions relative to human 
nature. The Deweyite theory of activity is based on the developmental 
potentials exclusively within the child himself. According to this po~ition 
the end or level of development is built into child nature, therefore ab-
solute freedom with no control will assure attainment of the goal. Edu-
cation is based on the inherent needs of the child.25 This position is 
not in harmony with Dewey's educational philosophy. Dewey points out 
that the c,mcept of human nature as the unfolding of inherent powers and 
which suggests that attempts at modification will inevitable lead to 
frustration, may be traced to the climate of thought in romanticism. Dewey 
was a firm believer in the modifiability of human nature. He said that 
"the essential fixity of human nature" is not a valid concept. 
The supposition that there is such a thing as a purely native original 
23rerriere, TheActivitySchool, p. 13. 
24Rickover, Education and Freedom, p. 137. 
25 ulich, History of Educational Thought, pp. 33-335. 
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constitution of man which can be distinguished from everything ac-
quired and learned cannot be justified by appeal to the facts. (For 
practical purposes the distinction between the native and the ac-
quired is valuable). Included in this native stock is, however, the 
tendency to learn and acquire ... The capacity for modification is part 
of the natural make up of every human tendency; it belongs to an 
unlearned equipment (as that is defined at a parttcular time) for 
learning, in which process it is i.tself changed. 2 
The crux of the tension between Dewey and the Deweyites which 
apparently has not been recognized by the contemporary critics, is in the 
nature of educational growth and development. Dewey says a situation 
must be provided for intellectual growth. Deweyites contend that in-
tellectual growth is built in or provided for internally. Deweyites :believe 
that a priori categories develop regardless of interaction. Dewey main-
tains that there is no such thing as fixed, immutable human nature. 
Deweyite Theori~,s of Interest 
Dewe yite "Interest Theory, 11 in much the same manner as "Activity 
Theory, 11 grows out of sources in early radical progressivism based on a 
philosophical orientation arising out of romanticism. Romanticism as in-
dicated above is to be contrasted with Dewey's view because of Dewey's 
recognitiGn of objective factors. V\/ith Dewey's theory of interest as a 
sounding board, the differences between Dewey and the Deweyites may 
be presented. The Deweyites separate the object of interest from the 
individual self or organism. They assume that since it is psychologically 
2 6John Dewey, "Human Nature, " E. R.A. Seligman, editor, Seleetions 
from the Encyclopedia Qf Social Sciences, (New York: The MacMillan 
Co., 1945), p. 533. 
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impossible for a person to give attention to that in which he has no in-
terest, then interests of the child are the only fundamental interests of 
educational significance. 
It is assumed, on the basis of the Deweyites view of human nature, 
that the child's interest at a given stage gives insight into the child's 
view of reality at a given level of development. The Deweyite theory of 
interest argues that it is harmful to force subject matter on a child in 
which he expresses no interest. It asserts that if a child is inhibited, 
that child's moral development suffers a tremendous set back. 27 Subject 
matter is conceived of as something that is objective to the child. In 
the discussion of Dewey's theory it was pointed out that Dewey conceived 
of subject matter as growing out of the interaction of the individual and 
his environment. In some sense both the traditional school and the 
Deweyites are a distance from Dewey in this matter. 
Junius L. Meriam argues that child interest internally motivated 
should govern the choice of subject matter. He goes so far as to assume 
that subject matter is not needed, provided the activities of the chil.d 
. meet the immediate and. personal demands of the child. The Dew!?yite is 
saying in effect that the immediate interests of the child are the sole 
criterion for the selection of subject matter. 28 
Margaret Naumberg in her portrayal of practices and theory at 11 The 
27 Gady, ''Functions of the Creative Principles in Education, 11 pp. 
133-134. 
28Junius L. Meriam, Child Life and the Curriculum, (Yonkers-on 
Hudson: World Book Co., 1921), pp. 382, 415, 436-437. 
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Walden School," asserts that the child's personality will be harmed if 
not given "adequate expression at every age period. 1129 She is of the 
opinion that the school should cater to the interests of the child. 30 
This is essential because release of spontaneous feelings is essential if 
the child is to find fulfilment, Consequently, there should be no norms 
set up as goals toward which children should reach. 31 Jean Piaget, 
following a similar point of view, suggests that the curriculum be built 
(if at all) on the basis of the interests found in children. 32 
Naumberg indicates her affinity to· Freudian thought when she suggests 
that self-activity motivated by pupil-directed interest can be completely 
trusted when it is guided by a teacher trained in psycho-analysis. Unless 
the child is permitted freedom, the deterioration of the mind which is now 
in progress will be continued.33 
Adolph Ferriere emphasizes that it is the useful and not the verbal 
that is important in education. This is a basic concept in the Deweyite 
philosophy of education. He says, "It will be noted that two traits 
29Margaret Naumberg, "The Walden School," National Society for 
the Study of Education, 26th Yearbook, Part I, Curriculum Making: 
Past and Present, (Bloomington: Public School Publishing Co., 1926), 
pp. 335-339. 
301bid., pp. 333-334. 
31 
Naumberg, The Child and th~ World, pp" 250-251. 
32Piaget, The Child's Conception of the World, pp. 11-30. 
33 
Naumberg, The Child and the World, pp. 211-214. 
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characterize the Activity School as I have set it forth: the absence of 
verbalism and the presence in every thought and act of an element of 
usefulness.1134 
Ferriere wants the teacher to be very reticent in the matter of guidance. 
If the teacher leads the child the child should not be aware that he is 
being led. 
First, remember that it is seldom your place to suggest to him what 
he shall learn; it is for him to desire it, to seek for it, to find it, 
it is fo~ you to bring it within his reach, skillfully to awaken this 
desire, and provide him the means of satisfying it. 35 
Ferriere wants it made clear that it does not matter what the child 
learns just so the child is interested in what he is doing and understands 
it. He says, "Moreover, as it little matters what he learns, provided 
he thoroughly understands it and what use it is to be put to, the minute 
you can give him nothing further in the way of real enlightenment, give him 
nothing at alL " 3 6 In order that the child understand what he is doing it 
is necessary that the Work be a concrete experiential project of doing 
something. Ferriere instructs teachers, "Do as much as possible of 
your teaching by doing, and fall back on words only when doing is out 
of the question. 1137 
Ferriere is definite as to the basis bf this learning by doing cur-
34Ferriere, p. 19L 





riculum. Child interest is to be the criterion of school activity. The 
".program will be adapted to the dominant interests of children and ad-
olescents. 1138 If the child is not immediately interested, then the teacher 
must recognize that the child is too young. Spontaneous desire should 
be the criterion of educational readiness. 
At the very beginning the technique must be understood and wanted 
by the child; if he doe:s not want it he is still too young to understand 
the necessity for it, and. if at that time it is imposed on him, he will 
infallibly take a dislike to it. 39 
If the child is interested in the task he is doing and understands 
it, there will be a sense of happiness. Joy and happiness will be the 
credentials of a satisfactory curriculum. 
The child• s .own character finds expression above all in drawing. He 
loves to work in accord with his imagination and his nature, and to 
produce beautiful forms, agreeable figures. He produces them by a 
. free impulse of his will; he enjoys everything he does; he experiences 
an inner satisfaction. He has imitated God, for he has, so to speak, 
created; he is well pleased with his handiwork ..• The teacher is here 
simply a witness, and can only at times serve as guide; the pupil, 
free to go his own pace, in his own way, consults his powers, follows 
his inclinations, obeys his nature. 4 0 
Regardless of the age of the child, it is the contention of the Deweyite, 
the child• s essential nature is the moving force. Dewey, it will be re-
called recognized a need for balance between the organism and its envi-
ronment. 
38Ibid., p. 196. 
39 . 
Ibid., p. 136. 
40Ibid., pp. 130-13L 
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Contemporary Critics' Criticism of Interest 
The Deweyite theory of interest is much less complex than Dewey's 
theory. They stress the inner springs of action and talk about child natur.e. 
Dewey is not unmindful of the child's basic drives but also emphasizes that 
educational growth and experience are the result of an interaction with the 
environment. 
The contemporary critics have not noticed this vital distinction. 
They accuse Dewey of advocating an interest theory based on spontaneous 
expression which leads to absolute anarchy. From the above study it is 
clear that the critics are reacting to an educational philosophy which has 
received articulate expression. However, the critics have failed to see 
that the Deweyite, unlike Dewey, is building his educational philosophy 
on the foundation of a romantic view of human nature which places ex-
elusive emphasis on subjective factors to the neglect of objective con-
siderations. 
John Dewey uses terms such as "activity" and "spontaneous in-
terest, " but the context makes it clei;;tr that Dewey does not use the words 
with the same meanings attached to them as in Deweyite interpretations. 
The meaning applied to these terms by the Deweyites are explicitly denit3d 
by Dewey. It is difficult, he says, to build walls around philosophical 
and educational concepts in order to i.nsure the integrity of meaning. 
The difficulty is particularly great in the discussion of interest. 
Interest is in the closest relation to the emotional life, on the one 
side, and through its close relation, if not identity, with attention, 
to the intellectual life, on the other side. Any adequate explanation 
... would require the development of the complete psychology both 
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of feeling and of knowledge, and of the relations to each other, and 
of the discussion of their connection or lack of connection with 
volition. 41 . 
Dewey goes on to say that it is impossible to call forth any activity with-
out interest. He then characterizes two interest theories which he points 
out are not in harmony with his own. The traditional effort theory which 
just substitutes one interest for another and holds out remote goals as a 
reason for the effort. The other notion is that of distracting the child. 
and thereby creating interest. 
The principle of interest is eternally to excite, that is, distract 
the child. Continuity of activity is destroyed. Everything is made 
play, amusement. This means over-stimulation; it means dissipation 
of energy. Will is never called into action at all. The reliance 
is upon external attractions and amusements. Everything ,is sugar 
coated for the child, and he soon learns to tum from everything which 
is not artificially surrounded with diverting circumstances. The 
spoiled child who does only what he li~zs is the inevitable outcome 
of this theory of interest in education. 
Both theories, Dewey says, have the same ultimate goal, mastery of an 
existent objectified knowledge. 
This identical assumption is the externality of the object or idea to 
be mastered; the end to be reached, the act to be performed to the 
self. It is because the object or end is assumed to be outside self 
that it.has to be made interesting; that it has to be surrounded with 
artificial stimuli and with ficti.tious inducements attention, It is 
equally because the object lies outside the sphere of self that the 
sheer power of 'will,' the putting forth of effort without interest, 43 .. 
has tG be appealed to, 
41 John Dewey, "Interest in Relation to the Training of the Will," 
Second Supglement t2 Herbart Yearbook for 189_§. (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1905), p. 5. 
42 Ib' d l. . • I PP. 7 -81, 
43Ibid., p. 9. 
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Dewey I s theory of interest, as shown above, is from a completely 
different orientation. 
The genuine principle of interest is the principle of the recognized 
identity of the fact or proposed line of action with the self; that it 
lies in the direction of the agents own growth, and is, therefore, 
imperiously demanded, if the agent is to be himself. 44 
If one would recognize the concept of identification there would be no 
need, Dewey says, for 11 appeal to sheer strength of will, 11 or to the 
"making Gf things interesting to the child. 1145 
Mortimer Smith claims that Dewey is responsible for the exclusive 
emphasis on forming the curriculum around the immediate interests of the 
child. He says the Deweyan emphasis leads to 11 a mere catering to what 
the student thinks he wants. 114 6 The discussion of Dewey's theory of 
interest in the previous chapter has destroyed this indictment. It was 
shown at that point that Dewey advocated enduring in a course of action 
in spite of contrary solicitations when that course of action led to the 
solution of a problem or the reaching of a goal. However, the Deweyites 
are frank to admit that the child's immediate interests are the only impor-
tant factors in the curriculum. 
The discussion of Deweyite theory of interest and the contemporary 
critics assumption that Dewey advocated the Deweyite philosophy of 





Smith, The Diminished Mind, p. 18. 
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Dewey and the Deweyites at this point. Therefore, since the criticisms 
are leveled at a theory which are not consistent with Dewey•s interest 
theory it appears safe to conclude that they are not criticisms of Dewey. 
Deweyite Theories of Subject Matter 
The discussion of Deweyite theories of activity and interest are 
correlated with a particular view of subject matter. To a large extent 
everything that has been said in these areas applies to curriculum de-
velopment. Gustav Schoench.en speaks of the three fold nature of the 
. child; mental, physical and social. 4 7 Recognizing these distinct but 
interrelated aspects and the development within each phase of human 
nature, Schoenchen asserts that there must be an attempt to synthesize 
and correlate subject matter. All knowledge is based on sense impressions 
and it is the teachers responsibility to furnish the impressions. However, 
even without a teacher human nature is so constituted that powers can 
be developed even when the individual is isolated from society. Schoenchen 
is tremendously influenced by Rousseau's high regard for the inherent 
development as depicted by Robinson Crusoe while separated from society. 
Therefore, the aim of education is not to be found .in society but in the 
individual child. Basically, the individual and society have opposing 
48 
aims. The good individual must precede the good society. It should 
47 Gustav G. Schoenchen, The Activity School: A Basic Philosophy 
for Teachers, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), p. 60. 
48Ibid., pp. 65, 138, 283, 285. 
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be observed that to Dewey education and man's social relationships are 
inseparable. 
Most Deweyite literature reveals the assumption that the spontaneous 
active interest cif the child should be the sole guide in curriculum formu-
lation. Most of the spokesman assume the necessity of this position on 
the basis of child nature. This in tum is posited because there is a 
predisposition to believe in the culture epoch theory as indicated pre-
viously. 49 A host of Deweyites may be cited who ascribe to this view of 
human natur.e which is in contrast with that proposed by John Dewey. 
Hughes Mearns points out the determinative effect this view of human 
nature has on subject matter. 
The child is a genuine primitive. He needs little or nb instruction, 
but he must have materials and his surroundings must be such as to 
call his effort worthy; he is susceptible to condemnation and will 
give up all his precious ;art and lose one of the most gracious of 
nature 1-s g~bts..:.for, alas, it may be easily lost-if his overlords 
command._ 
The inter-relatedness between. child.nature and educational philosophy 
for the Deweyite is obvious. The child _must not be forced to pursue a 
logical c~msecu,tive subject matter because his militates against his 
private interests and encroaches upon his free activity. As a result 
subject matter traditionally conceived is to be discarded because it doe:s 
not square with the Deweyites I romantic view of human nature. 
49Ferriere, The Activity School, pp. 76-78. 
50Hughes Mearns, "Childhood's Own Literature, 11 Gertrude Hartman 
and Ann Shumaker,. editors, Creative Expression, (New York: The John 
Day Co . , · 19 3 2), p . 17. · 
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Peppino Mongravite says, 
My idea of a teacher ... is a person who is clairvoyant, who is able 
to penetrate the mind and soul of a child. A teacher must comprehend 
what the child wants to do.. He must never interfere with the child 1 s 
mental image by telling him how to begin. 51 
Adolph Ferriere argues that the child must be free to externalize 
instincts. Children, he says should be twelve to.fourteen years of age 
before they are ever faced with any subject matter other than the child• s 
own immediate interests. Ferri ere' s rule is no subject matter, by which 
he means the traditional subject, before adolescence. Prior to adoles-
cence there should be no encroachment on the liberty of the child. Spon-
taneous expression, child interest, immediate needs, and the "play way" 
are the important criteria of curriculum building. 52 
Deweyites indicate in all their writings that feeling is a surer 
guide to understanding reality than is intellect. 53 This position is to be 
contrasted with that of John Dewey. Dewey, while he recognized modes 
of awareness other than the cognitive, taught that every child is capable 
of genuine cognitive experj_ence. He said that only through intelligent 
action can American d~mocratic culture reach the ideaL The school is the 
place for training the pupil in intelligent action. 
Slpeppino Mongravit~, "The Artist and the Child," Gertrude Hartman 
and Ann Shumaker, editors, Creative Expression, (New York: The John Day 
Co., 1932), pp. 31-33. 
52 Ferriere, The Activity School, pp. 84, 121. 
Adolph Ferriera, "What is the New School," Progressive Education, 
63:123-125, June 18, 1930. 
53Ferriere, TheActivitySchool, p. 103. 
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To bring to consciousness of the coming generation something of the 
potential significance of the life of today, to transmute it from out-
ward fact into intelligent perception, is the first step in the creation 
of a culture ... Teachers ... are sharing in the act of creation .. ; Not 
chiding but the sympathy and direction of understanding are the harsh 
utilitarian and prosaic tendencies (that) present education require. 54 
The Deweyite who gives exclusive attention to child development on 
the basis of free expression differs from Dewey in that Dewey emphasized 
thorough study of subject matter materials, Dewey's view of subject mat-
ter, however, is different than that of the traditionalist. The chief dif-
ference is in the structure of knowledge as pointed out in the discussion 
of Dewey's theory of knowledge and educational philosophy. From that 
discussion it was shown that Dewey believed that subject matter is simply 
raw material which must undergo certain transformations, as it is inter-
nalized by the individual, before it may be described as having been a 
part of cognitive experience. 
The Deweyite does not hold this view of subject matter. Some Dewey-
ites differ among themselves in varying degrees but they are consistent in 
that they hold that when the materi.al of learning is encountered, it is en-
countered q.irectly. Know how comes with use but things are known for 
what they are directly. Dewey, it has been shown, emphasized the in-
strumental character of objects of knowledge. Knowledge is never im-
mediate. It is always at the conclusion of a successful process of re-
flective inquiry. 
54John Dewey, "Education and American Culture," Joseph Ratner, 
editor, John Dewey's Philosophy, (New York: The Modem Library, 1939), 
p. 728. 
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Summarizing the position of Dewey it may be clearly indicated that 
Dewey called for a carefully developed subject matter leading to sequential 
activities on the part of the child, Content is determined by experience 
taking place interactively between: (l) the ch.ild as experiencer, and (2) 
the object or thing in the environmenL Subject matter is the careful se-
quential organization of materials leading to these experiences. 
Contemporary Critics' Criticism of Subject Matter 
Admiral Rickover has accused Dewey of denying a legitimate place 
for content in the educational process. He has equated Dewey's position 
with the Deweyite who just wants the child to express himself. 55 It has 
been established that this is not the position of John Dewey. It is the 
Deweyite educational philosophy deeply rooted in romanticism which con-
ceives the end of educaUon to be the unfolding of the nature of the child. 
Elizabeth Ferm epitimizes this position, 
We believe that man, to know himself, was necessitated to objectify 
his inner life in the very outermost, that that outermost might serve 
as a mirror to reflect his image. This belief made us zealously guard 
the outposts of the child's life. So many good people are always 
ready to do things for children. 56 
An unhampered child is always self-active and creative. He is ab-
sorbed in his own interests and is therefore reluctant to receive sug-
gestion or direction from outside. He needs no encouragement to do 
things. His own impulses and desires are so alive and urgent they 
keep him busy fulfilling the promptings of his own being. Outside 
55 Rickover, pp. 138-140. 
56Elizabeth Bvrne Ferm, "Creative Work at the Modern School, " 
Gertrude Hartman and Ann Shumaker, editors, Creative Expression, (New 
York: The John Day Co., 1932), p. 36, 
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suggestion or directi.on only serves to interrupt and retard the work of 
the self active child, 5 7 
Mortimer Smith asserts that Dewey is responsible for the movement 
which neglects the cultural traditi.on. He says, "The controversy today is 
between those who continue to believe that cultivation of intelligence, 
moral as well as intellectual, is inextricably bound up with the cultural 
heritage and accumulated knowledge of mankind ... 11 58 Again, it must be 
understood that Dewey does not conceive of the cultural tradition as an 
objective body of knowledge to be learned in a rote manner by every child 
who enters the school. Failure to understand Dewey's philosophy of educa-
tion at this point will continue to bring this allegation from traditionally 
oriented critics. Dewey says we must use the cultural heritage as raw 
material to connect the child with the past but this is not the end of the 
process. Out of the interaction of the child with the raw material--the 
child, on the basis of intelligence, sees new connections and as a conse-
quence novel experiences result. 59 
Demo era tic Education 
(Life Adjustment) 
The contemporary critics have been vocal in their equation of demo-
cratic education, conceived in terms of life adjustment, with the educa-
57Ibid"' p, 37. 
58smith, p, 20. 
59 Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 177-178, 
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tional philosophy of John Dewey. 60 It will become increasingly clear that 
there are developments growing out of "Life Adjustment Theory" which would 
be applauded by Dewey: the emphasis on education for all American youth; 
the recognition of the practical arts as truly educative; and. the emphasis 
on expansion of the curriculum to meet the needs of a changing society. 
However, to equate "Life-Adjustment Education" as the critics interpret it 
with the educational philosophy of John .Dewey is to fail to take into con-
sideration irreconcilable differences in fundamental approach. 
"Life Adjustment Education For Every Youth," became the avowed 
policy of the United States Office of Education, in a Bulletin release• Num-
ber 22, in 1951. 61 John W. Studebaker, in the introduction to the bulletin, 
points out the leading spirit in the life adjustment movement, 
The office of education is indebted to the large number of educational 
leaders who participated in the conferences .•. Gratitude is extended 
to those who rendered services as officers of several committees and 
to persons who, through their writing and other labors, contributed to 
this project. Foremost among those is Charles A. Prosser, author of 
the resolution, and a never-ending source of inspiration. 62 
The man who led the commHtee in its report which stated the need for "Life 
6°Keats, Schools Without Scholars, pp. 83-86; Smith, The Dimin-
ished Mind, pp. 83-86; Lynd, Quackery in the Public Schools, pp. 169-209; 
Rickover, Education and Freedom, pp. 23-24; Redden and Ryan, A Catholic 
Philosophy of Education, p. 565; Hutchins, The Conflict in Education, p. 55. 
61United States Office of Education, Life Adjustment Education for 
.Every Youth, (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, Bulletin 
No. 22, 1951). 
62Ibid., p. 3. 
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Adjustment Education" was Charles A, Prosser. 63 John Dewey's name does 
not appear in the list of distinguished educators who attended the confer-
ence, 64 (in fact he was ill and died the next year), nor does his name ap-
pear among the educators who had been working on this report as early as 
January, 1944. The fact that Dewey had no vital connection with the de-
velopment and implementation of the program which began as early as 1944 
would indicate that Dewey had no direct bearing on the program in a formi-
tive manner. 
The contemporary critics attack the life adjustment education philos-
ophy primarily because it presents, in terms of democratic right, an educa-
tional pattern which would insure training through the secondary level for 
all American youth. The criticism arises because the educational patterns, 
63Ibid., p. 16. Original form of Prosser Resolution: It is the belief 
of this conference that, with the aid of this report in fi.nal form, the voca-
tional school of a community will be able better to prepare 20 percent of 
the youth of secondary-school age for entrance upon desirable skilled 
occupations; and that the high school will continue to prepare another 20 
percent for entrance to college. We do not believe that the remaining 60 
percent of our youth of secondary school age will receive the life-adjust-
ment training they need and to which they are entitled as American citizens 
--unless and until the admini.strators of Public education with the assist-
ance of the vocational education leaders formulate a similar program for 
this group, 
We therefore request the U, S. Commissioner of Education and the assist-
ant commissioner for Vocational Education to call at some early date a 
conference or a series of regional conferences between an equal number of 
representatives of general and of vocational education to consider this 
problem and to take such initial steps as may be found advisable for its 
solution, 
64Ibid., p. 105, 
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techniques and aims of the life adjustment approach are, it is felt by the 
critics, in opposition to that which truly represents education. Education, 
according to contemporary critics, is sound grounding in the 3 R1 s on the 
elementary level, and beyond these rudiments, disciplined grasp of the 
cultural tradition through rigid stucN of traditional liberal arts subject 
matter. 
The Prosser report on life adjustment education denies the adequacy 
of traditional secondary school education. The report asserts that second-
ary schools have been oriented to preparing students for college. This 
approach, the report states, is legitimate for those who plan to attend col-
lege and may even be acceptable to others who have the capacity for liberal 
arts education. However, the majority of American high school students 
do not go to college and the report contends that they have little or no 
interest in the subject matter of the college preparatory high school. As a 
result students are dropping out of high school in alarming numbers .. If the 
American democratic ideal of education for all youth is to be realized, the 
secondary school must change its approach and provide educational oppor-
tunities of a quality and kind ,that is appropriate to the needs of the 30 per-
cent of American youth who do not enter high school and the additional 30 
percent who do not complete the work begun. 65 
The emphasis of life adjustment education is a movement away. from 
college preparation as the sole curriculum criterion for the modem American 
65Ibid., p. 15. 
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high school to a diversified curriculum which takes into account the needs 
of pupils not college bound. Life adjustment education elpands the cur-
riculu.m to include vocational interests, family relationships and citizen-
ship. 
The Commission defines Life Adjustment Education as that which better 
equips all American youth to live democratically with satisfaction to 
themselves and profit to society as home members, workers, and 
citizens. It is concerned with ethical and moral living and with 
physical, mental, and emotional health. 66 
Life adjustment education assumes that it i.s the school's responsi-
bility in a democratic society, to provide a school environment where each 
student may develop his own abilities and potentials. It is the opinion of 
life adjustment educators that, although a child is not gifted in the pursuit 
of traditional school subjects, and may be incapable of such educational 
pursuit, there are practical educational pursuits which will bring challenge 
to such a child. The report asserts, "These youth are educable, but they 
are different in abilities to learn and in types of educational needs ... teach-
ers need to provide for them a wide variety of learning activities. 1167 Mod-
em educational psychology concurs with this point of view and nothing in 
the educational philosophy of Dewey vvould oppose the expansion of the cur-
riculum in an effort to meet student's ind.ividual needs. 
The original report on life adjustment education was focused on 
secondary school education. Since the report a number of educators have 
66Ibid., pp, 9-10. 
67Ibid., p. 48. 
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advocated life adjustment education for all levels in the educative process 
including the college curriculum. Florence Stratemeyer advocates such a 
position, She says, "It seems to me that the life adjustment concept ap-
plies equally well to elementary, to secondary and even to college educa-
t.ion. 11 68 Stratemeyer is of the ~pinion that life adjustment practices in 
vocational education might prove beneficial even to the "gifted" in pursuit 
of professions as well as the more menial occupations, 69 
Contemporary Critics' Criticism of Democratic Education 
The contemporary critics object to the concept of life-adjustment ed-
ucation because they feel that life adjustment is not the task of the school. 
Organizations in society, it is argued, are better equipped to teach social 
graces, manual occupations and a multitude of practical things. The school 
should be the school; and a school is a place where subjects in the liberal 
arts are taught. In a democracy every child should have an opportunity to 
go to school and take as much education as his capacity permits, When 
a child is no longer capable of successfully engaging in the pursuit of an 
education he should be permitted to find useful employment. 
Dewey's educational philosophy provides for a conception of educa-
tion which would recognize the genuine educational value of practical pur-
68f1orence B, Stratemeyer, "Education for Life Adjustment," edited 
by Phillip H, Phenix, Philosophies .9.f Education, (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc,, 1961), p. 29. 
69Ibid., p. 30. 
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suits. The basic approach of his philosophy in this regard was doubtless 
a strong support to the basic assumption of life adjustment education which 
attempts to reorganize the curriculum of the high school in an effort to pro-
vide vocational education for those individuals who do not plan to attend 
college. However, Dewey was not concerned with "vocational" education 
per se, but with the intellectual quality of all learning. So that while it 
might be possible to confuse Dewey's expansion of intellectual pursuits 
to practical studies with a suggestion that he advocated vocational educa-
tion--such an assumption is false and a confusion of the issues. 
Any scheme for vocational education which takes its point of depar-
ture from the industrial regime that now exists is likely to assume and 
to perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses,,. ,Such a vocational 
education inevitably discounts the scientific and historic human con-
nections ... To include such things in narrow trade education would be 
to waste time ... 70 
Life adjustment education with its concern for vocational education fails 
to recognize the Deweyan meaning of adjustmenL Dewey's theory of ad-
justment is not satisfied with adjustment to existing conditions by narrow 
specialized vocationalism but seeks to creatively open new horizons through 
reflective thought.· 
Admiral Rickover talks about the "bare intellectual backsides" of 
the Deweyan approach.71 The critics assert that Dewey is responsible for 
anti-intellectualism. If the critics define intellectualism as the success-
ful passing of the traditional subject matter course then Dewey stands 
70newey, Demo:cracy and Education, p. 372. 
71 Rickover, p. 14, 
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condemned. However, Dewey's educational philosophy plainly shows 
that within the framework of his philosophy disciplined intellectual growth 
would result in the traditional curriculum as well as in the practical pur-
suits. The critics are attacking the Deweyite when they assume Dewey 
had little interest in advancement toward goals and standards. There is 
some evidence of the lack of standards in the life adjustment bulletin 
statement which may be the source of the contemporary critics attack. 
The demands for technical knowledge of the language which life will 
make on the educationally neglected student will be practically non-
existent. These students will never to any great extent transfer the 
rules of grammar to the small amount of writing they will have to do. 
It seems far more likely that improvement in their written expression 
will result from practice in functiona 1 situations than from drill on 
technical rules of grammar. With oral expression, the same is true. 
It will be desirable to attempt to develop correct and concise usa7e, 
but the method will have to be chiefly practice in real situations. 2 
The critics equate Dewey 1 s educational philosophy with life adjustment 
education. The life adjustment view of interest as stated in the bulletin 
has some flavor of the Deweyite in that it views subject matter as some-
thing external to the individual which must be made interesting. The life 
adjustment report by Prosser and Stratemeyer 1 s statement both consider 
educational interests as in some sense external to the person. Interest, 
according to Dewey it will be recalled, is inherently involved in the in-
teractive process. 73 
The life adjustment report in the implementation of its program con-
siders the "project method" to be a vital tool in making life adjustment 
72 Life Adjustment Education Bulletin, p. 8'3. 
73 Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 3:62. 
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education meaningful. In the previous chapter certain differences be-
tween the educational philosophies of John Dewey and William Heard 
Kilpatrick were observed. It will be remembered that the "project method" 
is an innovation of Kilpatrick not Dewey. 
From the foregoing analysis of life adjustment education and the 
contemporary critics insistance that Dewey bears major responsibility for 
the movement; it is apparent that Dewey's involvement must be clarified. 
To what extent Dewey's philosophy is related becomes an important ques-
tion in the light of this the sis. It has already been recognized that Dewey 
would not condone narrow vocational studies as a consistent implementa-
tion of his intellectual interest in practical pursuits. He,would approve 
practical pursuits only as they become involved in a connected intellec-
tual problem solving situation. Dewey I s consistent approach to educa-
tional problems would react to the narrow interests of life adjustment ed-
ucation and to the inherent separations in the system between vocational 
and intellectual studies. 
Perhaps the problem can be dealt with more adequately under the 
heading of the critics over-enthusiastic generalizations. They assume 
that because Dewey advocated an expanded curriculum that he must have 
been the father of life adjustment education. The facts clearly indicate 
that the actual father of life adjustment education was Charles Prosser. 
The critics assert that Dewey and the life adjusters in general are attempt-
74Life Adjustment Education Bulletin, pp, 1-39. 
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ing to tear ,down the intellectual standards not only of students but of 
teachers as well. In the discussion of Dewey's educational philosophy 
documentary evidence was presented showing the importance of teachers 
being soundly grounded in the intellectual disciplines. Moreover, in the 
only record available of Dewey's encounter with college curriculum plan-
ning, Dewey gives every evidence of advocating a very strong logically 
organized subject matter for colleges. The report states: 
Changes in the educational system should come, not by surrendering 
the peculiar values of the liberal arts college, but by suffusing 
through the whole educational structure the liberalizing spirit and 
outlook that have characterized the liberal arts college at its best. 7 5 
John Keats pinpoints what he considers to the continuing power of 
life-adjustment education--the teacher training colleges which hold sub-
ject matter orientation in disrepute. He considers Dewey to be ca usually 
responsible for the modern pragmatic school and the teacher training col-
lege which sustains it. In any event the modern school, according to 
Keats, is without intellectual standards. 
Mastery is not the goal in pragmatic high schools. Like other 
teachers - college - trained - pragmatists, they do not consider 
mastery of any subject matter to be the primary goal of education, 
but believe that primary goal to be manufacture of life-adjustment 
citizens. 76 
Dewey would accept Keats' suggestion that he believed that subject matter 
75Rollins College Bulletin, "The Curriculum for the College of 
Liberal Arts," John Dewey Chairman, (Winter Park, Florida: Rollins 
College, 1931), p. 10. 
76Keats, p. 63. 
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per se is not the primary end of education. However, Dewey clearly em-
phasized the great importance of sequential subject matter for both student 
and teacher. In the report of the committee study on curriculum in the lib-
eral arts college Dewey• s committee statement clearly decries the lack of 
preparation of many students entering college. 
It is regrettable, but nevertheless a fact, that the college must waste 
a great deal of time and energy in doing what should have been but 
was not done earlier, in overcoming, antidating, correcting, supplant-
ing, the results of ignorance ... long accumulations during the formi-
tive years in home and school. .. 77 
Not only did the Dewey-sponsored committee report emphasize the need 
for adequate preparation for those entering college but the actual curricu-
lum suggestions indicate a solid foundation in the liberal arts. The cur-
riculum suggestions were not exclusive for those taking a particular degree 
but for all college graduates. 
a. English competence bhould include ability to write and speak 
witl.17 confidence, appeal; interest, accuracy and effectiveness. 
D)etails have been eliminated in this outlin§.7 
b. At least one foreign language ... 
c. Mathematics through solid geometry and plane trigonometry ... 
d. History: The student should have a comprehensive and general 





h. Social and Economic institutions,;. 
i. Physical fitness ... 78 
Robert M. Hutchins considers life-adjustment education to be in-
77Rollins Report, pp. 10'"".ll. 
78Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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adequate because to him education should not only give the individual the 
ability to adjust to the present environment but to change the environment. 
He says, "It is far more urgent that we notice that our mission here on 
earth is to change our environment, not to adjust to it." 79 Hutchins 
argues that life-adjustment education has led to a curriculum over-loaded 
with vocational specializations to the point where no time is available 
for serious study and a reasonable degree of thoroughness. 
The process of specialization has therefore turned out to be a process 
of inhibition. The traditional definition of a specialist is that he is 
a man who learns more and more about less and less, In the United 
States we have discovered that he can be a man who learns less and 
less about less and less, 80 
The degree to which Hutchins' criticism affects higher education is a 
matter of conjecture. There are any number of books on the market today 
. 81 
which seek to substantiate his claims, · However, it is a completely 
different thing to say that John Dewey advocated adjusting the individual 
into existing environmental conditions without providing for developing 
capacities for changing both the individual and the environment. Hutchins 
says, ", .. Mr. Dewey also had a hand ... 1182 in the educational process 
which lead up to current life adjustment concepts. Concepts which load 
down the curriculum with so many activities that it is impossible to master 
79Hutchins, The Conflict in Education, p. 19. 
80rbid,,p, 39. 
81 See Bibliography under Bestor, Conant and Koerner. 
82Hutchins, The Conflict in Education, p. 8 6. 
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anything,, Dewey speaking through his committee report on curriculum for 
liberal arts education in college shows the error of equating him with 
positions which advocate anything less than mastery. 
Time must be allowed in the educational process for a reasonable 
degree of thoroughness in dealing with problems. Quality of educa-
tional experience must not suffer for the sake of added quantities of 
information. 83 
The Dewey committee study on college curriculum for a liberal arts col-
lege at Winter Park, Florida, had some interesting things to say in an 
anticipatory manner which cuts the heart out of equation of Dewey with 
"quackery" in American education particularily on the college leve L The 
committee reported that teacher certification should never limit the quali-
fied teacher simply because he had not met some procedural requirement. 
The training and certification of teachers for school and college should 
not be so completely as a1t present controlled by law and bureaucratic 
regulations, under which some of the best qualified teachers are often 
debarred because of failure to comply with some quantitative regula-
tion. 84 
The Dewey sponsored report, contrary to the critics view of Dewey's 
democratic equalitarianism, suggests that standards of admission and 
attrition at college should be closely guarded. There is no indication in 
this report that just any student be e.ither admitted or retained in college 
without meeting the intellectual requirement. 
... the college should select with extreme care these students best 
fitted for it. Within the college, appraisals should be frequent in 
83 Rollins Report, p. 13. 
84Ibid. , p. 14 , 
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the first part of the work so that necessary adjustments and elimina-
tions should not be too long deferred. 85 
Summary 
To what extent is Dewey involved in life-adjustment education? The 
discussion has indicated that a man by the name of John Prosser is the 
recognized father of the life-adjustment theory of education. Life-adjust-
ment education originally sought to provide secondary school vocational 
training for students unequipped for college preparatory courses. There 
was no indication in the "Prosser Report" that college preparatory courses 
per se should be altered or diluted in any manner. Since the original re-
port there has been an expansion of life-adjustment conception downward 
into the grades and upward into the college. The expansion of life-adjust-
ment education, according to the critics, has threatened the whole system 
of American education with intellectual suicide. The person responsible 
for life adjustment education I according to the contemporary critics, is 
John Dewey. It has been shown that the critics' equation of Dewey's 
educational philosophy with radical progressive practices including life 
adjustment education is not warranted by the facts. Life adjustment educa-
tion is a narrow utilitarian emphasis which seeks to implement its aim by 
a shallow vocationalism which Dewey rejected. Dewey's approach pro-
vided for the expansion of the processes of intelligence into every area 
85 Ibid. 
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of life; however, he never advocated separating the cultural aims of educa-
tion from a vocational training approach which played down the intellectual 
capacities of large numbers of students. 
Chapter VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding discussion has been undertaken with the conviction 
that a careful analysis of the patterns of thought which characterize the 
philosophy of John Dewey would tend to exonerate him of the many care-
less charges of anti-intellectualism. This study has not attempted to be 
an apology or defense of "Instrumentalism II per se. There has been no 
effort to suggest that the philosophy of John Dewey is either superior or 
inferior to other current philosophical approaches. Such an effort is be-
yond the scope of this presentation. However, there has been an attempt 
to show clearly that John Dewey has been falsely equated with philosoph-
ical thought and educational practices which are not conducive to intel-
lec~al excellence or educational efficiency. ~~·· ~ .~ 
The material presented will be summarized with a view to crystall-
izing the arguments. Finally, the conclusions which have been stated or 
implied will be made explicit. 
Summary 
The first chapter began with a recognition of the difficulty faced in 
attempting to assess the influence of John Dewey on current educational 
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thought and practice. This problem has been increased by the fact that 
many educational innovators have claimed Dewey as their source without· 
respect to harmonizing their practices with his educational philosophy. 
Critics who have reacted to these unwarranted educational inno-
vations have assumed that because Dewey advocated certain educational 
reforms and because Dewey's reforms had semantic similarities to the 
unwarranted innovations--therefore, Dewey must be considered the 
source of these illicit practices. Such an equation has been facilitated 
by the tension in basic philosophy between Dewey and the contemporary 
critics. 
The problem of this thesis has been to ascertain what validity con-
temporary criticisms have which equate the educational philosophy of 
John Dewey with unwarranted educational innovations. The educators 
who advocated these radical views have been labeled Deweyites. It has 
been noted that while some Deweyites were followers of Dewey--a sec-
ond group were naive innovators who failed to see the discontinuity be-
tween their position and that of Dewey--and a third group who were fully 
aware of the fundamental differences between their approach and that of 
Dewey. 
The contemporary critics are alarmed at what they consider to be a 
drift away from subject matter orientation to life adjustment practices in 
American education. They argue that the structure of Dewey's philoso-
phy is the responsible sou.rce for theories of activity, interest, subject 
matter and democracy which have led to a lowering of educational 
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efficiency and intellectual standards. 
The purpose of the thesis has been to defend the hypothesis that 
educational methods and techniques of the Deweyites are not derived 
from or consistent with the educational philosophy of John Dewey. 
In the second chapter the views of six representative contemporary 
critics were presented. John Keats argued that Dewey abandoned mental 
discipline and intellectual responsibility by his substitution of life ad-
justment educational practices. Dewey's theory, according to Keats, 
trains the student to meet the problems of life by conditioning him in 
proper social attitudes and providing vocational training. In the early 
phases of education, Keats argued that Dewey emphasized letting the 
child's interest and active nature set the pattern of learning. Democratic 
education is the conforming of students into a dull grey intellectual and 
moral middle of the road standard through group pressure. 
Mortimer Smith said Dewey was responsible for current weaknesses 
in American public school practices. The disregard for intellectual 
standards, life adjustment education, moral decay, curriculum set by 
student whim, projects and narrow vocational preparation, conformity to 
group value s--each of these educationally questionable approaches are 
the result of the Deweyan pragmatic philosophy. 
Albert Lynd said Dewey was the founder of progressive education 
and that all progressive innovations flow out of the basic Deweyan ed-
ucational philosophy. Anti-intellectualism, disregard for subject matter, 
democracy which emphasizes equality without re9ard for individual 
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differences or capacities, narrow v9cational concerns, grade school 
curriculum based on the felt-needs of the child, and a philosophy lack-
ing in moral and intellectual values--all these approaches to educational 
thought and practice grow out of Dewey• s philosophical orientation. 
H. G. Rickover said that human survival is in the hands of the 
educational enterprise but the public school is in a sad state of cultural 
lag due to the pervasive influence of the educational philosophy of John 
Dewey •. As a result of the Deweyan philosophy "real education" has been 
replaced by a curriculum where childhood's free expression is the rule, 
activity in terms of gross bodily movement is the norm, narrow vocational 
preparation is the means of providing training for everyone, mediocrity is 
the standard, and the pursuit of excellence has been completely disre-
garded in the life adjustment program of conditioning. 
Redden and Ryan asserted that progressive education is simply the 
implementation of John Dewey's "Instrumentalism." They suggested that 
Dewey is responsible for emphasis on curriculum development based on 
"felt-needs" of the student, personal interests, and immediate satis-
faction with the consequent disregard for subject matter and deferred 
values. 
Robert M. Hutchins said that Dewey is responsible for child-cen-
tered education and narrow utilitarian vocational concerns which have 
resulted in proliferation of the curriculum. This has been done, said 
Hutchins, on the pretext of providing democratic education for the masses. 
These unwarranted educational innovations, which have made a wasteland 
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of public school education, are the direct result of the failure of progres-
sivism to provide a solid fundamental philosophy. Because Dewey's 
thought stands behind progressivism and Dewey does not have an authentic 
basic philosophy, progressivism is left without a foundation. The anti~ 
intellectualism in American education is the outgrowth of a philosophy of 
education without intellectual support from a sound fundamental philosophy. 
The contemporary critics in their attack on American public school 
education and their equation of Dewey with unwarranted educational inno-
vation criticized four basic areas--democratic education, activity, interest 
and subject matter. 
In the third chapter an attempt was made to ascertain the re liability 
of the critics' assertion that John Dewey's educational philosophy had no 
foundation in an authentic fundamental philosophy. The critics assumed 
that Dewey's view of reality was inadequate because it was set in the frame-
work of constantly changing experience centered process. Such a process, 
they said, was without form or structure. 
An analysis of Deweyan philosophy, contrary to the critics allega-· 
tion, revealed that Dewey does indeed present an authentic basic philo-
sophical orientation. His metaphysical views, it was seen, grew out of 
his methodological approach. Reflective inquiry, necessitated by problem 
situations, culminate in objects of knowledge. On the basis of examina-
tion of the process of reflective thought and the objects of knowledge pro-
duced by quantitative relational implementation of the process--Dewey 
made some assumptions about reality or nature. 
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Dewey approached the problem of philosophy and life from a common-
sense view of experience, Experience is the active-passive encounter 
which the organism faces in environmental situations. Experience of things 
and events are immediate and non-cognitive, In experience difficulties 
develop when the harmonious relations between an organism and its en-
vironment is broken, Reflective thinking-·-through the process of inquiry 
--pinpoints the problem, projects possible solution, hypothesizes answers 
and checks for experimental verification. Successful solutions are habit-· 
ua lly used in similar instances. However, when man is challenged by 
nove 1 situations which move beyond the particular situation to more gen-
eral ones--there is a need for a scientific methodology. Scientific meth-
odology abstracts qualitative factors from nature and sets them in quantita-
tive relationships which form the basis for objects of knowledge, Object:, 
of knowledge are logical constructs disHnct from the original subject mat·-
ter of experience but verifiable by recourse to experimental examination 
in the experiential situi:;l.tion. 
Dewey pointed out that the ends of inquiry reveal termina 1 points 
from which qualitatively distinctive elements may be ascertained. On the 
basis of these distinctive qualitative elements which reveal certain struc·-
tural elements in nature--Dewey makes a metaphysical assumption. The 
gross (non-cognitive) subject matter of experience (nature) possesses 
qualities which are in any given process of inquiry terminal or structured 
in such a way as to be amenable to qua:1titat.ive relational abstraction. 
Nature may change but it is not a fluid unstructured change, In the con-
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tinuum of experience, Dewey says, there are points whi.ch are relatively 
fixed at a given moment. This permanence provides the basis for verifica-
tion, on the one hand, and by a process of interaction provides the content 
which undergoes transformation, on the other. 
The discussion of Dewey's value theory pointed out that his moral 
philosophy, contrary to the critic's charge, provides for deferred values. 
The meaning of value, for Dewey, was seen to be in terms of guidelines 
or projections for future moral choices. A value is a proposed activity 
(end-in-view) which will lead to a good action. A good action is the sat·-
isfactory termination to a moral problem oriented situation. Values, in 
contrast to goods which are already completed, are estimates of what will 
be good in the future . 
The nature of philosophy, for Dewey, is to provide for use of scien-
tific method and data--via the process of inquiry--to dea 1 with the problems 
of human preference. Philosophy is a value oriented discipline in contrast 
to science which is fact oriented. 
In chapter four the discussion of John Dewey's educational philosophy 
established the contention that Dewey was no radical innovator in educa-
tional practices, He made no attempt to cast aside the cultural heritage 
or disciplined study. However, while recognizing the value of funded 
human experience and the necessity of its transmission-·-Dewey reacted 
to what he considered the unrealistic manner in which traditional educa-
tors separated subject matter from student life. Education, he said, must 
be lived to be vital. Not all education is equally valid. The criterion of 
educational efficiency is the capacity of educational experience to produce 
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growth, Educationa 1 growth is the living out, in a dynamic experiential 
situation, of various aspects of the funded experience of the race. Educa-
tiona 1 growth takes place only through the dynamic interaction between 
student and environment. On the basis of this approach, contrary to the 
critic's assertion, Dewey said that not just any experience produces edu-
cational growth, Efficiency in transmission of the cultural heritage comes 
about when a teacher-·thoroughly in command of the intellectual heritage 
of the race--guides the young through patterns of growth in self-realized 
experiential situations, Dewey means by growth--the capacity of the in-
dividual to project ends-in-view, and then on the basis of intelligent ac-· 
tion and reaction, resulting from practiced ability in the art of reflective 
inquiry, to reach the goal or educational value. Such growth does not 
mean undirected activity but a developing capacity to deal successfully 
with richer and more meaningful areas of life both now and in the future. 
Dewey's view of Democracy is not naively equa litarian--nor does it 
advocate narrow vacationa lism to insure education for the masses. Man, 
to Dewey, is a social being who realizes himself most fully when the in-
terests of the groups are shared by all its members. Ideas in society must 
be shared to be vital. Dewey felt that democracy could best be realized 
if people, in small groups, interacted with each other for the purpose of 
communicating their thoughts and feelings. Problems of society are amen-
able to intellectual procedures just the same as problems of any individual 
person. Interaction of the group is impeded when its members are isolated 
according to so-called intellectual capacities into labor forces (vocational 
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job tralning) and intellectual professions (via liberal arts). 
Critics equate Dewey with pictures of school room practices where 
children are running about doing whatever strikes their fancy. Dewey never 
advocated activity simply for the sake of gross bodily movement. Merely 
being actively engaged in pleasant pastime does not necessarily consti-
tute valid educational experience, Experience is the key concept in an 
attempt to understand what Dewey means by activity, The controlling in-
fluence on activity is always the problematic situation, Out of interaction 
which results from attempting to relieve an imbalance in the environment 
--there is of necessity activity. Activity is educationally meaningful only 
when it connects the individual to factors in his environment which lead 
to resolution of experienced difficulties. Activity is the intellectual in-
volvement of the organism in the pursuit of solution to experienced prob-
lems. 
The original experience is non-cognitive but when in the course of 
living customary responses do not resolve encountered difficulties-- the 
organism actively engages the experienced difficulty through inquiry, In 
the process of inquiry the problem is crystalized, hypotheses (ideas) are 
formulated and tested intellectually through projection and finally tested 
for validity in experimental examination, It is clear that Dewey never 
meant activity to mean pleasant pastime--although the activity of inquiry 
may itself be pleasant. Nor did Dewey suggest that the school is the place 
where just any activity goes on. School activity is always problem ori-. 
ented with a purpose or goal-in-view, in the Dewey educational philosophy. 
183 
Dewey reacted to theories of interest which separated the organism 
from the thing which supposedly possesses interest. Interest is not ex-
ternal--it is an inherent part of what we call aim or purpose. Interest is 
not capricious--it is goal directed. Interest, involved as it is with goal 
directed activity, is equivalent to acting with a mind. Acting with a mind 
is the capacity of the organism to refer present conditions to future conse-
quences. Interest is that which moves the organism along to the fulfilment 
of its aims. Dewey says that in a real sense aim and mind are two sides 
of the same coin because aim is to act with meaning. 
Forced interest, for Dewey, is a contradiction. Interest means that 
the self and world are engaged in a developing situation. To be interested 
is to absorbed in a situation. Discipline is that capacity of interest to 
persist toward a goal in spite of intervening obstacles. Dewey escaped 
the interest-effort dilemma by identifying the self with the developing 
growing organism in search of fulfilment through goal directed activity. 
Educational aims are not separate from the individual but part of the de-
veloping process. The self is a unity to the extent that the organism in-
corporates and relates previous meanings, but it is in the process of be-
coming in the sense that ends are anticipated beyond the present experi-
enced terminals. The educators task is to guide the student into an involve-
ment with the ends of previous inquiry (the cultural heritage) in such a way 
that the student sees the aim as his own. 
Dewey's view of subject matter reacts to traditional views which 
approached subject matter as something external which is presented to the 
184 
"mind" of man to be mastered because it is the intelligible essence of the 
world, The Deweyan approach to subject matter is based on the assump-
tion that knowledge is the result of the organism interacting through in-
quiry with the environment. In this approach subject matter and method 
are separable only in classification for convenience. Therefore, for Dewey, 
attention is not exclusively given to the outcome of inquiry butt.he approach 
is made from significant experiential situations which wiJl draw the student 
intelligently into a quest for knowledge. 
Dewey's view of subject matter revolves around his conception of 
growth and educational experience, Growth means the successful involve-
ment of the organism in a problem situation which in turn becomes a means 
to further growth. Valid educational experience sets the pattern by prepar-
ing situations in which growth toward the fulfilment of educationa 1 ends 
may be·· realized. Logically arranged subject matter is the teachers organi-
zation of terminations of previous inquiry which represents potential ex-
perience for the student. Logically arranged subject matter is the teacher's 
orientation--it is not yet the experiential status of the student until the 
pupil becomes involved in the processes of thought which call for imple-
mentation of the subject matter. 
The critics have been unfair in thei.r suggestion that Dewey gives no 
consideration to subject matter. The tension between Dewey and the critics 
is in the area of emphasis, Traditionalists place emphasis on content to 
be mastered, Dewey felt that content becomes meaningful only when ex-
perienced. Such experience involves the dynamic interation between stu-· 
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dent and environment. Both aspects are important in the Deweyan approach. 
In the fifth chapter the educational philosophy of William Heard Kil-
patrick was considered as a possible source of Deweyite practices. Kil-
patrick was a noted student and interpreter of John Dewey. In some of his 
interpretations Kilpatrick went beyond the pronouncements of Dewey and 
developed his own unique philosophy of education. It was in the area of 
purely Kilpatrickan views that the source of some erroneous Deweyite 
practices were discovered. 
Kilpatrick felt that social pressure is essential to conform the stu-
dent into the values of democratic society. Dewey recognized the value 
of social institutions but in contrast to Kilpatrick' s emphasis on conformity 
to existing institutions--Dewey argued that society is a forum in which 
intelligent interactions leads to patterns of creative development. Dewey 
considered the institutions of society to be environmental factors which 
interact with individuals in problems of a social nature. Criticisms of 
practices advocating social pressure is clearly a view of Kilpatrick. 
Kilpatrick is close to the Italian educator Montessori--not Dewey--· 
in his view of activity which asserts that the inner nature of the child fixes 
the aim of education and furnishes the inner motivation. Criticisms of the 
hands-off policy of the schools finds a source in Kilpatrick. 
Dewey recognized interest to be an integral aspect of the educational 
aim. On this basis discipline was seen to be the organisms persistent 
effort to reach its goal in spite of intervening difficulties. Kilpatrick felt 
that interest was in the child or that the ch.ild had an interest in things. 
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Such interest, he said was transferable. Dewey never placed interest in 
things, Interest was always, for Dewey, an integral part of the aim of a 
person which grows out of the interaction between the organism and the 
environment, 
Kilpatrick emphasized "felt needs" of the child as legitimate factors 
in curriculum development. Dewey had said that the individual integrate~, 
data (subject matter) as a means to the solution of problems growing out 
of the interactive process. Kilpatrick said the inner nature or desires of 
the child should set the pattern for the educational enterprise. The tension 
between Dewey and Kilpatrick is clear--Dewey pointed out that educationa 1 
problems grow out of encountered difficulties artfully instigated by the 
school--Kil.patrick suggests that "felt needs" of the student sets the goal. 
Criticisms directed at formulating the curriculum on the basis of childish 
whim is clearly a position advocated by Kilpatrick. 
The discussion in chapter six revealed that there is no causal rela-
tionship between Dewey's educational philosophy and what the critics caJ.l 
democratic education--stressing life adjustment education; school activ-
ity--emphasizing gross bodily movement; interest--in terms of doing what 
the child thinks he wants to do; and anti-intellectualism-unconcern over 
subject matter. 
Besides William Heard Kilpatrick there was a group of radica 1 pro-
gressives who denied any affinity to Dewey but whose views were equated 
with him. These radical progressives share responsibility for the extreme 
educationa 1 innovations considered in this discussion. 
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In attempting to delineate these sources of Deweyite educational 
philosophy the meaning of several terms was defined, Progressivism was 
seen to be a movement in American education where the child and his in.,.. 
terests were given emphasis. Some progressives became extremely radical 
and denied the importance of the cultural heritage·--they assumed that child 
nature set the exclusive ai.m of education, Romanticism was defined in 
terms of a view of child nature which states that the child is capable of 
unfolding completely from within without external guidance or control, 
Psychoanalytics has reference to views of human nature (Freudian in 
source) which suggests that behavior originates from instinctual energy 
and that inhibition of such energy leads to personality difficulty, 
There was tension between Dewey and the radical progressives, 
Margaret Naumberg said the psychoanalists, with their subjective explana-
tion of behavior, were closer to the truth than Dewey, who had explained 
behavior in terms of an interaction between subjective (organism) and ob~ 
jective (environment) factors, The tension between Dewey and the radical 
progressives was evident in the views of activity which each advocated. 
Dewey had said that activity is an integral part of the process of reflec-
tive thinking which leads to knowledge. The radical progressives (Dewey-
ites) said the child's essential nature is brought to fruition through activ~· 
ity, Inhibition of felt needs (which demand free expression) leads to dam-
age of the child's emotional nature. Feeling for the Deweyite is a surer 
guide to reality than the intellectual process outlined by Dewey. 
Growth for Dewey was seen to be in terms of satisfactory solutions 
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to problem oriented situations which bring meaningful connections to the 
inquiring student. Growth for the radical progressive (Deweyite) was seen 
to be the uninhibited flowering of the child's inherent nature. This flower-
ing proceeds naturally when not disturbed by outside interference. When 
such interference occurs, before the child has reached a pre-ordained 
level, great harm may be done to the delicate flower of nature. Conse-
quently, activity--for the Deweyite--must be undirected if nature's goal 
is to be fulfilled. Dewey, by way of contrast, said the task of the school 
is to bring the cultural heritage into meaningful situations in which (through 
interaction) the child integrates and makes the meanings of past experi-
ence his own. Robert M. Hutchins, H. G. Rickover, and Redden and Ryan, 
misinterpreted Dewey's view of activity to mean gross bodily movement. 
They assumed that Dewey conceived of such gross activity as being es-
sential to the child's inherent nature without respect to objective (outside) 
forces. 
Deweyite theories of interest grew out of sources in early radical 
progressivism based on a philosophical orientation arising out of romanti-
cism. The Deweyite separated the object of interest from the individual 
self or organism. Interest is inherent and ready made in the organism at 
the various levels of development, according to the Deweyites. Therefore 
child interest exclusively motivated from within should govern the educa-
tor's choice of subject matter. Some of the Deweyites argued that subject 
matter, beyond the persona 1 demands of the child is not needed. Child in-
terest should set the complete content of the activities of the school, Naum-
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berg, said child interest can be completely trusted. Adolph Ferrie re dis-
couraged teacher guidance. He said the school program must follow the 
dominant interests of the child. The child's essential nature should al-
ways be the moving force in the development of the curriculum. 
In contrast to the exclusive stress on inner springs of action and 
child nature--Dewey, while not unmindful of the child's basic drives, em-
phasized that educational growth is not exclusively the subjective unfold-
ing of inherent nature but intellectual progress in terms of the cultural aims 
being incorporated by the student (through teacher guidance) into his own 
aims and interests. Mortimer Smith erroneously claimed that Dewey is re-
sponsible for trends in public school education which have attempted to form 
the curriculum around the immediate interests of the child--catering to 
what the student thinks he wants. 
The Deweyite theories of activity and interest are correlated with a 
particular view of subject matter; It is based on an assumption of human 
nature which stresses the inherent powers of the individual. Such inherent 
powers are capable of full development even when the individual is isolated 
from society. The aim of education is inherent in the child, Therefore, 
the spontaneous active interest of the child should be the sole guide in 
curriculum formulation. Hughes Mearns says subject matter has had a 
detrimental effect on child nature. Logical consecutively arranged subject 
matter militates, he says, against the free expression of the child's own 
interests. Mangravite and Ferriere said the child must be absolutely free 
to externaHze instincts. Dewey, in contrast to the Deweyite approach, 
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said every child is capable of genuine cognitive experience. Subject mat.,. 
ter for Dewey, in contrast to the Deweyite, is the necessary raw material 
for learning which the student uses in the process of reflective thought. 
The contract between Dewey and the Deweyites view of subject matter 
has as its basic source of tension the fundamental difference in philo-
sophical orientation. The Deweyite assumes that knowledge is grasped 
intuitively and immediately. Dewey says knowledge, in the emphatic 
sense, is always at the conclusion of a process of reflective inquiry. 
H, G. Rickover said Dewey made no place for logically arranged 
subject matter in the content of education. He said Dewey just wanted 
the child to express itself freely. Mortimer Smith also equated Dewey 
with the Deweyites when he said Dewey neglected the cultural tradition. 
The contemporary critics were vocal in their equation of democratic 
education, conceived in terms of the life adjustment education, with the 
education philosophy of John Dewey. However, it was seen that life ad-
justment education came as a result of the work of an educator named 
Charles Prosser. Life adjustment education was inaugerated for those 
students who supposedly lacked mental capacity to profit from the college 
preparatory course of the traditiona 1 secondary school. The curriculum 
of life adjustment education has been in terms of narrow utilitarian voca-
tional training. Dewey, by way of contrast, recognized the intellectual 
aspects of practical pursuits. He felt strongly that narrow vocational 
training militated against studies which involved the student in an appre-
ciation for the cultural heritage and perpetuated the false dicotemy between 
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the practical and intellectual. 
The critics said Dewey was responsible for what they considered to 
be inadequate teacher training schools. Such schools, they said, major 
in methods and neglect content. It was observed that in a committee re-
port on higher education at Rollins College (John Dewey as Chairman) 
great stress was laid on thorough comprehension of the disciplines of the 
culture as expressed in the so-called "libera 1 arts," 
H. G. Rickover talked about the "bare intellectual backsides" of 
life adjustment education which he said was the child of Deweyan philos·-
ophy of education, However, Dewey's philosophy of education calls for 
vigorous intellectual pursuit within the framework of the reflective process 
of inquiry, 
Conclusions 
Without attempting to suggest the extent to which radical progres·~ 
sive innovations in American public school education has influenced the 
schools--this analysis has accepted the contemporary critics assertion 
that such innovation have to some extent been practiced in some American 
schools, However, there has been a denial of the contemporary critics' 
unfair equation of John Dewey"s educaUonal philosophy with these inno-
vations. There has also been a denial of the assertion that Dewey fails 
to present an authentic basic philosophy, On the basis of the evidence 
presented the following conclusions appear warranted, 
Fundamenta 1 Philosophy 
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The contemporary critics have alleged that John Dewey does not pre-
sent a valid fundamental philosophy. The evidence presented clearly shows 
that such an assertion is possible only if metaphysical, epistemological 
and axiological considerations are defined in such a limited way as to ex-
clude the Deweyan approach and then suggest, as does Hutchins, that 
Dewey's orientation does not warrant the name philosophy. The basis for 
criticism of Dewey, from this approach, is intellectually suspect. A sys-
tem of thought should be judged and criticized by attacking its basic as-
sumptions--not by assigning it to limbo because it fails to satisfy the 
criterion of a rival philosophical approach. Dewey presents an authentic 
theory of reality, knowledge and value. 
(1) Dewey's metaphysical assumptions present a world view set 
within the framework of human experience. His view of reality develops 
out of an acceptance of an environment where the common sense observa-
tions are taken at face value and where the organism and the environment 
interact dynamically. Contrary to traditional philosophy, Dewey attempted 
to build his world view on the basis of assumptions exclusively re lated to 
man's experience. "Experience" is his fundamenta 1 metaphysical concep-
tion. His view of experience is not a fact--it is an assumption--there-
fore metaphysical in the sense that it is beyond validation in terms of 
scientific proof. Dewey's metaphysica 1 assumption of "experience" in-
volves a methodologica 1 approach to that whi.ch is experienced. The ex-
perienced nature i.s non-cognitive but possesses qualitative features. The 
experience of an organism is in its original state non~cognitive--it just is. 
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However, when experiences of an organism in its interaction with its en-
vironment becomes confused and difficulties arise--the human organism, 
possessed with intelligence, uses the techniques of reflective inquiry to 
resolve the situation. The solution becomes the habitual response of the 
organism in similar situations. 
Two metaphysical points have emerged from Dewey's world view (a) 
the non-cognitive but qualitative elements of nature are experienced by 
the organism in the flow of experience; (b) the active-passive interaction 
(experience) between the organism and its environment provides the basis 
for the processes of inquiry. 
(2) Dewey's view of knowledge is set within the framework of the 
experience continuum. Knowledge is never immediate or given. Knowl-
edge is the result of a quest. It grows out of a problem situation which 
has been mediated by inquiry and verified in experience. Habitual solu-
tions are satisfactory in specific situations. However, in order to move 
beyond isolated solutions to answers of a scientific nature--man abstracts 
the qualitative factors from nature ahd forms quantitative relational con-
cepts which become objects of knowledge. Objects of knowledge based 
on quantitative relational factors have a more universal application to 
novel problems arising in experience than does habitual response based on 
isolated solutions. 
Knowledge for Dewey is never immediate--it grows out of the process 
of inquiry when this process is used as a scientific methodology--via 
quantitative relational generalization. The proposed object of knowledge 
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becomes knowledge when it yields and continues to yield satisfactory 
consequences to problems in various experiential situations. 
(3) Dewey presents an objective theory of knowledge and value. 
He defines the true and/or good in terms of ideas which have been tested 
and have yielded satisfactory consequences. The term true is used to 
describe satisfactory ideas. The term good has reference to ideas which 
have been tested in moral and human problems. Good actions are those 
which have already led to satisfactory consequences, Values are projec-
tions of what will be good or preferable in the future. Values are ends-in-
view. Therefore, contrary to the critics a~rnertion that Dewey neglected 
consideration of deferred val ues--future preference based on intelligent 
projected satisfactory consequences is the very heart of Dewey's value 
theory. The allegation that Dewey does not present an authentic funda-
mental philosophy is not warranted by the facts. Such an assertion is 
possible only if philosophy is defined in terms which exclude the Deweyc;l.n 
approach. 
Philosophy of Education 
Four areas have been discussed in which Dewey's educational 
philosophy has been equated, by the critics, with Deweyite practices--
democratic education, activity, interest and subject matt.er. Evidence has 
b~en presented in each case which shows clearly that this has been a 
false equation. 
(1) Democratic Education 
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The contemporary critics allege that John Dewey's educational phil-
osophy is the source of life adjustment education and that Dewey's view 
of democratic education may be equated with the narrow utilitarian voca-
tional aims of the life adjustment approach. Evidence has been clearly 
presented whicl.1, exonerates Dewey of this charge, 
Charles Prosser was the father of life adjustment education, Prosser 
and his associates were of the opinion that the majority of the school pop-
ulation could not profit from secondary school curriculum which has been 
primarily adapted to preparation for college. Prosser and the life adjust.,. 
ment movement perpetuated the traditional dicotomy, or as Dewey said the 
false dualism, between the practial arts and intellectual pursuits, Life 
adjustment educators argued that since the majority of secondary school 
students could not profit from intellectual pursuits--and in a democracy 
everyone has a right to education--then the curriculum should be expanded 
to meet the needs of these students, The expansion was based on the 
most obvious need--that of making a livelihood and with it was coupled a 
conditioning program in which attitudes necessary to democratic life were 
to be developed. 
John Dewey's view of democratic education does not fit in the nar-
row patterns of vocational training or attitude conditioning. He reacted 
to the false division between practical and intellectual pursuits, He said 
there is no intellectual discontinuity between producing commodities and 
significant knowledge of a cultural variety, He said we perpetuate the 
false dualism when we separate those who do menial tasks in industry 
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(prepared in vocational trade schools) from the scientists and intelligensia 
who deal with ideas (educated in the traditional knowledge disciplines}. 
Modern educators (Ufe adjustment people) fail to see, Dewey argues, that 
changing the public sentiment to a feeling that labor is dignified does not 
bridge the traditional gap between the practical and liberal pursuits. The 
idea is still current that a truly liberal education cannot be on a common 
footing with industrial affairs. Vocational training with the consequent 
doing of useful things is thought to be a second-best-undertaking for in-
ferior minds. This is clearly the approach of life adjustment education 
which Dewey denies. Dewey argued that intelligence is the bringing to 
bear of the reflective process of inquiry on any type of problem. The solu-
tion of any problem is intellectually oriented. And since man is a social 
being--his problems are socially conditioned. True democratic education, 
for Dewey, is the involvement of the masses in problems which have sig-
nigicant meaning for the group at large.- Dewey thought that students--
regardless of native intellectual capacity--must have the opportunity to 
make connections with the past (cultural heritage) in order to make mean-
ingful connections and solve new problems in the future. 
The critics are wrong in equating life adjustment education with 
John Dewey. His entire philosophy of education militates againi;;t narrow 
utilitarian vocationalism in the name of democratic education. 
(2) Activity 
The contemporary critics assumed that because Dewey talked about 
children being active creatures that he advocated uninhibited self-expres.-
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sion. · It has been observed that this is the view of the Deweyites. Dewey-
ites, as previously considered, are educators imbued with an educational 
philosophy inspired by romanticism. A philosophy which, as defined in 
this presentation, suggests that the inner nature of the child sets the pat-
terns of uninhibited growth. Educational growth to the Deweyite comes 
through the flowering of inherent nature which is realized when the child 
is free and active. 
Growth is a key concept in the educational philosophy of John Dewey 
but it does not mean undirected activity. Growth, for Dewey, is predi-
cated on the involvement and satisfactory solution of problems (directed 
by the teacher)--in which the student recognizes an experienced difficulty 
in his persona 1 fulfilment. Such a view of growth demands a special kind 
of educational experience, An experience in which the student can see 
the difficulty for hims elf, formulate it into a problem, propose solutions 
and validate the idea. The criterion of growth--developing out of a prob-
lem situation--is the capaci.ty of the solution to provide satisfactory con~ 
sequences which will be both immediately applicable and provj_de adequate 
means to deal successfully with future difficulties, Growth is not a dead·-
end but that which provides a foundation for more growth or fulfilment of 
purposeful activity. 
Not just any activity is purposeful or conducive to growth, Much 
activity, in and out of school, is mis-educative because it is not condu-
cive to broader fulfilment--m eaningful experiences or grm,vth~-in the future, 
The critics are wrong in equating Dewey with a view of activity which 
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fosters gross bodily movement and provides for undirected growth. Activ-
ity is an integral part, for Dewey, of meaningful problem solving and 
knowledge. 
(3) Interest 
The contemporary critics assume that Dewey's theory of interest 
states that the interests of the child are fixed and final within the frame-
work of a pre-ordained level of natural development. On this bases, the 
child is the sole guide to the educational process. They further assume 
that because child interest is the criterion of the curriculum, in Deweyite 
educational philosophy, that Dewey was not interested in the intellectual 
heritage of the race. It has been shown that each of these assumptions 
were not Dewey's but the result of Deweyite educational thought. 
Dewey never placed interest exclusively in either objects or persons. 
Interest, for Dewey, is essentially what we mean when we say a person 
has an aim. An aim is that which holds a person steady in the face of 
opposition or difficulties. Difficulties intervene as the person seeks the 
fulfilment of his goal in the process of inquiry. Interest or aim provides 
the needed discipline which leads through difficulty to fulfilment. 
The critics claimed that Dewey advocated the necessity of catering 
to any childish whim or supposed interest. This is not consistent with 
Dewey's interest theory. His interest theory is set in the framework of 
the organism involved in an interaction with the environment where a 
problem has developed. The organism has set a goal or solution and 
through the process of reflective inquiry is involved in the fulfilment of 
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the goal or solution of the problem, Satisfactory consequences which bring 
fulfilment of purposes and aims--not immediate satisfaction--is the cri-
terion of the Deweyan interest theory. 
(4) Subject-Matter 
The contemporary critics claimed that Dewey's phHosophy of educa-
tion failed to provide intelligent standards because Dewey disregarded the 
value of subject matter. The critics meant by subject matter--mastery of 
a body of "objective truth" not necessarily related to the present life of 
the student. 
Dewey, contrary to the allegation, placed strong emphasis on mean-
ingful subject matter. He advocated a firm grounding in the intellectua 1 
heritage of race, But Dewey did not believe that the wisdom of the ages 
could be taken in capsule form (subjects)--disassociated from the life of 
the student--and immediately transferable to the problems of adult life 
when the child grew up. 
Knowledge, for Dewey, like life is the result of a quest and must 
be lived to be effective. Knowledge, therefore, is not a body of truth ob-
jectively discovered or immediately apprehended by the mind. Scientific 
knowledge came into existence as the verified solution to a problem ori-
ented process of inquiry. Such knowledge may be crystallized into vari-
ous subject matter disciplines for classification purposes. However, 
such knowledge is meaningless to the student unless he becomes involved 
in an experiential--problem oriented--situation where the need and purpa; e 
for the knowledge is connected to him in a personal manner--and it becomes 
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his problem. 
This is the basis of Dewey• s reaction to traditional approaches to 
subject matter. He did not deny knowledge or the cultural heritage but 
the thing he objected to was the fruitless orientation through which the 
student was introduced to knowledge. 
The student, Dewey said, ·must experience the subject matter--the 
perplexity which originally led to inquiry must in some sense challenge 
the student. Then fonnulating the problem as his own--and directed by a 
teacher with a rich background in the field--the student is led through the 
intellecuta 1 processes to a meaningful solution--a fulfilment or growth. 
The subject matter is the raw material used intelligently by the student 
in the solution of his problems--problematic situations set up by the 
teacher for the express purpose of guiding the student into the knowledge 
of the race. Such an approach equips the student with disciplined use of 
the process of inquiry which will enable the student to deal creatively with 
problems in the future wherever they might arise. 
Subject matter and method are inseparably re lated in the Dewey an 
approach. Method is simply the manner in which subject matter is used 
in the experiential situation. Subject matter is not, for Dewey, a body 
of truth to be mastered and filed for future refere nee. Subject matter is 
the data used by the student--but logically arranged and put at his dis-
posal by the teacher--in the quest for solutions of problems in educational 
situations set up by the school. Subject matter is the material or data 
used as a means to build a purpose or goal. Each facet in the process of 
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inqufry i.s so entwined as to present a unity of growth and fulfilment. 
The critic is wrong in his equation of Dewey with views of the cir-
riculum set by the whim of the child and the consequent allegation that 
Dewey was anti-intellectual. Dewey's philosophy of education provided 
for a logically organized subject matter which could be drawn upon by the 
student in the pursuit of meaningful problem-oriented experiences. 
The evidence presented in his dissertaUon has shown that there is 
no validity in the contemporary critics' equation of John Dewey's educa-
tiona 1 philosophy with the unwarranted educational innovations of the 
Deweyites. Dewey's educationa 1 philosophy is an intellectually respon-
sible attempt to provide a rationale for the educational enterprise. It has 
an authentic fundamental source in the philosophy of "Instrumenta lism," 
and deals in a creative manner with the pervasive educational problems 
of our time. 
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